Jon S, List, Jon wrote: [re: deduction] "Hence, that sequence (3ns/2ns/1ns) is to be preferred, even if it is not strictly required."
Since we seem to be on pretty much the same page regarding deduction, I would probably leave your comment alone, that is, not take issue with your remark that, 3ns/2ns/1ns (i.e. rule/case/result/ "is preferred, even if it is not strictly required." However, my somewhat contrarian response to this will allow me to discuss the other inference patterns, especially abduction, in a way which might help clarify my position on all three inferences. In these comments I want to especially emphasize what I referred to in earlier posts as Matthias Alexander's dynamic and relational notion of something happening all-together-one-after-another. Originally this idea referred to the 'use' of the body, especially the movement of the spine, neck, and head--but, really, the whole body--in continuous movement, a movement which he sometimes referred to as 'forward' and 'up'. For the present purpose there's no need to get much into Alexander technique, but for those not familiar with it, 'use' (or "the primary control") is neatly conveyed, I think, in this snippet. This direction, "forward and up," may need some clarification. "Forward" is the movement of the center of gravity of the head. It is a direct result of the freeing of the neck muscles as they attach both to the head and the upper torso. The movement "up," resulting from the movement forward, calls forth a length along the spine and movement through the whole body which allows [one] to experience natural length and width. *Though these movements follow one another, they feel as though they are happening at the same time.* Alexander described this as *"all together one after the other."* The Primary Control is not a posture. *It is a dynamic relationship* Now, whatever Ben Udell might have originally meant in suggesting that one should consider "the inference as a whole," I am employing his phrase along the lines of Alexander here in consideration of the syllogism and its inversions. So, taken logically, both Udell's and Alexander's ideas have for me here a kind of 'family resemblance' a la Wittgenstein. I would say that for *the logic of deduction*, the order rule/case/result is not merely preferred, but is indeed "strictly required." My meaning might best be hinted at by a bit of visual logic. So, let's make a little thought experiment: I have a bag of beans before me, and I plunge my hands into it to take a sample. Do I even need to take my hands out to look at the beans to arrive at the result? I do not, because deduction 'strictly requires' that, starting at the rule--here, knowing all the beans are white-- that *even before I retrieve my sample* (case, 2ns) that I will know the result (the character, 1ns), white. Looseness in language use (for example, phrase order) should not prevent us from seeing the underlying logic: that once we know a rule, that all-together-one-after-the-other, the case and result will *necessarily *follow (keep you sample in the bag for all we care). In deduction one *necessarily* begins at the rule, and linguistic looseness/sloppiness in this matter undermines the logical structure, in my opinion. Now for induction, similarly I commence my inferential thought-experiment *not *when my hands are in the bag, but, rather, at the very moment, say, that, in this example, my two hands emerge from the bag, that is, for the purpose of the inference, I *logically always-already had* in my possession a sample, and seeing that all beans in my sample are white (for I am sampling for *some specific character*, color in this case; *not* size, shape, texture, etc.), I immediately infer that all the beans are *probably *white (more sampling will be needed for confirmation). This is also to suggest that the bag of beans from which the sample is drawn is i *mplicated* from the get go, but the order is, of course, entirely different: case (existential sample, 2ns in my formulation), immediately revealing a character (all white, 1ns), suggesting a *probable* rule, that the bag of beans *from which the sample was already drawn *will all be white. So, for deduction and induction, following Alexander's notion and Ben's idea that we need to look at the inference as a whole, we can see that (and now paraphrasing the Alexander snippet above) that "*Though these [logical] movements follow one another, [it is] as though they are happening at the same time, [l*ogically] *"all together one after the other."* And I would maintain that something like this all-at-once-together-viewing-the-inference-as- a-whole kind of logic holds for abduction as well. For the bean example, as Peirce originaly offered it, I begin my experiment at the rule, knowing that *that* bag of beans is entirely white, and seeing a handful of beans near it which share a character, white, I suppose it *possible* that in this world of bean storage in which I find myself (perhaps in a warehouse surrounded by many bags containing beans of possibly several colors), that *these* beans are from this bag because I found them near it. I may be proved wrong (say, sampling for some other characteristic, say size, I discover that they couldn't possibly have come from that bag and have to look for some other reason why they were where they were). But this is an example of (merely) the sleuthing kind of abduction which, as I've earlier noted, I personally don't think takes us far enough since, as I believe, the most important type of abductions are those in which the rule is *not* known but inferred, the kind of hypothesis that a Newton might make, one that is only *possibl*y a rule, but which, in such a case as Newton's, repeated scientific experimentation will show not only to be possbily a new, but a *new rule in fact *(and I hope my putting 'rule' and 'fact' in the same phrase doesn't confuse those who forget that language is far looser than categorial logic). So, turning now to this 'richer' form of abdution, for a moment recall my Alexandrian-Udellian thought-experiment involving deduction, whereas before I had even removed my sample from the bag (=the rule), I always-already and *necessarily* know the character of the sample even before it is drawn from the bag. Well, I've been arguing all along in this thread and for years that I see this second kind of abduction as something like *that* in reverse, noting, for starters, that in the bean examples that *both *deduction and abduction commence at a rule (in this sense, deduction and abduction *mirror* each other--see my first post for a comment on that notion which I can't discuss further now). I have been suggesting in this thread and elsewhere that, and strangely not unlike deductive inference, in one sense, one imagines (hypothesizes, abduces) that she *knows a rule*; that out of the wealth of her knowledge, training, actually doing science, being an especially smart cookie, etc. that her well-trained mind has indeed hypothesized a new rule.. At that moment, and for the purposes of our thought-experiment, that new rule* is already "in the bag," *so to speak--and pun intended. But rather than putting my hands in and knowing without even withdrawing them that the beans will be white, I just suppose that experimental testing may *possibly* confirm my hypothesis regarding the characteristics (1ns) and, say, physical reality which the hypothesis hopes will be covered by this new rule, that experimental testing *in the world* (2ns) will show its validity. In other words, she hopes that her, possbily several years of, hard work on that theory, will have resulted in a valid theory. (This second approach to abduction in the bean example is meant as both an extension of and a deepening of it in going beyond the sleuthing type of abduction to include the abduction of a new, hitherto unknown theory.) Jon wrote: Can the same be said of presenting the Rule first in hypothesis/abduction, as Peirce does in CP 2.623? I am still inclined to think otherwise--consistent with CP 5.189, the surprising fact (Result) properly comes first, followed by the circumstances of its occurrence (Rule) as the reason why the surprising fact would be a matter of course if the credible conjecture (Case) is true. So besides having three different conclusions, the three forms of inference have three different starting points--Rule/Case/Result for deduction, Case/Result/Rule for induction, and Result/Rule/Case for abduction. In my view, the various analyses of the possible meanings of "the surprising fact" which have been put forth here (and which tend to put it at odds with the three patterns laid out by Peirce in the bean example) are, somewhat arbitrarily based on, imo, not much evidence. Firstly, CP 5.189 is from a lecture, and as such it uses language well, shall we say, rather *freely* to get its various points across. I think, for example, that attempting to make of 'fact' in the phrase "the surprising fact," to mean that it must be some sort of 2ns since Peirce in certain formal situations (in particular those dealing with facticity and categoriality) employs it in that way, rather tortures the word in this context. For this and a host of reasons only hinted at above, I believe that Peirce was correct in ordering the three inferences patterns as he did in at 2.623. In short, I have not seen arguments that persuade me that he was while, from another standpoint, I find the phrase, "a surprising fact" to have perhaps little to motivate the great hypothesizers of the world (what was the surprising fact which motivated Newton, for example?) Not to say that there aren't unresolved questions, anomalies and the like. But are they truly the greatest motivators of scientific inquiry and hypothesis generation (I'm not saying that they *never* are. . .) So, as to the categoriality of rule/case/resutl, I think I'll stick with my earlier analyses but try to add a few examples to support my position. Firstly, there seems to be no disagreement whatsoever, among those who are attempting to apply categorial associations to the three inference patterns, that a 'rule', as a kind of 'law', must be a 3ns. It seems so fundamentally Peircean to associate law with 3ns that I am pretty certain that there can be no question here. Now, as for induction and abduction, I have argued that the bean example in particular makes it clear--at least to me-- that in such exemplary cases involving *sampling*, that a sample *is *some existential (or, quasi-existential) part of some larger whole, that that existential something is a 2ns within some greater universe of experience the laws of which govern (rule) that case. Certainly "sample" will have a decidedly different emphasis in meaning for each of the three inference patterns. It is perhaps more problematic in abduction than in deduction and induction, since in abduction the sample is expanded, so to speak, so as to represent *all* that that scientific theory or theatrical play or novel *might* refer to (might govern). But it is still at least quasi-existential, whether relating to the world of the events occurring in a play, say, *Hamlet*, or the entire physical universe for some of the theorizing of Newton and Einstein. But whatever its characters (whether 'literary' or 'scientific'), whatever its firstnesses may be, the case-referent in abduction is to 'a universe of experience' which *might* be sampled (even in literature, say, for stylistic consistency), experimented upon, excerpted from (say, a scene from *Hamlet,* as a convincing 'slice' of that imagined world, etc.) For both the literary work and for the scientific theory I would suggest that this imagined world is altogether *virtual*. Perhaps John Updike suggests what action an author might take to bring this world into being (mutatis mutandis for the theorist). *Marching Through a Novel* Each morning my characters greet me with misty faces willing, though chilled, to muster for another day’s progress through dazzling quicksand, the march of blank paper. With instant obedience they change clothes and mannerisms, drop a speech impediment, develop a motive backwards to suit the deed’s done. They extend skeletal arms for the handcuffs of contrivance, slog through docilely maneuvers of coincidence, look toward me hopefully, their general and quartermaster, for a clearer face, a bigger heart. I do what l can for them, but it is not enough. *Forward* is my order, though their bandages unravel and some have no backbones and some turn traitor like heads with two faces and some fall forgotten in the trench work of loose threads, poor puffs of cartoon flak. *Forward*. Believe me, I love them though I march them to finish them off. I have thoroughly enjoyed this discussion, and must especially thank Jon S for pushing me *hard* to better explain myself in the course of it. But I have now expended much more time than I legitately should have given other really quite pressing concerns. Thus, I hope others will continue this discussion, and I'll drop in later if I have anything further to add. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 5:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Thanks for your patience and persistence. You make a good case (no pun > intended) that the logic of deduction is more clearly presented by giving > the Rule first, followed by the Case as something that necessarily falls > under it; and that this was one of the specific points that Peirce intended > to convey in the passage of interest. Hence, that sequence (3ns/2ns/1ns) > is to be preferred, even if it is not strictly required. > > Can the same be said of presenting the Rule first in hypothesis/abduction, > as Peirce does in CP 2.623? I am still inclined to think > otherwise--consistent with CP 5.189, the surprising fact (Result) properly > comes first, followed by the circumstances of its occurrence (Rule) as the > reason why the surprising fact would be a matter of course if the credible > conjecture (Case) is true. So besides having three different conclusions, > the three forms of inference have three different starting > points--Rule/Case/Result for deduction, Case/Result/Rule for induction, and > Result/Rule/Case for abduction. > > Of course, it also remains unresolved between us whether the surprising > fact in abduction corresponds to Firstness, as the Result does in > deduction; or to Secondness, as Peirce typically categorizes facts in other > contexts. And I still see guessing a Rule as induction, rather than > abduction; one must know (or presuppose) that these white beans are from > this bag in order to infer that all of the beans in this bag are (probably) > white. See my comments on the Kepler example, as well. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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