Thanks Edwina, I'm enjoying this earnest conversation! Peirce offers his method for coming to resolution. So, what does he offer?
An example: cf. figure 6 and 7 in which two computer models were constructed as a method to subduance. So, how to decide which model is the best model, since they say different things, they embody different contexts. The goal, of course, is to converge on truth but truth about what?.. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced/doi/10.1002/cplx.21562 Best, Jerry R On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 5:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Ah, so we will fight and fight-it-out, and... > > Nope. I see deduction as Thirdness, because it rests its assertions within > laws. The term of 'mediation' does not necessarily mean what we consider as > a 'mediator', i.e., someone bringing two opposites into some kind of > harmony with each other. It can simply mean 'carrying the one idea over to > the next stage'. > > Secondness is, in itself, pure brute interactional physical force. Without > laws. So, I see it as induction, which is merely about gathering all the > data, everything you can find...almost without analysis...I don't see it as > evaluating the data, simply gathering it. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> ; Peirce List > <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> > *Sent:* Tuesday, March 22, 2016 6:23 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation > > haha! :) > > I see Edwina's objection as Secondness. > > I also see deduction as a Second, not a third. It does not emphasize > mediation; rather, it emphasizes laws and execution of laws, the generation > of possibilities; possibilities that can serve to refute the freedom of > imagination in First. Induction decides the goodness of possibilities, and > therefore, is a Third. > > This conversation, is a mediation, and therefore, a Third...but is > dependent on Mike's initial offering of deduction induction abduction, > which came about in First. > > Best, > Jerry R > > " > > “But by that time, I had reached a mode of thought so remote from that of > the ordinary man, that I was unable to communicate with him. Another great > labor was required in breaking a path by which to lead him from his > position to my own. I had become entirely unaccustomed to the use of > ordinary language to express my own logical ideas to myself…The clear > expression of my thoughts is still most difficult to me. How awkward I am > at it, this very statement will in some measure show.” ~ Peirce > > On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> I think tables can be fraught with problems. For example..I agree with >> Jerry's question about: >> >> 1) deduction/induction/abduction....corresponding to the modes of >> Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. >> I'd see it as abduction/induction/deduction >> >> 2) And I have a problem with symbols/generality/interpreter. What? >> Symbols are, as the Relation between the Representamen and the Object - in >> a mode of Thirdness. So, how have you put them into a mode of Firstness? >> And 'generality' is the opposite of Secondness. >> And an 'interpreter'? An external agent-who-interprets? As Thirdness? >> >> 3) I also have a problem with your putting these three categorical modes >> in a linear order, as First/Second/Third. There is no ordinality in the >> categories. >> >> 4) I also reject your 'past/present/future', for the nature of Firstness >> is its very 'presentness', while the nature of Secondness is its 'past' - >> ie, that is has closure. >> >> 5) And reject your 'sign/object/interpretant' for the three nodal sites >> can be in any one of the three modal categories. >> >> 6)And reject your 'conscious[feeling]; self-consciousness; >> mind.....though i see your point. But feeling is not the same as >> consciousness. When you become conscious of that feeling, you've moved out >> of Firstness. >> >> That's as far as I've gone. >> >> Edwina Taborsky >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> >> *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Mike Bergman >> <m...@mkbergman.com> >> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 22, 2016 2:06 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation >> >> Hi Mike, >> >> >> >> I like your table of threes. I think tables such as yours help others >> to extract the regularity for themselves. Peirce did that exercise: >> >> >> >> “This list is fortunately very short…I find only three, Quality, >> Reaction, Mediation. Having obtained this list of three kinds of elements >> of experience…the business before me was the mixed one of making my >> apprehension of three ideas which had never been accurately grasped as >> clear and plain as possible, and of tracing out all their modes of >> combination. This last, at least, seemed to be a problem which could be >> worked out by straightforward patience… I said to myself, this list of >> categories, specious as it is, must be a delusion of which I must disabuse >> myself. Thereupon, I spent five years in diligently, yes, passionately, >> seeking facts which should refute my list….” >> >> >> >> But he also discovered some dangers in the method; that he will have >> trouble communicating it to others because the force of evidence can only >> be apprehended through experience. >> >> >> >> Among your list is “induction deduction abduction”. >> >> I think it ought to be abduction deduction induction (then recursion). >> >> Would you mind justifying why yours and not mine? >> >> >> >> Also, as Edwina mentioned, there are differences between interpretant and >> meaning. So why interpretant and not meaning? >> >> >> Finally, I think a person working in AI should be concerned with what >> makes for a *good* abduction as opposed to any other formulation. So >> why eros and not epithumia? >> >> >> >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm >> >> >> >> hth, >> >> Jerry Rhee >> >> On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 10:15 AM, Jerry LR Chandler < >> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: >> >>> Mike, List: >>> >>> Thanks for posting your views on your interpretation of CSP’s writings >>> in relation to AI. >>> >>> While I agree with many (if not most of your comments,) I offer a >>> comment on only one: >>> >>> The nature needed to be the sign because that is how information is >>> conveyed, and the trichotomy parts were the fewest “decomposable” needed to >>> model the real world; we would call these “primitives” in modern >>> terminology. Here are some of Peirce’s thoughts as to what makes something >>> “indecomposable” (in keeping with his jawbreaking terminology) [7] >>> <http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/#tri7> >>> : >>> “It is a priori impossible that there should be an indecomposable >>> element which is what it is relatively to a second, a third, and a fourth. >>> The obvious reason is that that which combines two will by repetition >>> combine any number. Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more >>> important.” (CP 1.298) >>> >>> The logic of this proposition is grounded on the meaning of the term >>> “com-bines”, that is a binary operation is intrinsic to such a Liebnizian >>> perspective. >>> >>> However, if the logical operation of composition of parts of a whole >>> FUSE the elements into a singular object (as in CSP’s usage of the notion >>> of a continuum), then one can imagine the whole is not subject to >>> separation, that is, decomposition. Example: Antecedent is sand. >>> Consequence is glass. The logical operation is heat. >>> >>> In modern mathematics, this conundrum expresses itself as the relation >>> between discrete and continuous mathematics, between finite arithmetics and >>> topologies. >>> >>> To further confound the tensions between CSP’s proposition and Mother >>> Nature, the logic of the chemical combinations may be a single bindings, >>> double bindings, and triple bindings. Typically, if these bindings are >>> antecedent premises, decomposition of such bindings result in different >>> consequences. >>> >>> Thus, the assertion that: >>> Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP >>> 1.298) >>> may not be so simple. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >>> >>> On Mar 22, 2016, at 9:17 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi All, >>> >>> Here is my take on how Peirce may contribute to knowledge representation >>> for the area I work in, knowledge-based artificial intelligence: >>> >>> >>> http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/ >>> >>> I welcome any comments or suggestions (or errors of omission or >>> commission!), since we plan to use this approach much going forward. >>> >>> Thanks! >>> >>> Mike Bergman >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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