Gary R., List:
I understand your point about the Rule coming first in deduction, and while
I am still not 100% convinced that this is truly *necessary*, I am content
to let it pass and focus on abduction. If I have pushed you hard on the
latter, then Jerry R. also deserves credit for repeatedly calling attention
to CP 5.189.
GR: For the bean example, as Peirce originaly offered it, I begin my
> experiment at the rule, knowing that *that* bag of beans is entirely
> white, and seeing a handful of beans near it which share a character,
> white, I suppose it *possible* that in this world of bean storage in
> which I find myself (perhaps in a warehouse surrounded by many bags
> containing beans of possibly several colors), that *these* beans are from
> this bag because I found them near it.
>
I almost commented on this before--you keep saying that the reason why we
infer that these beans are from that bag is "because [we] found them near
it," but there is nothing in CP 2.623 to suggest this at all. On the
contrary, Peirce states, "On the table there is a handful of white beans;
and, after some searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans
only. I at once infer as a probability, or as a fair guess, that this
handful was taken out of that bag." The hypothesis has nothing to do with
*where* the handful of white beans is found, but rather is based only on
their being of the same *color *as all of the ones in that particular bag.
Notice also that we find the handful of white beans *before* we find
("after some searching") the bag that contains only white beans; i.e., we
have the Result first, and then go *looking *for the Rule. This is
interesting, because it suggests that rather than *knowing* the Rule
beforehand, we *suspect* that there is a Rule of some kind that would
explain the Result; we (evidently) *anticipate *that there will be a bag
with only white beans. However, we do not merely sample that bag and infer
(inductively) that all of its beans are white; we (apparently) inspect
the *entire
*contents of the bag, such that we *know* that all of its beans are white,
and only *then *hypothesize that the handful came from it.
This is probably stretching the bean example beyond its breaking point, but
it hints at your second type of abduction, as well as the notion of
treating the inference as a unified whole. It still clearly begins with a
surprising fact, rather than a Rule; but perhaps the categorial emphasis
should be on *surprising* (1ns), rather than on *fact* (2ns). I also want
to note that CP 5.189 is not the only place where Peirce uses this
terminology for the Result; he also does so in "A Neglected Argument for
the Reality of God"--a carefully written article, not a "mere" lecture.
CSP: Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation, in one or
another of the three Universes, of some surprising phenomenon, some
experience which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some
habit of expectation of the *inquisiturus *... The inquiry begins with
pondering these phenomena in all their aspects, in the search of some point
of view whence the wonder shall be resolved. At length a conjecture arises
that furnishes a possible Explanation, by which I mean a syllogism
exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily consequent upon the
circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the credible
conjecture, as premisses. On account of this Explanation, the inquirer is
led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favour. (EP 2.440-441)
Here Peirce seems to be saying that the observed fact is surprising because
it does not conform to an *established *Rule. It is obviously not all or
just any of "the circumstances of its occurrence" that combine with "the
credible conjecture" to make the surprising fact "a matter of course"; the
inquirer has to discern something *relevant *about the situation in order
to construct the explanatory syllogism. We see a handful of white beans in
a room full of bags, and posit that one of the bags might contain only
white beans, perhaps because that would be consistent with our previous
observations under similar conditions. This is what I would call an
exercise of judgment cultivated through experience.
Here are a few more passages that I came across ...
Now a retroductive conclusion is only justified by its *explaining* an
observed fact. An explanation is a syllogism of which the major premiss,
or rule, is a known law or rule of nature, or other general truth; the
minor premiss, or case, is the hypothesis or retroductive conclusion, and
the conclusion, or result, is the observed (or otherwise established) fact.
(CP 1.89)
But the stimulus to guessing, the hint of the conjecture, was derived from
experience. The order of the march of suggestion in retroduction is from
experience to hypothesis. (CP 2.755)
*Presumption*, or, more precisely, *abduction* … furnishes the reasoner
with the problematic theory which induction verifies. Upon finding himself
confronted with a phenomenon unlike what he would have expected under the
circumstances, he looks over its features and notices some remarkable
character or relation among them, which he at once recognizes as being
characteristic of some conception with which his mind is already stored, so
that a theory is suggested which would explain (that is, render necessary)
that which is surprising in the phenomena. (CP 2.776)
Does this get us any closer to being on the same page regarding abduction?
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
