Gary R., List: Thanks for clarifying your (accurate) criticism. The explanation that I provided was just that--not a justification, by any means. I agree completely with your much more nuanced assessment.
Regards, Jon On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 5:11 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > .Jon, list, > > Jon, I don't think that there's a need for you to apologize, especially as > this may simply be a matter of semantics (or an unfortunate phraseology, or > my lacking a subtle sense of humor, etc.) > > You wrote: "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any > philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*" > (emphasis added). Then in your response to my questioning this statement > wrote: "My sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious > exaggeration, and it was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor > job of conveying that. I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone." > > I'm sorry if I didn't catch your humor and didn't see your remark as "an > obvious exaggeration;" while I must add that your apology seems a bit > strained since you followed the just quoted comment with this > qualification/explanation: > > JS: I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized > Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Remusat, Kant, > and Hegel as nominalists, and "all modern philosophy of every sect" as > nominalistic. I also read somewhere recently the general suggestion that > as Peirce's scholastic realism became more and more extreme, he described > more and more philosophers and/or philosophical views as nominalistic; > unfortunately, I cannot seem to find that comment at the moment. Of > course, at different times he wrote that even Duns Scotus (CP 8.208; c. > 1905) and his younger self (CP 6.270; 1892) were "too nominalistic." > > > In response I'd say that it is true that, as Peirce's own realism deepened > in the late 19th, early 20th century into an 'extreme scholastic realism' > that, as you noted, even his own earlier analyses of realism are revised in > the light of it (consider the famous revision of the diamond thought > experiment, for famous example). But it is not true in my view that he > deemed other philosophical stances and philosophers as nominalistic > *because* "he disagreed" with their views. Indeed, he draws > philosophically a little or a lot from most all of them, including Leibniz, > Kant, Hegel, etc. > > It seems to me that Peirce held the realistism/nominalism problem to be of > considerable importance, perhaps even decisive in the history and potential > progress of philosophy. It it this nominalistic *facet* of any--and you > seem to be suggesting, perhaps, all--philosophers' work, again including > his own, which he found problematic *in the extreme*. > > So the long and short of my criticism of your stated position is just > this: To suggest that Peirce called philosophers "nominalists" *just > because he disagreed with them* is not only incorrect, but tends to make > him sound petty which, in my opinion, he most certainly was not. This is > what in your remarks I thought might tend to mislead. > > I might add that I think his assessment in this matter was correct and, > further, that this strong nominalistic tendency in philosophy and science > continues to this day. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 11:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> My sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious exaggeration, and >> it was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor job of conveying >> that. I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone. >> >> I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized >> Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Remusat, Kant, >> and Hegel as nominalists, and "all modern philosophy of every sect" as >> nominalistic. I also read somewhere recently the general suggestion that >> as Peirce's scholastic realism became more and more extreme, he described >> more and more philosophers and/or philosophical views as nominalistic; >> unfortunately, I cannot seem to find that comment at the moment. Of >> course, at different times he wrote that even Duns Scotus (CP 8.208; c. >> 1905) and his younger self (CP 6.270; 1892) were "too nominalistic." >> >> Was the rest of my response to Helmut closer to the mark? I hope so. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 9:56 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon wrote: >>> >>> "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any >>> philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*" >>> (emphasis added). >>> >>> Please offer sufficient (considerable) support for this statement, in my >>> view,, at very least a hugely overstated mere opinion. "Any philosophical >>> stance with which he disagreed.as "nominalistic."Really? Please offer >>> support for this, in my opinion quite misleading assertion. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *C 745* >>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 9:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Helmut, List: >>>> >>>> Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any >>>> philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic." However, >>>> my understanding is that the fundamental issue was (and presumably still >>>> is) whether there are any real generals--or as Peirce once put it, any real >>>> continua. This includes both qualities (1ns) and habits (3ns); i.e., both >>>> "may-bes" and "would-bes." Peirce was especially concerned about any >>>> approach that would posit something as real yet incognizable, or as >>>> inexplicable; he saw both of these moves as blocking the way of inquiry. >>>> If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we >>>> can have no knowledge of anything real. If there are no real laws of >>>> nature, then predictable regularities are just brute facts. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:27 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon, Kirstima, List, >>>>> I am not clear about (besides many others) the term "Nominalism", and >>>>> why everybody does not like nominalism. Ockham thougt, that universals do >>>>> not have an extra-mental substance. I think it is ok. to guess so, if I >>>>> think, that the universe has a mind. So universals are not extra-mental, >>>>> because they are part of the universe´s mind, and had been so even before >>>>> there were organisms. So my question is: Is nominalism only then a stupid >>>>> thing, if the nominalist believes that the universe is inanimate except >>>>> for >>>>> the organisms (who have not been there from the start), but if you believe >>>>> that the universe itself is an organism (pantheism) or part of an organism >>>>> (panentheism), then nominalism would make sense? >>>>> Best, >>>>> Helmut >>>>> >>>>
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