Kirsti, List:
What problems do you think I am trying to solve with definitions?
What is intrinsically nominalistic about working with definitions?
Peirce associated them with the second grade of clarity, and wrote
many of them for the _Century Dictionary_ and Baldwin's _Dictionary_.
How would one go about better understanding the concepts of
universal/general/continuous and particular/singular/individual by
means of "strict experimental work"?
Since you brought it up, I actually found no mentions of "atomos" but
three of "atomon" in the Collected Papers.
This distinction between the absolutely indivisible and that which
is one in number from a particular point of view is shadowed forth
in the two words _individual _{to ATOMON} and _singular _(to kath'
hekaston); but as those who have used the word _individual _have not
been aware that absolute individuality is merely ideal, it has come
to be used in a more general sense. (CP 3.93; 1870)
(As a technical term of logic, _individuum _first appears in
Boëthius, in a translation from Victorinus, no doubt of {ATOMON}, a
word used by Plato (_Sophistes_, 229 D) for an indivisible species,
and by Aristotle, often in the same sense, but occasionally for an
individual. Of course the physical and mathematical senses of the
word were earlier. Aristotle's usual term for individuals is {ta
kath' hekasta}, Latin _singularia_, English _singulars_.) Used in
logic in two closely connected senses. (1) According to the more
formal of these an individual is an object (or term) not only
actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each general
character and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated
by its mode of being to be so determinate. See Particular (in logic)
... (2) Another definition which avoids the above difficulties is
that an individual is something which reacts. That is to say, it
does react against some things, and is of such a nature that it
might react, or have reacted, against my will. (CP 3.611-613; 1911)
But experience only informs us that single objects exist, and that
each of these at each single date exists only in a single place.
These, no doubt, are what Aristotle meant by {to kath' hekaston} and
by {ai prötai ousiai} in his earlier works, particularly the
Predicaments. For {ousia} there plainly means existent, and {to ti
einai} is existence. (I cannot satisfy myself that this was his
meaning in his later writings; nor do I think it possible that
Aristotle was such a dolt as never to modify his metaphysical
opinions.) But {to ATOMON} was, I think, the strict logical
individual, determinate in every respect. In the metaphysical
sense, existence is that mode of being which consists in the
resultant genuine dyadic relation of a strict individual with all
the other such individuals of the same universe. (CP 6.335-336; c.
1909)
Regards,
Jon
On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 11:39 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
Solving problems with definitions and defining is the nominalistic
way to proceed.
I do not work in the way of presenting definitions. - I work with
doing something, with a (more or less) systematic method. - Just
like in a laboratory.
I have done strict experimental work. And strict up to most
meticulous details!
Since then, I have been studieing tests. With just as keely
meticulous aattitude.
Definitions I do abhorre.
If you are looking for definitions, you'll be certainly going amiss
with CSP. - So I will not offer you any.
CSP does mention ATOMOS, once. Referring to Ariatotle and the
ancients.
Best,
Kirsti
Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 17.1.2017 16:12:
Kirsti, List:
KM: Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not
consist of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or
not so. A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without
breaking the very continuity you are trying to capture. - It
presents just the same geometrical problem as do points.
You are correct, "segment" was probably a poor choice of word on my
part.
KM: You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of
thinking) by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle).
What specific "nominalistic ways of thinking" do you detect in my
posts? How would you define an "individual" from a Peircean
standpoint?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
[2]
On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 5:04 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
Jon S.
Not only is continuity the most difficult problem for philosophy to
handle, it is also the most difficult problem for mathematics to
handle.
Taking into consideration the view of CSP that we always have to
start with math, then proceed to phenomenology, and only after this
try to handle logic (in the broad sense or in ny more restricted
sense), it follows that some (not yet definable) mathematical ideas
should be developed. - Such may not as yet exist!
Viewing Moore's collection of mathematical writings of CSP & his
introductions there seems to prevail a basic misunderstanding of
the
relation between continua and continuity.
Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not consist
of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or not so.
A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without breaking the
very continuity you are trying to capture. - It presents just the
same geometrical problem as do points.
One has to start with (geometrical) topology. A topic SCP says so
little about e.g. in Kaina Stoicheia. - He only states that it must
come first. And followed by perspective, and only after these any
kinds of measuring.
But what kind of topology? - And how and why the simplest math must
come before phenomenology & be followed by (a special kind of)
phenomenology?
Definitely not Husserlian, according to CSP.
But there are grounds in the writings of CSP to assume that
Hegelian dialectics, with the three moments, are not such a far
catch.
You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of thinking)
by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle).
True continuity involves time. (And vice versa: time involves
continuity.) They are like RECTO and VERSO in CSP's Existential
Graphs.
Or a jacket with a lining. Most jackets do have a separable inside
cloth but even if it is taken away, there always remains a RECTO
and
VERSO. As well as both taken together: the jacket!
With this there comes triadicity.
Keen to hear your response,
Kirsti
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
