Dear list:
Disputation/eristic and not dialectic: *Gor.* And if the last is false, is the first false? *Soc.* It follows. *Gor.* If, then, black is white, does it follow, that black is not smooth? *Soc.* It does. *Gor.* Black-white is not smooth? *Soc.* What do you mean? *Gor.* Can any dead man speak? *Soc.* No, indeed. *Gor.* And is any speaking man dead? *Soc.* I say, no. *Gor.* And is any good king tyrannical? *Soc.* No. *Gor.* And is any tyrannical king good? *Soc.* I just said no. *Gor.* And you said, too, that no rough black is white, did you not? *Soc.* Yes. *Gor.* Then, is any black-white, rough? *Soc.* No. “Out of Plato come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought… For it is fair to credit the broadest generalizer with all the particulars deducible from his thesis.” ~ Emerson, Plato; or, the Philosopher Best, Jerry R On Sat, Jan 21, 2017 at 10:04 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > wrote: > Kirsti, List: > > What you wrote on Tuesday: "Definitions I do abhorre." > > What I wrote on Thursday: "You say now that you are not denying the > usefulness of definitions, > but you said before that you abhor definitions." > > What you wrote today: "I definitely never said that I "abhorr > definitions"." > > All of these comments are copied directly from the messages threaded > below. Needless to say, I am even more confused now, and still wondering > what exactly you find "nominalistic" about my "ways of thinking." > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Sat, Jan 21, 2017 at 7:26 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Sorry Jon. Again. - I definitely never said that I "abhorr definitions". >> If you do not regocnize an intrepretation here, compared to what I wrote, >> I'm afraid there is nothing to discuss. - We are not on anything like a >> same page. >> >> Kirsti >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 19.1.2017 16:25: >> >>> Kirsti, List: >>> >>> Just to clarify, Alan is my middle name; I go by Jon. >>> >>> What makes you think that I am missing that "crucial aspect"? I >>> provided this quote very early in the thread. >>> >>> But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in the >>>> sense of that which has no generality and which here appears as a >>>> mere ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider >>>> sense of that which can be only in one place at one time. It will >>>> be convenient to call the former singular and the latter only an >>>> individual … With reference to individuals, I shall only remark >>>> that there are certain general terms whose objects can only be in >>>> one place at one time, and these are called individuals. They are >>>> generals that is, not singulars, because these latter occupy neither >>>> time nor space, but can only be at one point and can only be at one >>>> date. (W2:180-181; 1868) >>>> >>> >>> You say now that you are not denying the usefulness of definitions, >>> but you said before that you abhor definitions. I find this >>> confusing. Again, how would one go about better understanding the >>> concepts of universal/general/continuous and >>> particular/singular/individual by means of "strict experimental work"? >>> In other words, how can we achieve the third grade of clarity >>> regarding those concepts? >>> >>> Most importantly, I am still wondering what you find "nominalistic" >>> about my "ways of thinking." On a Peirce list, that is a rather >>> serious allegation. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 19, 2017 at 7:51 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Alan, >>>> >>>> Sorry for the typo. - Sill it seems to me you miss a crucial aspect >>>> of ' to kath ekaston', what is singular. - The difference lies in it >>>> being determinate only as long as 'time is so'. - What is real, in >>>> contrast to existent individuals, always lies (partly) in the >>>> future. Thus it is never wholly determined, but possesses the >>>> element of vagueness, never wholly captured by any definition. >>>> >>>> I am not denying the usefulness of definitions. - By no means. >>>> >>>> With all respect, >>>> >>>> Kirsti >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 17.1.2017 22:10: >>>> Kirsti, List: >>>> >>>> What problems do you think I am trying to solve with definitions? >>>> >>>> What is intrinsically nominalistic about working with definitions? >>>> Peirce associated them with the second grade of clarity, and wrote >>>> many of them for the _Century Dictionary_ and Baldwin's >>>> _Dictionary_. >>>> >>>> How would one go about better understanding the concepts of >>>> universal/general/continuous and particular/singular/individual by >>>> means of "strict experimental work"? >>>> >>>> Since you brought it up, I actually found no mentions of "atomos" >>>> but >>>> three of "atomon" in the Collected Papers. >>>> >>>> This distinction between the absolutely indivisible and that which >>>> is one in number from a particular point of view is shadowed forth >>>> in the two words _individual _{to ATOMON} and _singular _(to kath' >>>> hekaston); but as those who have used the word _individual _have >>>> not >>>> been aware that absolute individuality is merely ideal, it has come >>>> to be used in a more general sense. (CP 3.93; 1870) >>>> >>>> (As a technical term of logic, _individuum _first appears in >>>> Boëthius, in a translation from Victorinus, no doubt of {ATOMON}, >>>> a >>>> word used by Plato (_Sophistes_, 229 D) for an indivisible species, >>>> and by Aristotle, often in the same sense, but occasionally for an >>>> individual. Of course the physical and mathematical senses of the >>>> word were earlier. Aristotle's usual term for individuals is {ta >>>> kath' hekasta}, Latin _singularia_, English _singulars_.) Used in >>>> logic in two closely connected senses. (1) According to the more >>>> formal of these an individual is an object (or term) not only >>>> actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each general >>>> character and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated >>>> by its mode of being to be so determinate. See Particular (in >>>> logic) >>>> ... (2) Another definition which avoids the above difficulties is >>>> that an individual is something which reacts. That is to say, it >>>> does react against some things, and is of such a nature that it >>>> might react, or have reacted, against my will. (CP 3.611-613; 1911) >>>> >>>> But experience only informs us that single objects exist, and that >>>> each of these at each single date exists only in a single place. >>>> These, no doubt, are what Aristotle meant by {to kath' hekaston} >>>> and >>>> by {ai prötai ousiai} in his earlier works, particularly the >>>> Predicaments. For {ousia} there plainly means existent, and {to ti >>>> einai} is existence. (I cannot satisfy myself that this was his >>>> meaning in his later writings; nor do I think it possible that >>>> Aristotle was such a dolt as never to modify his metaphysical >>>> opinions.) But {to ATOMON} was, I think, the strict logical >>>> >>>> individual, determinate in every respect. In the metaphysical >>>> sense, existence is that mode of being which consists in the >>>> resultant genuine dyadic relation of a strict individual with all >>>> the other such individuals of the same universe. (CP 6.335-336; c. >>>> 1909) >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 11:39 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> Solving problems with definitions and defining is the nominalistic >>>> way to proceed. >>>> I do not work in the way of presenting definitions. - I work with >>>> doing something, with a (more or less) systematic method. - Just >>>> like in a laboratory. >>>> >>>> I have done strict experimental work. And strict up to most >>>> meticulous details! >>>> >>>> Since then, I have been studieing tests. With just as keely >>>> meticulous aattitude. >>>> >>>> Definitions I do abhorre. >>>> >>>> If you are looking for definitions, you'll be certainly going amiss >>>> with CSP. - So I will not offer you any. >>>> >>>> CSP does mention ATOMOS, once. Referring to Ariatotle and the >>>> ancients. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Kirsti >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 17.1.2017 16:12: >>>> Kirsti, List: >>>> >>>> KM: Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not >>>> consist of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or >>>> not so. A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without >>>> breaking the very continuity you are trying to capture. - It >>>> presents just the same geometrical problem as do points. >>>> >>>> You are correct, "segment" was probably a poor choice of word on my >>>> part. >>>> >>>> KM: You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of >>>> thinking) by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle). >>>> >>>> What specific "nominalistic ways of thinking" do you detect in my >>>> posts? How would you define an "individual" from a Peircean >>>> standpoint? >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] [1] [1] - >>>> >>>> twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] [2] >>>> >>>> [2] >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 5:04 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> Jon S. >>>> >>>> Not only is continuity the most difficult problem for philosophy to >>>> handle, it is also the most difficult problem for mathematics to >>>> handle. >>>> >>>> Taking into consideration the view of CSP that we always have to >>>> start with math, then proceed to phenomenology, and only after this >>>> try to handle logic (in the broad sense or in ny more restricted >>>> sense), it follows that some (not yet definable) mathematical ideas >>>> should be developed. - Such may not as yet exist! >>>> >>>> Viewing Moore's collection of mathematical writings of CSP & his >>>> introductions there seems to prevail a basic misunderstanding of >>>> the >>>> relation between continua and continuity. >>>> >>>> Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not consist >>>> of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or not so. >>>> >>>> A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without breaking the >>>> very continuity you are trying to capture. - It presents just the >>>> same geometrical problem as do points. >>>> >>>> One has to start with (geometrical) topology. A topic SCP says so >>>> little about e.g. in Kaina Stoicheia. - He only states that it must >>>> come first. And followed by perspective, and only after these any >>>> kinds of measuring. >>>> >>>> But what kind of topology? - And how and why the simplest math must >>>> come before phenomenology & be followed by (a special kind of) >>>> phenomenology? >>>> >>>> Definitely not Husserlian, according to CSP. >>>> >>>> But there are grounds in the writings of CSP to assume that >>>> Hegelian dialectics, with the three moments, are not such a far >>>> catch. >>>> >>>> You seem to be captured (along with nominalistic ways of thinking) >>>> by the notion of individual as ATOMOS (cf. Aristotle). >>>> >>>> True continuity involves time. (And vice versa: time involves >>>> continuity.) They are like RECTO and VERSO in CSP's Existential >>>> Graphs. >>>> >>>> Or a jacket with a lining. Most jackets do have a separable inside >>>> cloth but even if it is taken away, there always remains a RECTO >>>> and >>>> VERSO. As well as both taken together: the jacket! >>>> >>>> With this there comes triadicity. >>>> >>>> Keen to hear your response, >>>> >>>> Kirsti >>>> >>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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