Jon wrote: "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*" (emphasis added).
Please offer sufficient (considerable) support for this statement, in my view,, at very least a hugely overstated mere opinion. "Any philosophical stance with which he disagreed.as "nominalistic."Really? Please offer support for this, in my opinion quite misleading assertion. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 9:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Helmut, List: > > Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any > philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic." However, > my understanding is that the fundamental issue was (and presumably still > is) whether there are any real generals--or as Peirce once put it, any real > continua. This includes both qualities (1ns) and habits (3ns); i.e., both > "may-bes" and "would-bes." Peirce was especially concerned about any > approach that would posit something as real yet incognizable, or as > inexplicable; he saw both of these moves as blocking the way of inquiry. > If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we > can have no knowledge of anything real. If there are no real laws of > nature, then predictable regularities are just brute facts. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:27 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > >> Jon, Kirstima, List, >> I am not clear about (besides many others) the term "Nominalism", and why >> everybody does not like nominalism. Ockham thougt, that universals do not >> have an extra-mental substance. I think it is ok. to guess so, if I think, >> that the universe has a mind. So universals are not extra-mental, because >> they are part of the universe´s mind, and had been so even before there >> were organisms. So my question is: Is nominalism only then a stupid thing, >> if the nominalist believes that the universe is inanimate except for the >> organisms (who have not been there from the start), but if you believe that >> the universe itself is an organism (pantheism) or part of an organism >> (panentheism), then nominalism would make sense? >> Best, >> Helmut >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
