Hello Mike, Edwina, Jerry, fellow-archivists among the P-Listers: I notice that Mike's table of threes was accompanied by a diagrammatic representation of the sign (with its three constitutive correlates) by a space-enclosing equilateral triangle. Peirce never used this particular diagrammatic representation but used instead the diagram of a three prongs converging/diverging in/from a point to represent the triadic sign. In addition to being more effective (and truer-to-Peirce) representation, not only of the sign qua sign but also as the best opening gambit for representing semiosis itself, some contributors to that deeply archived conversation provided the list with many other logical and philosophical reasons and arguments in favor of the three-pronged representation of the signs over the triangular representation of same. Is there anyone on the list who, per chance, either saved that particular discussion or can lead me to that string of yester-year? Besides being personally grateful to such a lead I also think that it would shed critical light of the table provided by Mike.
Thank you. val daniel E. Valentine Daniel Professor of Anthropology Columbia University 1200 Amsterdam Avenue New York, NY 10027 (212) 854-7764 e...@columbia.edu > On Mar 22, 2016, at 3:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > I think tables can be fraught with problems. For example..I agree with > Jerry's question about: > > 1) deduction/induction/abduction....corresponding to the modes of Firstness, > Secondness, Thirdness. > I'd see it as abduction/induction/deduction > > 2) And I have a problem with symbols/generality/interpreter. What? Symbols > are, as the Relation between the Representamen and the Object - in a mode of > Thirdness. So, how have you put them into a mode of Firstness? > And 'generality' is the opposite of Secondness. > And an 'interpreter'? An external agent-who-interprets? As Thirdness? > > 3) I also have a problem with your putting these three categorical modes in a > linear order, as First/Second/Third. There is no ordinality in the > categories. > > 4) I also reject your 'past/present/future', for the nature of Firstness is > its very 'presentness', while the nature of Secondness is its 'past' - ie, > that is has closure. > > 5) And reject your 'sign/object/interpretant' for the three nodal sites can > be in any one of the three modal categories. > > 6)And reject your 'conscious[feeling]; self-consciousness; mind.....though i > see your point. But feeling is not the same as consciousness. When you become > conscious of that feeling, you've moved out of Firstness. > > That's as far as I've gone. > > Edwina Taborsky > > >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: Jerry Rhee <mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com> >> To: Jerry LR Chandler <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> >> Cc: Peirce List <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Mike Bergman >> <mailto:m...@mkbergman.com> >> Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2016 2:06 PM >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation >> >> Hi Mike, >> >> I like your table of threes. I think tables such as yours help others to >> extract the regularity for themselves. Peirce did that exercise: >> >> “This list is fortunately very short…I find only three, Quality, Reaction, >> Mediation. Having obtained this list of three kinds of elements of >> experience…the business before me was the mixed one of making my >> apprehension of three ideas which had never been accurately grasped as clear >> and plain as possible, and of tracing out all their modes of combination. >> This last, at least, seemed to be a problem which could be worked out by >> straightforward patience… I said to myself, this list of categories, >> specious as it is, must be a delusion of which I must disabuse myself. >> Thereupon, I spent five years in diligently, yes, passionately, seeking >> facts which should refute my list….” >> >> But he also discovered some dangers in the method; that he will have trouble >> communicating it to others because the force of evidence can only be >> apprehended through experience. >> >> Among your list is “induction deduction abduction”. >> I think it ought to be abduction deduction induction (then recursion). >> Would you mind justifying why yours and not mine? >> >> Also, as Edwina mentioned, there are differences between interpretant and >> meaning. So why interpretant and not meaning? >> >> Finally, I think a person working in AI should be concerned with what makes >> for a good abduction as opposed to any other formulation. So why eros and >> not epithumia? >> >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm >> <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm> >> >> hth, >> Jerry Rhee >> >> On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 10:15 AM, Jerry LR Chandler >> <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: >>> Mike, List: >>> >>> Thanks for posting your views on your interpretation of CSP’s writings in >>> relation to AI. >>> >>> While I agree with many (if not most of your comments,) I offer a comment >>> on only one: >>> >>> The nature needed to be the sign because that is how information is >>> conveyed, and the trichotomy parts were the fewest “decomposable” needed to >>> model the real world; we would call these “primitives” in modern >>> terminology. Here are some of Peirce’s thoughts as to what makes something >>> “indecomposable” (in keeping with his jawbreaking terminology) [7] >>> <http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/#tri7>: >>> >>> “It is a priori impossible that there should be an indecomposable element >>> which is what it is relatively to a second, a third, and a fourth. The >>> obvious reason is that that which combines two will by repetition combine >>> any number. Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more >>> important.” (CP 1.298) >>> >>> The logic of this proposition is grounded on the meaning of the term >>> “com-bines”, that is a binary operation is intrinsic to such a Liebnizian >>> perspective. >>> >>> However, if the logical operation of composition of parts of a whole FUSE >>> the elements into a singular object (as in CSP’s usage of the notion of a >>> continuum), then one can imagine the whole is not subject to separation, >>> that is, decomposition. Example: Antecedent is sand. Consequence is >>> glass. The logical operation is heat. >>> >>> In modern mathematics, this conundrum expresses itself as the relation >>> between discrete and continuous mathematics, between finite arithmetics and >>> topologies. >>> >>> To further confound the tensions between CSP’s proposition and Mother >>> Nature, the logic of the chemical combinations may be a single bindings, >>> double bindings, and triple bindings. Typically, if these bindings are >>> antecedent premises, decomposition of such bindings result in different >>> consequences. >>> >>> Thus, the assertion that: >>> Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP >>> 1.298) >>> may not be so simple. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >>> >>>> On Mar 22, 2016, at 9:17 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com >>>> <mailto:m...@mkbergman.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi All, >>>> >>>> Here is my take on how Peirce may contribute to knowledge representation >>>> for the area I work in, knowledge-based artificial intelligence: >>>> >>>> http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/ >>>> >>>> <http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/> >>>> >>>> I welcome any comments or suggestions (or errors of omission or >>>> commission!), since we plan to use this approach much going forward. >>>> >>>> Thanks! >>>> >>>> Mike Bergman >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, >>>> send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >>>> <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, >>> send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >>> <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >> to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the > line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
