Gary F., List: Yes, not getting a lot of work done today; just enough to stay out of trouble.
I certainly do not intend to "deny the reality of 2ns" or to "deny that a relation of 2ns can subsist between a sign and its object," so I would like to understand why you see that as an implication of what I have said so far. The latter would just be an index, right? In that case, the sign-object relation is an Existent, but the sign itself could still be a Necessitant (legisign/type), in which case the object would also have to be a Necessitant. The question remains whether a concept can be a qualisign/mark or a sinsign/token; I do not believe so. Again, do you think otherwise? Your usage of "collective" is right and mine was wrong; that term properly refers to a sign whose Dynamic Object is a Necessitant, not that object itself. My (corrected) understanding is that all concepts are legisigns/types, which requires them to be collectives, such that all of their objects are Necessitants. This is in accordance with EP 2:481--"It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant ... the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself ..." As for "general," I was not thinking specifically of the communicative context with utterer and interpreter; I had in mind simply the opposite of "singular," fully determinate in every conceivable respect. Note that Peirce sometimes uses the term for *both* kinds of indeterminacy. "Generality is either of that negative sort which belongs to the merely potential, as such, and this is peculiar to the category of 1ns, or it is of the positive kind which belongs to conditional necessity, and this is peculiar to the category of law [3ns]" (CP 1.427; c. 1896). Regards, Jon On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 4:40 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, you’re having a busy day here! > > > > I see where you’re coming from now, but I can’t go there myself because > that would deny the reality of Secondness (or else deny that a relation of > Secondness can subsist between a sign and its object). > > > > I think our problem may be that we’re not using the term “general” in the > same way. I’m trying to observe what Peirce calls “the proper distinction > between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.: indefiniteness and > generality, of which the former consists in the sign's not sufficiently > expressing itself to allow of an indubitable determinate interpretation, > while the latter turns over to the interpreter the right to complete the > determination as he pleases” (EP2:394). He “completes the determination” by > selecting an individual from the universe of discourse defined by the > general term, and that individual is the dynamic object of the sign. > > > > We may also be using the term “collective” differently. In Peirce’s letter > to Welby (CP 8:366) a “collective” is a kind of sign, one whose dynamic > object is a *collection*. Obviously your usage comes from somewhere else. > > > > Anyway I’m out of time for a day or two … > > > > Gary f. >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
