Jon, you’ve acknowledged the point that Gary R. made about your post (below) but I see another problem with it. You wrote, “If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we can have no knowledge of anything real.” But Peirce does not say that all objects of cognition are general. All thought is in signs which, if factual, have the structure of a proposition, as he says in “New Elements.” All propositions include predicates which are general, but the objects of those signs (and thus of cognition) are not all general. In fact, as I quoted earlier, Peirce says that “the totality of all real objects” is a singular, not a general (EP2:209, CP 5:152), even though some of them (such as “second intentions”) may be generals.
Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 23-Jan-17 21:01 To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> Cc: kirst...@saunalahti.fi; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual Helmut, List: Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic." However, my understanding is that the fundamental issue was (and presumably still is) whether there are any real generals--or as Peirce once put it, any real continua. This includes both qualities (1ns) and habits (3ns); i.e., both "may-bes" and "would-bes." Peirce was especially concerned about any approach that would posit something as real yet incognizable, or as inexplicable; he saw both of these moves as blocking the way of inquiry. If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we can have no knowledge of anything real. If there are no real laws of nature, then predictable regularities are just brute facts. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
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