Edwina and list,
Btw, what you call “induction”, I call deduction and vice versa; that is, there is a conflation of labels only. This would also suggest that there *is* ordinality in the categories, that abduction and induction are opposite poles of reason, that induction is the concluding step. That should release some frustration (meaning I agree with you), except for the comment about Secondness being without laws. This is not true because: one, two, three… chance, law, habit-taking… tychism, anancism, agapism… absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love. Best, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 6:23 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Val Daniel - thank you also pointing this out. I've argued against that > space-enclosing equilateral triangle for years. It is NOT representative of > the Peircean triad; instead, the best image is of the 'three prongs' - or, > as I wrote in my first comment this morning - that 'umbrella spoke triad', > outlined in 1.347. I wrote: > > 5) I do, however, quibble with your triangle. Peirce himself didn't use > the > triangle. See 1.347, where he uses an 'umbrella spoke triad'. This image > OPENS the semiosic process to networking, whereas the triangle, in my > view, > is a closed, one-way linear process and obscures the power of semsiosis. > > That closed triangle is the wrong image of the semiosic process - and has > been discussed before - but I don't keep archival data. But thanks for > that comment. > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* E Valentine Daniel <e...@columbia.edu> > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Tuesday, March 22, 2016 6:20 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation > > Hello Mike, Edwina, Jerry, fellow-archivists among the P-Listers: > I notice that Mike's table of threes was accompanied by a diagrammatic > representation of the sign (with its three constitutive correlates) by a > space-enclosing equilateral triangle. Peirce never used this particular > diagrammatic representation but used instead the diagram of a three prongs > converging/diverging in/from a point to represent the triadic sign. In > addition to being more effective (and truer-to-Peirce) representation, not > only of the sign qua sign but also as the best opening gambit for > representing semiosis itself, some contributors to that deeply archived > conversation provided the list with many other logical and philosophical > reasons and arguments in favor of the three-pronged representation of the > signs over the triangular representation of same. Is there anyone on the > list who, per chance, either saved that particular discussion or can lead > me to that string of yester-year? Besides being personally grateful to such > a lead I also think that it would shed critical light of the table provided > by Mike. > > Thank you. > > val daniel > > E. Valentine Daniel > Professor of Anthropology > Columbia University > 1200 Amsterdam Avenue > New York, NY 10027 > > (212) 854-7764 > e...@columbia.edu > > On Mar 22, 2016, at 3:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > I think tables can be fraught with problems. For example..I agree with > Jerry's question about: > > 1) deduction/induction/abduction....corresponding to the modes of > Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. > I'd see it as abduction/induction/deduction > > 2) And I have a problem with symbols/generality/interpreter. What? Symbols > are, as the Relation between the Representamen and the Object - in a mode > of Thirdness. So, how have you put them into a mode of Firstness? > And 'generality' is the opposite of Secondness. > And an 'interpreter'? An external agent-who-interprets? As Thirdness? > > 3) I also have a problem with your putting these three categorical modes > in a linear order, as First/Second/Third. There is no ordinality in the > categories. > > 4) I also reject your 'past/present/future', for the nature of Firstness > is its very 'presentness', while the nature of Secondness is its 'past' - > ie, that is has closure. > > 5) And reject your 'sign/object/interpretant' for the three nodal sites > can be in any one of the three modal categories. > > 6)And reject your 'conscious[feeling]; self-consciousness; mind.....though > i see your point. But feeling is not the same as consciousness. When you > become conscious of that feeling, you've moved out of Firstness. > > That's as far as I've gone. > > Edwina Taborsky > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> > *To:* Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> > *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Mike Bergman > <m...@mkbergman.com> > *Sent:* Tuesday, March 22, 2016 2:06 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation > > Hi Mike, > > > I like your table of threes. I think tables such as yours help others to > extract the regularity for themselves. Peirce did that exercise: > > > “This list is fortunately very short…I find only three, Quality, Reaction, > Mediation. Having obtained this list of three kinds of elements of > experience…the business before me was the mixed one of making my > apprehension of three ideas which had never been accurately grasped as > clear and plain as possible, and of tracing out all their modes of > combination. This last, at least, seemed to be a problem which could be > worked out by straightforward patience… I said to myself, this list of > categories, specious as it is, must be a delusion of which I must disabuse > myself. Thereupon, I spent five years in diligently, yes, passionately, > seeking facts which should refute my list….” > > > But he also discovered some dangers in the method; that he will have > trouble communicating it to others because the force of evidence can only > be apprehended through experience. > > > Among your list is “induction deduction abduction”. > I think it ought to be abduction deduction induction (then recursion). > Would you mind justifying why yours and not mine? > > > Also, as Edwina mentioned, there are differences between interpretant and > meaning. So why interpretant and not meaning? > > Finally, I think a person working in AI should be concerned with what > makes for a *good* abduction as opposed to any other formulation. So why > eros and not epithumia? > > > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm > > > hth, > Jerry Rhee > > On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 10:15 AM, Jerry LR Chandler < > jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > >> Mike, List: >> >> Thanks for posting your views on your interpretation of CSP’s writings in >> relation to AI. >> >> While I agree with many (if not most of your comments,) I offer a comment >> on only one: >> >> The nature needed to be the sign because that is how information is >> conveyed, and the trichotomy parts were the fewest “decomposable” needed to >> model the real world; we would call these “primitives” in modern >> terminology. Here are some of Peirce’s thoughts as to what makes something >> “indecomposable” (in keeping with his jawbreaking terminology) [7] >> <http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/#tri7> >> : >> “It is a priori impossible that there should be an indecomposable element >> which is what it is relatively to a second, a third, and a fourth. The >> obvious reason is that that which combines two will by repetition combine >> any number. Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more >> important.” (CP 1.298) >> >> The logic of this proposition is grounded on the meaning of the term >> “com-bines”, that is a binary operation is intrinsic to such a Liebnizian >> perspective. >> >> However, if the logical operation of composition of parts of a whole FUSE >> the elements into a singular object (as in CSP’s usage of the notion of a >> continuum), then one can imagine the whole is not subject to separation, >> that is, decomposition. Example: Antecedent is sand. Consequence is >> glass. The logical operation is heat. >> >> In modern mathematics, this conundrum expresses itself as the relation >> between discrete and continuous mathematics, between finite arithmetics and >> topologies. >> >> To further confound the tensions between CSP’s proposition and Mother >> Nature, the logic of the chemical combinations may be a single bindings, >> double bindings, and triple bindings. Typically, if these bindings are >> antecedent premises, decomposition of such bindings result in different >> consequences. >> >> Thus, the assertion that: >> Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP >> 1.298) >> may not be so simple. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> On Mar 22, 2016, at 9:17 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: >> >> Hi All, >> >> Here is my take on how Peirce may contribute to knowledge representation >> for the area I work in, knowledge-based artificial intelligence: >> >> >> http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/ >> >> I welcome any comments or suggestions (or errors of omission or >> commission!), since we plan to use this approach much going forward. >> >> Thanks! >> >> Mike Bergman >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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