Dear Jerry, List:
You ask two questions. First, what is
Anselm's ontological argument. Thankfully,
that is easy to answer. It is short, and I
append it to this email at the end.
Your second question is why "you are imposing the
question on us, which includes me [Jerry
Rhee]?
First. let
me clarify for the record: I am not
from Missouri, and only used that phrase
assuming everyone is familiar with it, in
order to get to the "show me" part. Further,
I do not know whether everyone in Missouri
has heard of Anselm's ontological argument,
though I assume not.
However, I would expect (silly me!) that
anyone with a Ph.D. would have heard of it,
since it is pretty nearly the most famous
argument about God's existence in the
history of philosophy, and would be expected
to be brought up in any introductory, or
history of, philosophy course or in any
conversation or study anytime anyone
questions whether God exists.
Further, since we are talking about
Peirce's "Neglected Argument for the Reality
of God," Anselm's argument would naturally
come to mind as soon as anyone inquires into
why Peirce thought his argument had been
"neglected." In other words, the very title
of Peirce's paper points to other arguments
for God's existence in the context of which
he is placing his. But it is worth noting
that Peirce did not claim that he had a new
argument, but suggests by his title that it
may have arisen before and was merely
"neglected." So he was bringing a long
neglected argument back into view. At least
I take that to be one possible
interpretation of the suggestion in his
title.(On the other hand, I take Peirce's
title to imply that he felt his argument had
been neglected because it was so simple!!!!
that no one thought to dignify it
previously. Silly me.)
Since the original questions that
commenced this chain include "How exactly is "this
theory of thinking" logically connected
with "the hypothesis of God's reality"? I assumed that that was
to be one of the major questions dealt
with in the discussion, which Jon thought
to begin by asking his four questions.
Now, the
ontological argument has evoked a
stupendous literature in philosophy and
logic, because it seems to prove the
existence of God by a purely logical and
non-empirical method. That is why it is
called ontological, i.e., the argument
proceeds only from being (_onto_=being).
Philosophers agree that Anselm makes at
least two different arguments in chapters
II and III, though some philosophers find
three and even four separate arguments.
Many logicians have wrestled with it, and
some logicians see it as a "modal"
argument.
The Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a very
brief and readable description of Anselm's
ontological argument: Be sure to read
sections 1, 2a, 3, and 4.
I hope that you will agree, after reading
the brief account in the link above that
Anselm is quite relevant to placing Peirce's
"neglected" argument into context. The
connection is that both Anselm and Peirce
seek to prove God's existence purely from a
thought process.
Now, if you want to read a different take
on Anselm's understanding of what is meant
by "existence," I invite you to read my
article entitled "Anselm on Nothing," in
the International Philosophical Quarterly,
Volume 48, Issue 3, September 2008, pages
305-320, which you may read on line here:
For this second link, it must be borne in
mind that Anselm wrote two tracts relating
to God's existence (or being), and the first
link deals with his second work, the Proslogion,
where his famous ontological argument is
found (appended below), while the second
link (my article) deals mostly with Anselm's
arguments in his first work, the Monologion.
(Understand, too, that my views though
increasingly cited are nevertheless
minority.)
Understand too that Peirce's works were
constantly on my mind throughout writing
"Anselm on Nothing," and that I planned to
write a second article on Peirce and Anselm,
but was largely discouraged from doing so by
the realization that Peirceans would
disagree with just about everything a simple
person like me would say about Peirce's
thought---which is why I was so excited when
Jon posted his questions that began this
chain.For example, I thought the example I
gave of simple firstness, secondness, and
thirdness was safe, but I received a private
email from an observer of this list that
such is not the case:
Echoing others,
the Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness
ordering in your example is too linear.
It should be Firstness-Thirdness-Secondness. That
is, some shock meets your habitual
conditioning which determines the
reaction. How else could we have
different reactions?
So, I need a lot of
enlightenment, which is why I appreciate
this forum so much.
In any
event, appended below are Chapters II,
III, and IV of the Proslogion, which contains
Anselm's famous ontological argument;
Ben
Chapter II
Therefore, O Lord, who grantest to
faith understanding, grant unto me that, so
far as Thou knowest it to be expedient for
me, I may understand that Thou art, as we
believe; and also that Thou art what we
believe Thee to be. And of a truth we
believe that Thou art somewhat than which no
greater can be conceived. Is there then
nothing real that can be thus described? for
the fool hath said in his heart, There is no
God. Yet surely even that fool himself when
he hears me speak of somewhat than which
nothing greater can be conceived under
stands what he hears, and what he
understands is in his understanding, even if
he do not under stand that it really exists.
It is one thing for a thing to be in the
understanding, and another to understand
that the thing really exists. For when a
painter considers the work which he is to
make, he has it indeed in his understanding;
but he doth not yet understand that really
to exist which as yet he has not made. But
when he has painted his picture, then he
both has the picture in his understanding,
and also under stands it really to exist.
Thus even the fool is certain that something
exists, at least in his understanding, than
which nothing greater can be conceived;
because, when he hears this mentioned, he
understands it, and whatsoever is
understood, exists in the understanding. And
surely that than which no greater can be
conceived cannot exist only in the
understanding. For if it exist indeed in the
understanding only, it can be thought to
exist also in reality; and real existence is
more than existence in the under standing
only. If then that than which no greater can
be conceived exists in the understanding
only, then that than which no greater can be
conceived is something a greater than which
can be conceived: but this is impossible.
There fore it is certain that something than
which no greater can be conceived exists
both in the under standing and also in
reality.
Chapter II
Not only does this something than
which no greater can be conceived exist, but
it exists in so true a sense that it cannot
even be conceived not to exist. For it is
possible to form the conception of an object
whose non-existence shall be inconceivable;
and such an object is of necessity greater
than any object whose existence is
conceivable: wherefore if that than which no
greater can be conceived can be conceived
not to exist; it follows that that than
which no greater can be conceived is not
that than which no greater can be conceived
[for there can be thought a greater than it,
namely, an object whose non-existence shall
be inconceivable]; and this brings us to a
contradiction. And thus it is proved that
that thing than which no greater can be
conceived exists in so true a sense, that it
cannot even be conceived not to exist: and
this thing art Thou, O Lord our God! And so
Thou, O Lord my God, existest in so true a
sense that Thou canst not even be conceived
not to exist. And this is as is fitting. For
if any mind could conceive aught better than
Thee, then the creature would be ascending
above the Creator, and judging the Creator;
which is a supposition very absurd. Thou
therefore dost exist in a truer sense than
all else beside Thee, and art more real than
all else beside Thee; because whatsoever
else existeth, existeth in a less true sense
than Thou, and therefore is less real than
Thou. Why then said the fool in his heart,
There is no God, when it is so plain to a
rational mind that Thou art more real than
any thing else? Why, except that he is a
fool indeed?
Chapter IV
But how came the fool to say in his
heart that which he could not conceive? or
how came he to be able not to conceive that
which yet he said in his heart? For it may
be thought that to conceive and to say in
one’s heart are one and the same thing. If
it is true—nay, because it is true, that he
conceived it, because he said it in his
heart; and also true that he did not say it
in his heart because he could not conceive
it; it follows that there are two senses in
which something may be understood to be
conceived or said in the heart. For in one
sense we are said to have a conception of
something, when we have a conception of the
word that signifies it; and in another
sense, when we understand what the thing
really is. In the former sense then we may
say that God is conceived not to exist: but
in the latter, He cannot by any means be
conceived not to exist. For no man that
understandeth what fire and water mean, can
conceive that fire is really water; though
he may have this conception, as far as the
words go. Thus in like manner no man that
understandeth what God is can conceive that
God does not exist; although he may say
these words [that God does not exist] either
with no meaning at all, or with some other
meaning than that which they properly bear.
For God is that than which no greater can be
conceived. He who well under standeth what
this is, certainly understandeth it to be
such as cannot even be conceived not to
exist. Whosoever therefore understandeth in
this way that God exists, cannot conceive
that he does not exist. Thanks be to Thee, O
good Lord, thanks be to Thee! because that
which heretofore I believed by Thy grace, I
now by Thine illumination thus understand,
so that, even though I should not wish to
believe in Thine existence, I cannot but
understand that Thou dost exist.
