Hi Mike,
I like your table of threes. I think tables such as yours help others to extract the regularity for themselves. Peirce did that exercise: “This list is fortunately very short…I find only three, Quality, Reaction, Mediation. Having obtained this list of three kinds of elements of experience…the business before me was the mixed one of making my apprehension of three ideas which had never been accurately grasped as clear and plain as possible, and of tracing out all their modes of combination. This last, at least, seemed to be a problem which could be worked out by straightforward patience… I said to myself, this list of categories, specious as it is, must be a delusion of which I must disabuse myself. Thereupon, I spent five years in diligently, yes, passionately, seeking facts which should refute my list….” But he also discovered some dangers in the method; that he will have trouble communicating it to others because the force of evidence can only be apprehended through experience. Among your list is “induction deduction abduction”. I think it ought to be abduction deduction induction (then recursion). Would you mind justifying why yours and not mine? Also, as Edwina mentioned, there are differences between interpretant and meaning. So why interpretant and not meaning? Finally, I think a person working in AI should be concerned with what makes for a *good* abduction as opposed to any other formulation. So why eros and not epithumia? http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm hth, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 10:15 AM, Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Mike, List: > > Thanks for posting your views on your interpretation of CSP’s writings in > relation to AI. > > While I agree with many (if not most of your comments,) I offer a comment > on only one: > > The nature needed to be the sign because that is how information is > conveyed, and the trichotomy parts were the fewest “decomposable” needed to > model the real world; we would call these “primitives” in modern > terminology. Here are some of Peirce’s thoughts as to what makes something > “indecomposable” (in keeping with his jawbreaking terminology) [7] > <http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/#tri7> > : > “It is a priori impossible that there should be an indecomposable element > which is what it is relatively to a second, a third, and a fourth. The > obvious reason is that that which combines two will by repetition combine > any number. Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more > important.” (CP 1.298) > > The logic of this proposition is grounded on the meaning of the term > “com-bines”, that is a binary operation is intrinsic to such a Liebnizian > perspective. > > However, if the logical operation of composition of parts of a whole FUSE > the elements into a singular object (as in CSP’s usage of the notion of a > continuum), then one can imagine the whole is not subject to separation, > that is, decomposition. Example: Antecedent is sand. Consequence is > glass. The logical operation is heat. > > In modern mathematics, this conundrum expresses itself as the relation > between discrete and continuous mathematics, between finite arithmetics and > topologies. > > To further confound the tensions between CSP’s proposition and Mother > Nature, the logic of the chemical combinations may be a single bindings, > double bindings, and triple bindings. Typically, if these bindings are > antecedent premises, decomposition of such bindings result in different > consequences. > > Thus, the assertion that: > Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP > 1.298) > may not be so simple. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > On Mar 22, 2016, at 9:17 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > > Hi All, > > Here is my take on how Peirce may contribute to knowledge representation > for the area I work in, knowledge-based artificial intelligence: > > > http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/ > > I welcome any comments or suggestions (or errors of omission or > commission!), since we plan to use this approach much going forward. > > Thanks! > > Mike Bergman > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
