Edwina, List: ET: The universe is, after all, a physico-chemical existentiality, as Helmut points out.
And this is a matter of fact, which therefore (according to Peirce) calls for an explanation. Why is there (now) something, rather than (still) nothing? ET: It is almost impossible to discover what 'existed' before this physico-chemical existentiality. I am genuinely curious--why do you characterize it as *almost* impossible, rather than just plain impossible? ET: To suggest, as many have done, a metaphysical non-existential creator [God] is pure rhetoric. You either believe it or don't believe it. There is no proof - logical or empirical. The long history of philosophical arguments for the existence/reality of God indicates otherwise. You may not find any of these "proofs" convincing, but that does not entail that they are "pure rhetoric," nor that one's belief or disbelief in God is merely an arbitrary resolution of the will, and thus purely a manifestation of tenacity and/or authority. I have *reasons *for believing that God is real, as did Peirce; and you presumably have *reasons *for believing that God is *not *real. We can discuss those reasons, even if we never end up agreeing on which position is more rationally justified. ET: I don't see that we can discuss what went on before this physico-chemical existence of the Universe ... Well, we have been doing exactly that in this thread and others, mainly because Peirce did it quite a bit throughout his writings. There is always a certain amount of speculation involved, to be sure, but the point of any cosmological/transcendental argument--whether positing God, a multi-verse, or some other explanation--is to identify what was necessary for "this physico-chemical existence of the Universe" to come about in the first place, and to exhibit the degree of order and reasonableness that it does. CSP: But twenty years later, if you aspired to pass for a commanding intellect, you would have to pull a long face and declare that "It is not the business of science to search for origins." This maxim was a masterpiece, since no timid soul, in dread of being thought naive, would dare inquire what "origins" were, albeit the secret confessor within his breast compelled the awful self-acknowledgment of his having no idea into what else than "origins" of phenomena (in some sense of that indefinite word) man can inquire. (CP 6.460) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 12:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > I agree with Helmut. I think, for example, the nature of the > pre-universe is a 'seminar-room debate' ; i.e., symbolic, and ought to > remain there for those who enjoy the smoke and rhetoric of a seminar room. > I don't. > > The universe is, after all, a physico-chemical existentiality, as Helmut > points out. It is almost impossible to discover what 'existed' before this > physico-chemical existentiality. To suggest, as many have done, a > metaphysical non-existential creator [God] is pure rhetoric. You either > believe it or don't believe it. There is no proof - logical or empirical. > > We CAN empirically examine, however, the Three Categories within this > physico-chemical existentiality; the state of Feeling of Firstness; the > brute interaction of Secondoness; the development of habits of morphology > of Thirdness. I don't see that we can discuss what went on before this > physico-chemical existence of the Universe - and I, for one, don't see that > the Categories were 'real' or operational in the assumed 'Nothingness' of > the pre-univese. > > Edwina >
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