Thanks for that John. Very well explained. I realize this might be putting a can of soda next to the most expensive wine but why phi spiral and not M51? What part does collateral knowledge play in interpretation? I can say that the question really doesn't matter because it will not affect the actual experiments one executes but as for the consequences of what phi spiral instead of M51 means, that is a lot. It affects who pays attention. Philosophers and crystallographers, for instance...and psychologists and educators...
Watson's recognition of the double helix is clearly described in his book. He makes a big deal of it. It was a recognition that Franklin did not possess. The discovery of the double helix led to a HUGE transformation in science. If you don't hold this to be a Kuhnian paradigm, I'm not sure what qualifies. Relativity, I can't speak on. Way over my head, so I will trust what you say. Best, Jerry R On Sat, Mar 12, 2016 at 11:00 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > Jerry, Clark, List, > > > > I think there are no cases in which we have what Kuhn called revolutionary > science (paradigm shift) that operate through normal science. There is no > great truth to this, though; it is a matter of definition. There are cases > that might be considered transformative, such as the discovery of the > method of operation of the lac operon, that have been called paradigm > shifts, but when I looked at them they merely opened up an unexpected area > of science, or else showed that some prior widely or universally accepted > belief, such as the Central Dogma of DNA, was false, or both. But these > cases were not revolutionary in Kuhn’s sense because they did not involve > translation problems or disagreements about the interpretation of specific > observations. These result when there is a failure of shared implicit > assumptions (tacit knowledge) in the interpretations of theories’ bearing > on the evidence. Kuhn puts it down to a failure of shared principles within > a specific range of desiderata for theories, which come out in differing > exemplars and what he called “preferred analogies”. In the cases I have > looked at there was a resolution only once these unshared assumptions were > teased out and put into a common framework that did not previously exist. > For example, to compare Newtonian theory with General Relativity we need > something at least as strong as Weyl’s affine geometry, which was invented > well after General Relativity was proposed (though the basis was in > Reimannnian geometry and in Poincaré’s work on the conventionality of the > metric, both of which were pre-Einstein, but were regarded more as > mathematical curiosities than possible geometries for space, let alone > spacetime). There were major physicists as late as 1931 who rejected the > basics of relativity theory as nonsensical, and took a Lorenzian > interpretation instead, the 1919 eclipse observations notwithstanding (they > could be explained in a Lorenzian way – no need for this General Relativity > foolishness). > > > > I do not know, and much less have studied the phi spiral case you mention, > but your description led me to believe that the transformation was more > like the lac operon or the soma to gene cases I mentioned above as cases of > transformational but normal science. > > > > There is some vagueness about the limits of normal science, because our > understanding of anything we use is only partially explicable by us, and > different people at a given time can be better or worse at this. So my > standard for there being a common interpretation (framework) at a given > time is the whole scientific community and not the specific understanding > of specific scientists. > > > > Right now there is no common representation theorem for particle theories > and plenum theories, so the two can’t be compared and judged against each > other at the present time. We may eventually be able to do this, but it > might also be logically impossible. In that case we might never be able to > understand quantum mechanics, and the solution I proposed for judging > scientific progress cumulatively would fail. But perhaps we could > eventually show that the distinction between particle and plenum theories > was based on a conceptual error, and that the idea that they are different > was just a mistake, with our understanding in both cases being flawed. That > would permit my sort of solution. I take it that the General Relativistic > resolution of the bucket experiment was of this sort; both Newton’s and > Mach’s approaches were conceptually flawed, and there couldn’t really be > any competition between them, as neither was well-formed as an explanation. > Nonetheless, there were people on both sides who thought that one or the > other or both made sense for centuries, let alone decades, and that they > were in real competition. > > > > This is why, though I agree with Clark about the positive aspects of the > Pragmatic Maxim, I think the negative aspect I pointed to is important in > this sort of context. Very smart people can be deluded about whether what > they believe actually makes sense. I don’t think this is a normal > condition, though. We often do have ideas about the world that are both > coherent and accurate. And we can discover bad ones and dispose of them. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate > > University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Saturday, 12 March 2016 4:30 AM > > *To:* John Collier > *Cc:* Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; Clark Goble > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, > Inquiry > > > > John, > > You're saying there is no case where transformative science operates > through normal science? > > If it's simply a matter of coordinating the proper joint problem space and > convincing experts to see that space (eros), then phi spiral abduction has > it in spades. But the truth is in the future. So, let's wait... :) > > Best, > > Jerry Rhee > > > > On Fri, Mar 11, 2016 at 2:04 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > Jerry, > > > > The example I gave (bucket experiment) involved genuine doubt about what > at least some (e.g., Newton) took to be a real world situation. > > > > Your example is within normal science (the Kuhnian notion of cumulative > science under a single interpretative paradigm). I was focussing more on > cases in which doubt has been raised about the suitability of a paradigm > for explaining the phenomena. This has been a long standing area of > interest of mine, and the further concern I raised about abduction arises > primarily if not always in cases in which a paradigm has fallen into doubt. > In normal science there are common exemplars and preferred analogies(ways > of extending a theory to new applications). In this case my concerns would > not typically arise, except as a practical issue resulting from our limited > abilities to understand our methods, not more basic logical difficulties. > So I think we are talking past each other here by focussing on > significantly different kinds of cases (normal science versus revolutionary > science). I raised Feyerabend at least in part because he focuses on > problems for empiricism in the revolutionary case, but also because that is > the sort of case I see as being especially problematic. In my paper > “Pragmatic Incommensurabiity (1984)” I argued that the sort of problem that > Kuhn and Feyerabend raised arise from the lack of an available common > interpretative framework. In my dissertation I argued that the solution was > to use the available interpretations of the theories involved to tease out > discordant implicit presuppositions of the paradigms. As I said, I am still > working on this problem. I am pretty sure that there is more than just luck > involved in finding a good resolution. In my dissertation I explained how > this was done in relativity theory, as an example. I am not yet happy with > any analysis of this how that I have seen so far. It may be there in > Peirce, and I am certain that Peircean methods are needed to find a > solution. > > > > In any case, I repeat that I would agree that there is no special problem > of the sort I was worried about that arises in the course of normal science. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate > > University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Thursday, 10 March 2016 9:15 PM > *To:* John Collier > *Cc:* Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; Clark Goble > > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, > Inquiry > > > > John, > > > > To me, we are talking about whether Feyerabend or Peirce can offer a > definite suggestion on how to proceed if we are frozen with respect to > advancing on a problem. To say there’s no systematic way to proceed is > antithetical to Peirce, who offers abduction, a very definite formalism > that asks you to be explicit about three things, the icon (C), index (A) > and symbol (B) and to consider them in relation according to CP 5.189. > Yes, there are a number of things to consider in order to assess the > goodness of an explanation, some criteria that you list in the last part of > your post. But these things are not really assessable by talking strictly > in abstraction. The possibilities are simply too numerous. > > > > But why not take genuine doubt about a real-world phenomenon in a > real-world situation to test your assertions about quality, index, > interpretation, practice, effectiveness, goodness, space and time, testing > of explanation...? There is such a phenomenon in phi spiral abduction. It > is an abductive inference about a regularity that comes in perceptual > judgment. There were others with different collateral experience who saw > the phenomenon but did not see the same icon. I proposed an alternative > index, one that implicates optimal stromal collagen organization. It is a > definite prediction. It is testable, etc.… > > > > Is it a good explanation? I think so because eros, that is, it is > suggestive of "effective surprise". Reasons for eros are many. These > reasons go beyond materials and corneal science; justifications that flow > into philosophy and education. I trust that good ideas take care of > themselves and that there is a good chance for consilience here because if > not this, which? > > > > Are such justifications allowable for assessing an explanation? What does > Newton have to say on the matter? Who decides if I disagree with his > silence? Importantly, what if it turns out my idea is true; that it does > what I say it does. Is that reason enough to agree that there is a > systematic approach to creativity and that it is complete in CP 5.189? > > > > Best, > > Jerry Rhee > > > > On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 10:53 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > wrote: > > Jerry, > > > > That is certainly the main issue that needs to be resolved in full. The > phenomena to be explained have to be identified by the abductive inference. > This would be the index part of the proposition. The qualitative part has > to be able to allow this identification. Together they must permit an > interpretation that we have a way to use in pactice. I would say that it is > the effectiveness of the last that determines how good the abduction is. I > suspect that the answer involves considering a number of factors. > > > > For example, Newtonian space and time are one way to explain the bucket > thought experiment. But even in Newton's own time it was observed (e.g. > by Leibniz) that the explanation couldn't be tested (it failed the > pragmatic maxim). Mach made the problem even more clear. It was not a good > explanation on those grounds, though it was good enough for Newton and for > most physicists up to Einstein. > > > > John > > > > > > > > Sent from my Samsung device > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> > Date: 2016/03/10 00:07 (GMT+02:00) > To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Cc: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, > Inquiry > > John, Clark, List: > > > > > > On Mar 9, 2016, at 1:59 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > > > List, > > > > Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the > best explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I > think abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis > from which the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation > need not be a good explanation, so we need more than inference to the best > explanation to carry out inquiry responsibly. > > > > The simple question arises: > > If an abductive step is taken by the inquirer, then what? > > > > For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide > the informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this > abductive object and move through the inferential steps needed to generate > a valid argument? > > > > Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed to > extend (in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index to the > (telelogical?) goal of the inquirer? > > > > Cheers > > > > Jerry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > *From:* Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com <cl...@lextek.com>] > *Sent:* Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM > *To:* Peirce List > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, > Inquiry > > > > > > On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > > > > Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best > explanation”. > That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and > it has > led to a whole literature of misconception. Abduction is more like > “inference > to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a > concept > that reduces a manifold to a unity”. The most difficult part of its labor > is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as > a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain. > > > > I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to > the best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure > seems to get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable. > I’d argue that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation > he’s much more after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. > (Although I’d have to go through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to > the texts) > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > >
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