Yes, I suppose the Nothing of Peirce is akin to the biblican 'tohuvabohu 
'formless chaos', but my point is that it does not include any direction. And 
certainly there is no metaphysical agent to introduce a direction.

This nothing is limitless possibilities BUT, after those first two 'flashes' 
outlined by Peirce, these flashes which introduce particular matter also 
introduce Thirdness or habits of formation, and these then start to limit and 
constrain the possibilities. So, I don't consider that the 'Nothing' is like 
Firstness, since my reading of Peirce posits that Firstness operates as a mode 
of organization of matter...and this requires matter to exist! That is, my 
reading of Peirce is that the three modal categories only develop when matter 
develops. So, before there was matter, this 'Nothing' is not Firstness. As 
Peirce outlines it - it is 'nothing'. Firstness is a powerful mode of 
organization of matter, rejecting closure, limits, borders. And certainly, 
since matter at this pretemporal phase hasn't developed any laws of modal 
organization, it doesn't yet function within Thirdness. 

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Helmut Raulien 
  To: tabor...@primus.ca 
  Cc: Peirce List 
  Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 1:55 PM
  Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism


  Edwina,
  I agree, by adopting PeirceĀ“s definition of "Nothing", which is only a 
no-thing, meaning no things, no secondnesses, but possibilities there are, even 
limitless. So Peirces "Nothing" is not the absence of possibilities. Maybe this 
Peircean "Nothing" is the same like the Thoran/Biblical "Tohuvabohu"? In 
contrast to a nihilistic "Nothing", in which there is nothing, not even 
possibilities, unless whoever plants some ideas into it. What I wanted to say, 
is, I think I agree with you, there just has been or is an unclarity about the 
term "nothing".
  Best,
  Helmut
    
  24. Januar 2017 um 19:30 Uhr
   "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
   
  Helmut - I'll try to reply in points below:

    1) HR: I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?) everything 
to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute facts. So bio- and 
physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no symbolic language. Only 
humans have languages, so now Nominalism for me appears to be human hybris. Is 
the linguistic turn also nominalistic? I guess so.

    Edwina: Agreed

    2) HR:  Maybe my tentative attempt to rescue Nominalism by extending the 
"mind"-concept towards the universeĀ“s mind is anthropocentric:

    EDWINA: But according to Peirce, the universe IS an evolving Mind. Don't 
worry about the 'anthropocentrism'.


    3) HR: It would mean, that possibility, firstness, is not real by itself, 
but consists of symbols of secondnesses:

    EDWINA: The categories are modes of being; that is, they are modes of how a 
'being' or individual unit is organized. The question then is: Is 'possibility' 
a real force in nature, and I think we have to acknowledge that the force in 
matter organized in a mode of Firstness, is objectively real.  A symbol is in a 
mode of Thirdness not Secondness.


    4) HR: That would be Platonism, I guess: To say, that something, an 
organism, a repeated situation, whatever, does not occur because it was 
possible (firstness), and then became a habit (thirdness), but is only a copy 
or token of a divine or super-divine (in polytheism) idea.


    EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by the above. Are you saying that the 
FORM of Platonism is in a mode of Firstness? I don't accept the notion of a 
divine idea....I think you are moving into Platonism!

    5) HR: To me it boils down to the question we have had, what was in the 
beginning: Tohuvabohu, everything was possible, then possibility was not ideas, 
but everything (in a pre-world in which "everything is possible" possibility is 
everything). Or was there "nothing" in the beginning: In this case 
possibilities are ideas, planted into the nothing (by whom or what, Mr. 
Plato?), like in Platonism. I tend towards the Tohuvabohu-Hypothesis, and 
against Nominalism. My tentative attempt (to rescue Nominalism on the basis of 
universal mind) has failed, and I am happy about that.

    EDWINA: I tend to agree with Peirce - that in the beginning, there was 
nothing. .."a state of mere indeterminancy in which nothing existed or really 
happened" 1.411. Then, "Out of the womb of indeeterminacy we must say that 
there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may 
call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second 
flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense 
after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other 
successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency 
to take them every strengthening themselves". 1.412.  He continues on outlining 
the development of habits within space and time...

    You can read from this that there was no a priori Agent [God]; no necessary 
determinism. "We start then, with nothing, pure zero....But this pure zero is 
the nothing of not having been born.  There is no individual thing, no 
compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing in which the 
whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined 
and unlimited possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and 
no law. It is boundless freedom". 6.217.

    You can read from this that Thirdness or Laws did not exist prior to 
Secondness or the appearance of particular matter. In this phase, there were 
only - the tendency to the three modal categories of the organization of 
matter. Thirdness, as a modal category, can be understood as akin to Mind, and 
emerges with matter. Peirce was quite open about his view that Mind exists and 
is operative in all forms of matter: 

    "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work 
of bees, or crystals, and throught the purely physical world" 4.551.

    This does then raise the question of 'what is Mind'? My answer, which i 
derive from Peirce, is that it is a process of all three modal categories  
where "Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such 
that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in 
effective intercommunication'. [Note. 4.550]. That is, Mind is not just 
Thirdness nor is it a metaphysical agent but is a semiosic action of all three 
categorical modes.

    Edwina


    Best,
    Helmut
      
     24. Januar 2017 um 16:07 Uhr
     "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
     
    Helmut - further to your post, where you write
    "if you believe that the universe itself is an organism (pantheism) or part 
of an organism (panentheism), then nominalism would make sense?"

    I'd say 'no' to that. I, myself, consider that the universe is an organism, 
a massive operation of 'Mind', but that's not nominalism.

    Again, as Peirce pointed out in 1.16 - the question is, 'whether laws and 
general types are figments of the mind or real". As I mentioned in an earlier 
post, the Saussurian semiology is an example of a perspective that considers 
that general types are mental concepts. That is, since nominalism is expressed 
in symbols/words, then, information becomes almost entirely operative in the 
human realm. Plants, animals, cells, molecules..become inanimate or dumb 
matter. 

    And further, as Peirce noted, the great era of nominalism emerged in the 
14th century,  with the rise of the battle against the control of thought by 
the Church. That is, with the emergence of a market economy and middle class, 
the civic individual, i.e., the non-clerical working man, began to require the 
political and economic right to individually and personally 'handle' the 
environment. This 'handling' was all about 'the being of individual thing or 
fact' [1.21]. This new age man was not interested in the amorphousness of 
general laws outside of his direct actual grasp and personal perception.

    Thus, the world of nominalism reduces everything to only one mode of being; 
that of Secondness, or existent particular objects. It ignores Firstness, that 
mode of being of isolate free possibility - or, if it acknowledges it, it is to 
transform this mode into an 'unconscious' psychological feeling within that new 
age man..which can then be brought into the consciousness by ..guess what...by 
words.

    And most certainly, nominalism rejects Thirdness, the mode of being made up 
of general laws - since, for the nominalist, laws are not real in themselves 
but are intellectual constructs of the human mind...."this general rule is 
nothing but a mere word or couple of words" [1.26].

    When we reject nominalism for its obvious limitations, I think that we have 
to be careful with analyzing the two modal categories absent in nominalism; 
Firstness and Thirdness. These are modes of being, actual means of organizing 
matter, and can't be reduced to terms or words.

    Edwina


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