Ben - I don't think that you should 'assume that any of us is 'right' in our
interpretations of Peirce. You'll have to come to your own conclusions. BUT -
there is a great difference in our interpretations - of that, there is no doubt.
I see Peircean semiosis as necessarily interactional; there is no such thing as
a Sign [the triad] or even the Relations, as an isolate 'thing-in-itself'.
Signs exist only within interaction. And, I see the categories as the
method-of-organization of matter/concepts. And, as noted, this organization
takes place within interactions.
Therefore, in differentiation from Jon, for example, I don't see Firstness as
having any isolational reality. ALL of the three categorical modes funcion only
within the interactional dynamics that is semiosis.
My interpretation, as I said, is that an interaction [which is itself a
Relation or a triadic Sign] can function in a mode of Firstness - which is to
say, it is a qualitative feeling in that instant of the interaction. The brute
or immediate reaction to this stimuli is in a mode of Secondness. The habitual
reaction that might guide this first brute reaction and decision of 'what to
do' would be in a mode of Thirdness.
As for the other questions on God's reality - as an atheist - I'll stay out of
that. Plus, no-one has yet defined 'God'...and I think that would have to be a
basic first step in discussing any 'reality'. And if one moves into nominalism
- as the Anselm conceptualism seems to do - well...that's not going into
reality!
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Ben Novak
To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 10:54 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Dear Jon:
There are several issues floating around.
1. Example of firstness, secondness, thirdness
You disagree with my example, as well as its amendment, but give a definition
of secondness that, unfortunately, does not compute for me. I assume you are
right, but you may be at a level of abstraction that is way above my pay grade,
as it were.
In any event, I suggest that you think, at least in relation to me, on a
pedagogical level, i.e., teaching at the level of the student. For example, in
physics, I am told, introductory courses still begin with the old idea of the
atom with planet-like things called electrons whirling around a nucleus--even
though in more advanced courses in quantum physics these rudimentary examples
will be shown to be quite inaccurate. Nevertheless, once a clear, simple, and
elementary example is implanted, it is far easier to correct an elementary
example later by adding complicating factors, than to insist on the most
complications at the beginning, because the latter will likely prevent the
student from ever grasping the concept. In other words, start simple.
There is an old saying that wherever you have two philosophers together,
there are at least three opinions. In this regard, I am honored that Edwina
agrees with my example. Thank you, Edwina, for chiming in. You make things much
more lively.
2. Original thread topic
Moving on, there is another issue raised in Jon's email of 11:18 yesterday.
First, he thanks me for "steer(ing) the the discussion back to the original
thread topic". The original thread topic listed four questions that needed to
be addressed:
1.. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of the
nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and their
"logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or
something else?
2.. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically connected with "the
hypothesis of God's reality"?
3.. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of
thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, deductively
trace and inductively test?
4.. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the nature of
thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would thereby also be
"proved.
My suggestion was that the best way to answer the question posed in #1, is to
begin with the questions posed in #2, #3, and #4.
In his most recent email, however, Jon disagrees, writing,
I am not asking about the NA itself; I am asking about the "theory of the
nature of thinking" that Peirce does not clearly identify, but claims is
logically connected with "the hypothesis of God's Reality" in such a way that a
proof of the former would also constitute a proof of the latter.
Now, I appreciate Jon's desire to attack the problem of the Peirce's theory
of thinking frontally, but sometimes the best way to attack it is to go around
it, i.e., search out a weakness in the flanks or rear (to use a military
analogy). Such an opening is suggested in the very quotation from Peirce that
Jon offers, where Peirce says: "the hypothesis of God's Reality is logically
not so isolated a conclusion as it may seem."
Further, Jom summarizes Bowman as pointing out that Peirce "acknowledged that
the retroductive conjecture of the Reality of God is unlike a typical
scientific hypothesis--it is not amenable to deductive explication and
inductive corroboration. Peirce proposed the alternative of going through
those steps with his "theory of the nature of thinking" instead, because "the
hypothesis of God's Reality is logically ... connected so with" this theory
that "proving" the latter would suffice to "prove" the former."
Now, while Peirce says that if we prove the theory of thinking, then the
proof of God's reality is sufficiently proved, the search Jon wants to conduct
is to find the theory of thinking. If that is what we don't know, then its
connection to the hypothesis of God's reality would seem to be the place to
begin. In other words, we need to think backward from the hypothesis of God's
reality to discover the theory of thinking that proves it
Syllogism:
The fact that Peirce states that a theory of the nature of thinking will
.prove the hypothesis of God's reality is a surprising fact.
But if we knew what would (or would be required to) prove God's Reality, we
would understand (or at least have an example of) the theory of the nature of
thinking.
Therefore, the thing to investigate is the hypothesis of God's reality.
Which, by the way, is exactly the course that Peirce takes by suggesting a
theory of the nature of thinking in a work called A or The "Neglected Argument
for the Reality of God."
So, I suggest that we all help Jon in his quest to discover Peirce's theory
of the nature of thinking, by following both the logic dictated by the
situation, and and by following Peirce's example of tying it to an
understanding of what it may take to prove the hypothesis of God's Reality.
Let me just add one--kind of--snarky remark. If we were to follow this course
with any degree of success, we would undoubtedly have to engage with other
disciplines and lines of thought, and could possibly even make some
contribution to the thought of other thinkers, philosophers, and disciplines.
Heaven forfend!
I hope you all enjoy the humor in that...
Ben
Ben Novak
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702
"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart
will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes
may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message
will have gone." Oswald Spengler
On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 9:23 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Edwina, List:
Apparently we disagree once more, and I will try to be more careful going
forward about how I express my interpretation of Peirce. My understanding is
that he classified anything "singular," any event that happens or occurs, as
Secondness; and that he considered any "interaction" to be Secondness, because
it entails (at least) two subjects reacting with each other. Again, Firstness
is that which is as it is, independent of anything else. An extended excerpt
from "The Logic of Mathematics: An Attempt to Develop My Categories from
Within" (1896) is pertinent here.
CSP: We remark among phenomena three categories of elements.
The first comprises the qualities of phenomena, such as red, bitter,
tedious, hard, heartrending, noble; and there are doubtless manifold varieties
utterly unknown to us ... It is sufficient that wherever there is a phenomenon
there is a quality; so that it might almost seem that there is nothing else in
phenomena. The qualities merge into one another. They have no perfect
identities, but only likenesses, or partial identities. Some of them, as the
colors and the musical sounds, form well-understood systems. Probably, were
our experience of them not so fragmentary, there would be no abrupt
demarcations between them, at all. Still, each one is what it is in itself
without help from the others. They are single but partial determinations.
The second category of elements of phenomena comprises the actual facts.
The qualities, in so far as they are general, are somewhat vague and potential.
But an occurrence is perfectly individual. It happens here and now. A
permanent fact is less purely individual; yet so far as it is actual, its
permanence and generality only consist in its being there at every individual
instant. Qualities are concerned in facts but they do not make up facts.
Facts also concern subjects which are material substances. We do not see them
as we see qualities, that is, they are not in the very potentiality and essence
of sense. But we feel facts resist our will. That is why facts are
proverbially called brutal. Now mere qualities do not resist. It is the
matter that resists. Even in actual sensation there is a reaction. Now mere
qualities, unmaterialized, cannot actually react ... All that I here insist
upon is that quality is one element of phenomena, and fact, action, actuality
is another. We shall undertake the analysis of their natures below.
The third category of elements of phenomena consists of what we call laws
when we contemplate them from the outside only, but which when we see both
sides of the shield we call thoughts. Thoughts are neither qualities nor
facts. They are not qualities because they can be produced and grow, while a
quality is eternal, independent of time and of any realization ... A thought
then is not a quality. No more is it a fact. For a thought is general. I had
it. I imparted it to you. It is general on that side. It is also general in
referring to all possible things, and not merely to those which happen to
exist. No collection of facts can constitute a law; for the law goes beyond
any accomplished facts and determines how facts that may be, but all of which
never can have happened, shall be characterized. There is no objection to
saying that a law is a general fact, provided it be understood that the general
has an admixture of potentiality in it, so that no congeries of actions here
and now can ever make a general fact. As general, the law, or general fact,
concerns the potential world of quality, while as fact, it concerns the actual
world of actuality. Just as action requires a peculiar kind of subject,
matter, which is foreign to mere quality, so law requires a peculiar kind of
subject, the thought, or, as the phrase in this connection is, the mind, as a
peculiar kind of subject foreign to mere individual action. Law, then, is
something as remote from both quality and action as these are remote from one
another. (CP 1.418-420)
This is also another example of where I see Peirce rather explicitly
associating all thought(s) with Thirdness.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 7:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Ben - I think you are correct in your example and definition of Firstness
and Secondness. That is, the sound/shock wave that you feel in your body IS an
example of Firstness. As Peirce writes, this is a STATE, not a reaction [which
would be Secondness].
"A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to pass....a
feeling is a state, which is in its entirety in every moment of time as long as
it endures". 1.307.
Think of Firstness as a STATE, a singular experience, a whole feeling.
Firstness is a state that affects another body, so to speak. It is not just the
sound/shock wave isolate from interaction but is instead the interaction of
that sound/shockwave with another. That interaction, which is a qualitative
state, is Firstness. Remember, Peircean semiosis requires a network, an
interaction; nothing is isolate-in-itself.
Secondness develops when the other part of the interaction reacts. So,
Secondness, just as you point out, is your body's flinching or other reaction.
All of this is part of the process of Mind. Again, as Peirce writes
"Every operation of the mind, however complex, has its absolutely simple
feeling, the emotion of the tout ensemble" 1.311.
This points to, again, the fact that Firstness is not an isolate state
but an interactional state.
Edwina
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