John, Clark,  List:

> On Mar 9, 2016, at 1:59 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
> 
> List, <>
>  
> Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the 
> best explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
> abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from 
> which the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not 
> be a good explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation 
> to carry out inquiry responsibly. 

The simple question arises:
If an abductive step is taken by the inquirer, then what?

For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide the 
informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this abductive 
object and move through the inferential steps needed to generate a valid 
argument? 

Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed to extend 
(in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index to the 
(telelogical?) goal of the inquirer?

Cheers

Jerry 







>  
> From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
> Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
> To: Peirce List
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry
>  
>  
> On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net 
> <mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:
>  
> Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best 
> explanation”.
> That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it 
> has
> led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like “inference
> to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a concept
> that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor
> is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
> a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.
>  
> I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to the 
> best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems 
> to get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable. I’d 
> argue that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation he’s 
> much more after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. (Although I’d 
> have to go through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to the texts)
>  
>  
> 
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