> On Mar 10, 2016, at 12:14 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > > To me, we are talking about whether Feyerabend or Peirce can offer a definite > suggestion on how to proceed if we are frozen with respect to advancing on a > problem. To say there’s no systematic way to proceed is antithetical to > Peirce, who offers abduction, a very definite formalism that asks you to be > explicit about three things, the icon (C), index (A) and symbol (B) and to > consider them in relation according to CP 5.189.
I’m not sure those are as antithetical as people are presenting them. Peirce here is extremely vague and Feyerabend is being intentionally provocative to get people to look past the biases that had arisen in thinking about science. What Peirce presents is far less a method than a set of concerns to keep in mind as one approaches the problem. It’s far from a systematic approach IMO. Whereas I’m far from convinced Feyerabend would dispute we need focus on the things Peirce brings up. (Perhaps that’s because I don’t know as much Feyerabend as the rest of you probably do though - when I read him though he always just seems to be engaging in a bit of hyperbole to get people to question their biases) > The possibilities are simply too numerous. This is why I think talking about these things in this fashion is ultimately unhelpful. Science has its biases towards things like beauty and simplicity. But of course what is important in science is a while lot of people each with somewhat different biases and a bias towards what works. Yet in general, if only because of background training, there are also a slew of issues they keep in mind that often are in tension with each other.
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
