John, You're saying there is no case where transformative science operates through normal science?
If it's simply a matter of coordinating the proper joint problem space and convincing experts to see that space (eros), then phi spiral abduction has it in spades. But the truth is in the future. So, let's wait... :) Best, Jerry Rhee On Fri, Mar 11, 2016 at 2:04 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > Jerry, > > > > The example I gave (bucket experiment) involved genuine doubt about what > at least some (e.g., Newton) took to be a real world situation. > > > > Your example is within normal science (the Kuhnian notion of cumulative > science under a single interpretative paradigm). I was focussing more on > cases in which doubt has been raised about the suitability of a paradigm > for explaining the phenomena. This has been a long standing area of > interest of mine, and the further concern I raised about abduction arises > primarily if not always in cases in which a paradigm has fallen into doubt. > In normal science there are common exemplars and preferred analogies(ways > of extending a theory to new applications). In this case my concerns would > not typically arise, except as a practical issue resulting from our limited > abilities to understand our methods, not more basic logical difficulties. > So I think we are talking past each other here by focussing on > significantly different kinds of cases (normal science versus revolutionary > science). I raised Feyerabend at least in part because he focuses on > problems for empiricism in the revolutionary case, but also because that is > the sort of case I see as being especially problematic. In my paper > “Pragmatic Incommensurabiity (1984)” I argued that the sort of problem that > Kuhn and Feyerabend raised arise from the lack of an available common > interpretative framework. In my dissertation I argued that the solution was > to use the available interpretations of the theories involved to tease out > discordant implicit presuppositions of the paradigms. As I said, I am still > working on this problem. I am pretty sure that there is more than just luck > involved in finding a good resolution. In my dissertation I explained how > this was done in relativity theory, as an example. I am not yet happy with > any analysis of this how that I have seen so far. It may be there in > Peirce, and I am certain that Peircean methods are needed to find a > solution. > > > > In any case, I repeat that I would agree that there is no special problem > of the sort I was worried about that arises in the course of normal science. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate > > University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Thursday, 10 March 2016 9:15 PM > *To:* John Collier > *Cc:* Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; Clark Goble > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, > Inquiry > > > > John, > > > > To me, we are talking about whether Feyerabend or Peirce can offer a > definite suggestion on how to proceed if we are frozen with respect to > advancing on a problem. To say there’s no systematic way to proceed is > antithetical to Peirce, who offers abduction, a very definite formalism > that asks you to be explicit about three things, the icon (C), index (A) > and symbol (B) and to consider them in relation according to CP 5.189. > Yes, there are a number of things to consider in order to assess the > goodness of an explanation, some criteria that you list in the last part of > your post. But these things are not really assessable by talking strictly > in abstraction. The possibilities are simply too numerous. > > > > But why not take genuine doubt about a real-world phenomenon in a > real-world situation to test your assertions about quality, index, > interpretation, practice, effectiveness, goodness, space and time, testing > of explanation...? There is such a phenomenon in phi spiral abduction. It > is an abductive inference about a regularity that comes in perceptual > judgment. There were others with different collateral experience who saw > the phenomenon but did not see the same icon. I proposed an alternative > index, one that implicates optimal stromal collagen organization. It is a > definite prediction. It is testable, etc.… > > > > Is it a good explanation? I think so because eros, that is, it is > suggestive of "effective surprise". Reasons for eros are many. These > reasons go beyond materials and corneal science; justifications that flow > into philosophy and education. I trust that good ideas take care of > themselves and that there is a good chance for consilience here because if > not this, which? > > > > Are such justifications allowable for assessing an explanation? What does > Newton have to say on the matter? Who decides if I disagree with his > silence? Importantly, what if it turns out my idea is true; that it does > what I say it does. Is that reason enough to agree that there is a > systematic approach to creativity and that it is complete in CP 5.189? > > > > Best, > > Jerry Rhee > > > > On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 10:53 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > wrote: > > Jerry, > > > > That is certainly the main issue that needs to be resolved in full. The > phenomena to be explained have to be identified by the abductive inference. > This would be the index part of the proposition. The qualitative part has > to be able to allow this identification. Together they must permit an > interpretation that we have a way to use in pactice. I would say that it is > the effectiveness of the last that determines how good the abduction is. I > suspect that the answer involves considering a number of factors. > > > > For example, Newtonian space and time are one way to explain the bucket > thought experiment. But even in Newton's own time it was observed (e.g. > by Leibniz) that the explanation couldn't be tested (it failed the > pragmatic maxim). Mach made the problem even more clear. It was not a good > explanation on those grounds, though it was good enough for Newton and for > most physicists up to Einstein. > > > > John > > > > > > > > Sent from my Samsung device > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> > Date: 2016/03/10 00:07 (GMT+02:00) > To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Cc: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, > Inquiry > > John, Clark, List: > > > > > > On Mar 9, 2016, at 1:59 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > > > List, > > > > Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the > best explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I > think abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis > from which the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation > need not be a good explanation, so we need more than inference to the best > explanation to carry out inquiry responsibly. > > > > The simple question arises: > > If an abductive step is taken by the inquirer, then what? > > > > For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide > the informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this > abductive object and move through the inferential steps needed to generate > a valid argument? > > > > Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed to > extend (in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index to the > (telelogical?) goal of the inquirer? > > > > Cheers > > > > Jerry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > *From:* Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com <cl...@lextek.com>] > *Sent:* Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM > *To:* Peirce List > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, > Inquiry > > > > > > On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > > > > Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best > explanation”. > That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and > it has > led to a whole literature of misconception. Abduction is more like > “inference > to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a > concept > that reduces a manifold to a unity”. The most difficult part of its labor > is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as > a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain. > > > > I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to > the best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure > seems to get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable. > I’d argue that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation > he’s much more after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. > (Although I’d have to go through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to > the texts) > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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