Ah, so we will fight and fight-it-out, and...
Nope. I see deduction as Thirdness, because it rests its assertions within
laws. The term of 'mediation' does not necessarily mean what we consider as a
'mediator', i.e., someone bringing two opposites into some kind of harmony with
each other. It can simply mean 'carrying the one idea over to the next stage'.
Secondness is, in itself, pure brute interactional physical force. Without
laws. So, I see it as induction, which is merely about gathering all the data,
everything you can find...almost without analysis...I don't see it as
evaluating the data, simply gathering it.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List ; Mike Bergman
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2016 6:23 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation
haha! :)
I see Edwina's objection as Secondness.
I also see deduction as a Second, not a third. It does not emphasize
mediation; rather, it emphasizes laws and execution of laws, the generation of
possibilities; possibilities that can serve to refute the freedom of
imagination in First. Induction decides the goodness of possibilities, and
therefore, is a Third.
This conversation, is a mediation, and therefore, a Third...but is dependent
on Mike's initial offering of deduction induction abduction, which came about
in First.
Best,
Jerry R
"
“But by that time, I had reached a mode of thought so remote from that of the
ordinary man, that I was unable to communicate with him. Another great labor
was required in breaking a path by which to lead him from his position to my
own. I had become entirely unaccustomed to the use of ordinary language to
express my own logical ideas to myself…The clear expression of my thoughts is
still most difficult to me. How awkward I am at it, this very statement will in
some measure show.” ~ Peirce
On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
I think tables can be fraught with problems. For example..I agree with
Jerry's question about:
1) deduction/induction/abduction....corresponding to the modes of
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness.
I'd see it as abduction/induction/deduction
2) And I have a problem with symbols/generality/interpreter. What? Symbols
are, as the Relation between the Representamen and the Object - in a mode of
Thirdness. So, how have you put them into a mode of Firstness?
And 'generality' is the opposite of Secondness.
And an 'interpreter'? An external agent-who-interprets? As Thirdness?
3) I also have a problem with your putting these three categorical modes in
a linear order, as First/Second/Third. There is no ordinality in the
categories.
4) I also reject your 'past/present/future', for the nature of Firstness is
its very 'presentness', while the nature of Secondness is its 'past' - ie, that
is has closure.
5) And reject your 'sign/object/interpretant' for the three nodal sites can
be in any one of the three modal categories.
6)And reject your 'conscious[feeling]; self-consciousness; mind.....though
i see your point. But feeling is not the same as consciousness. When you become
conscious of that feeling, you've moved out of Firstness.
That's as far as I've gone.
Edwina Taborsky
----- Original Message -----
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Jerry LR Chandler
Cc: Peirce List ; Mike Bergman
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2016 2:06 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on Knowledge Representation
Hi Mike,
I like your table of threes. I think tables such as yours help others to
extract the regularity for themselves. Peirce did that exercise:
“This list is fortunately very short…I find only three, Quality,
Reaction, Mediation. Having obtained this list of three kinds of elements of
experience…the business before me was the mixed one of making my apprehension
of three ideas which had never been accurately grasped as clear and plain as
possible, and of tracing out all their modes of combination. This last, at
least, seemed to be a problem which could be worked out by straightforward
patience… I said to myself, this list of categories, specious as it is, must be
a delusion of which I must disabuse myself. Thereupon, I spent five years in
diligently, yes, passionately, seeking facts which should refute my list….”
But he also discovered some dangers in the method; that he will have
trouble communicating it to others because the force of evidence can only be
apprehended through experience.
Among your list is “induction deduction abduction”.
I think it ought to be abduction deduction induction (then recursion).
Would you mind justifying why yours and not mine?
Also, as Edwina mentioned, there are differences between interpretant and
meaning. So why interpretant and not meaning?
Finally, I think a person working in AI should be concerned with what
makes for a good abduction as opposed to any other formulation. So why eros
and not epithumia?
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm
hth,
Jerry Rhee
On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 10:15 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
<jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
Mike, List:
Thanks for posting your views on your interpretation of CSP’s writings
in relation to AI.
While I agree with many (if not most of your comments,) I offer a
comment on only one:
The nature needed to be the sign because that is how information is
conveyed, and the trichotomy parts were the fewest “decomposable” needed to
model the real world; we would call these “primitives” in modern terminology.
Here are some of Peirce’s thoughts as to what makes something “indecomposable”
(in keeping with his jawbreaking terminology) [7]:
“It is a priori impossible that there should be an indecomposable
element which is what it is relatively to a second, a third, and a fourth. The
obvious reason is that that which combines two will by repetition combine any
number. Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP
1.298)
The logic of this proposition is grounded on the meaning of the term
“com-bines”, that is a binary operation is intrinsic to such a Liebnizian
perspective.
However, if the logical operation of composition of parts of a whole
FUSE the elements into a singular object (as in CSP’s usage of the notion of a
continuum), then one can imagine the whole is not subject to separation, that
is, decomposition. Example: Antecedent is sand. Consequence is glass. The
logical operation is heat.
In modern mathematics, this conundrum expresses itself as the relation
between discrete and continuous mathematics, between finite arithmetics and
topologies.
To further confound the tensions between CSP’s proposition and Mother
Nature, the logic of the chemical combinations may be a single bindings, double
bindings, and triple bindings. Typically, if these bindings are antecedent
premises, decomposition of such bindings result in different consequences.
Thus, the assertion that:
Nothing could be simpler; nothing in philosophy is more important.” (CP
1.298)
may not be so simple.
Cheers
Jerry
On Mar 22, 2016, at 9:17 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:
Hi All,
Here is my take on how Peirce may contribute to knowledge
representation for the area I work in, knowledge-based artificial intelligence:
http://www.mkbergman.com/1932/a-foundational-mindset-firstness-secondness-thirdness/
I welcome any comments or suggestions (or errors of omission or
commission!), since we plan to use this approach much going forward.
Thanks!
Mike Bergman
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