.Jon, list, Jon, I don't think that there's a need for you to apologize, especially as this may simply be a matter of semantics (or an unfortunate phraseology, or my lacking a subtle sense of humor, etc.)
You wrote: "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*" (emphasis added). Then in your response to my questioning this statement wrote: "My sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious exaggeration, and it was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor job of conveying that. I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone." I'm sorry if I didn't catch your humor and didn't see your remark as "an obvious exaggeration;" while I must add that your apology seems a bit strained since you followed the just quoted comment with this qualification/explanation: JS: I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Remusat, Kant, and Hegel as nominalists, and "all modern philosophy of every sect" as nominalistic. I also read somewhere recently the general suggestion that as Peirce's scholastic realism became more and more extreme, he described more and more philosophers and/or philosophical views as nominalistic; unfortunately, I cannot seem to find that comment at the moment. Of course, at different times he wrote that even Duns Scotus (CP 8.208; c. 1905) and his younger self (CP 6.270; 1892) were "too nominalistic." In response I'd say that it is true that, as Peirce's own realism deepened in the late 19th, early 20th century into an 'extreme scholastic realism' that, as you noted, even his own earlier analyses of realism are revised in the light of it (consider the famous revision of the diamond thought experiment, for famous example). But it is not true in my view that he deemed other philosophical stances and philosophers as nominalistic *because* "he disagreed" with their views. Indeed, he draws philosophically a little or a lot from most all of them, including Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, etc. It seems to me that Peirce held the realistism/nominalism problem to be of considerable importance, perhaps even decisive in the history and potential progress of philosophy. It it this nominalistic *facet* of any--and you seem to be suggesting, perhaps, all--philosophers' work, again including his own, which he found problematic *in the extreme*. So the long and short of my criticism of your stated position is just this: To suggest that Peirce called philosophers "nominalists" *just because he disagreed with them* is not only incorrect, but tends to make him sound petty which, in my opinion, he most certainly was not. This is what in your remarks I thought might tend to mislead. I might add that I think his assessment in this matter was correct and, further, that this strong nominalistic tendency in philosophy and science continues to this day. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 11:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > Gary R., List: > > My sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious exaggeration, and > it was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor job of conveying > that. I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone. > > I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized > Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Remusat, Kant, > and Hegel as nominalists, and "all modern philosophy of every sect" as > nominalistic. I also read somewhere recently the general suggestion that > as Peirce's scholastic realism became more and more extreme, he described > more and more philosophers and/or philosophical views as nominalistic; > unfortunately, I cannot seem to find that comment at the moment. Of > course, at different times he wrote that even Duns Scotus (CP 8.208; c. > 1905) and his younger self (CP 6.270; 1892) were "too nominalistic." > > Was the rest of my response to Helmut closer to the mark? I hope so. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 9:56 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Jon wrote: >> >> "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any >> philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*" >> (emphasis added). >> >> Please offer sufficient (considerable) support for this statement, in my >> view,, at very least a hugely overstated mere opinion. "Any philosophical >> stance with which he disagreed.as "nominalistic."Really? Please offer >> support for this, in my opinion quite misleading assertion. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >> >> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 9:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Helmut, List: >>> >>> Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any >>> philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic." However, >>> my understanding is that the fundamental issue was (and presumably still >>> is) whether there are any real generals--or as Peirce once put it, any real >>> continua. This includes both qualities (1ns) and habits (3ns); i.e., both >>> "may-bes" and "would-bes." Peirce was especially concerned about any >>> approach that would posit something as real yet incognizable, or as >>> inexplicable; he saw both of these moves as blocking the way of inquiry. >>> If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we >>> can have no knowledge of anything real. If there are no real laws of >>> nature, then predictable regularities are just brute facts. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:27 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, Kirstima, List, >>>> I am not clear about (besides many others) the term "Nominalism", and >>>> why everybody does not like nominalism. Ockham thougt, that universals do >>>> not have an extra-mental substance. I think it is ok. to guess so, if I >>>> think, that the universe has a mind. So universals are not extra-mental, >>>> because they are part of the universe´s mind, and had been so even before >>>> there were organisms. So my question is: Is nominalism only then a stupid >>>> thing, if the nominalist believes that the universe is inanimate except for >>>> the organisms (who have not been there from the start), but if you believe >>>> that the universe itself is an organism (pantheism) or part of an organism >>>> (panentheism), then nominalism would make sense? >>>> Best, >>>> Helmut >>>> >>>
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