> On Jan 24, 2017, at 3:40 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> I think our problem may be that we’re not using the term “general” in the
> same way. I’m trying to observe what Peirce calls “the proper distinction
> between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.: indefiniteness and generality,
> of which the former consists in the sign's not sufficiently expressing itself
> to allow of an indubitable determinate interpretation, while the latter turns
> over to the interpreter the right to complete the determination as he
> pleases” (EP2:394). He “completes the determination” by selecting an
> individual from the universe of discourse defined by the general term, and
> that individual is the dynamic object of the sign.
I’m still thinking through all this but I think you’re right. Particularly the
place of secondness in signs. (Without getting into some of the debates of
triadicity that raged here in prior years)
I’d say there are actually three types of indeterminism. First vagueness where
there is a definite property that isn’t determinate in terms of an established
interpretant. ("A man I could specify said…”). Second what I understand by
generality. (“All white horses…”) Finally a more ontological or evolutionary
conception where an object is still determining its properties (“The height of
my son as an adult.”)
It seems to me this is pretty key to Peirce’s thinking and also where his terms
avoid a lot of the muddled thinking and communication found in much of 20th
century philosophical conceptions of vagueness or metaphor.
The relationship between the universe of discourse and the object is a bit
trickier. Again here I think we have to distinguish between the immediate and
dynamic object. As I understand it in a particular conversation the universes
of discourse that matter are the shared ones between the communicator and
communicatee. That is separate from the object although its via these universes
that the object is determined. Yet the indexical relationship to the object(s)
is by a hint or guess.
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