Peirce was more than a pingpong ball in a long and repetitive exegetical battle involving I suppose the core group of this forum. But I have had enough. I simply will not open mail from the correspondents until something that is not a bnary ether-or argument that dwells on "what Peirce thinks" as though he has not changed himself in a century. Sorry for the rant and if I am alone in my reaction then I will willingly confess to having lost patience and being somewhat saddened by it all. Best, S
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 9:30 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Clark, List: > > CG: I think the big break between Peirce and the nominalists is because a > general can’t be limited to any collection of actual entities. > > > I strongly agree with this, and just came across an interesting passage > that seems to confirm it--and also corroborates my comment to Edwina this > evening that a logical subject need not be something "existential." > > CSP: The universe of a logical subject has always hitherto been assumed > to be a discrete collection, so that the subject is an *individual *object > or occasion. But in truth a universe may be continuous, so that there is no > part of it of which every thing must be either wholly true or wholly false. > For example, it is impossible to find a part of a surface which must be all > one color. Even a point of that surface may belong indifferently to three > or more differently colored parts. But the logic of continuous universes > awaits investigation. (CP 2.339; c. 1895) > > > Presumably the RLT lectures a couple of years later--especially the final > one on "The Logic of Continuity"--were the results of Peirce's efforts to > undertake such an investigation. > > In my limited experience, rather than collection vs. continuum, the > nominalist will want to focus on the question of how a universal/general > can be identically instantiated in multiple individuals. Conceiving a > general as a continuum addresses this, in my mind, since no two > instantiations are truly *identical*--they are *different *actualizations, > even if only infinitesimally so, such that there are *potential > *instantiations > exceeding all multitude that would be intermediate between them. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 6:24 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > >> Just to add, I think the big break between Peirce and the nominalists is >> because a general can’t be limited to any collection of actual entities. >> This is obvious in mathematics if we talk about a general like “even >> integers.” Clearly that’s an infinite collection. But if you say something >> like “white horses” you don’t just mean all white horses but all possible >> white horses. You can limit things more, but generals by their very nature >> have this connection to continuity. >> >> While I said in practice there isn’t as big a practical effect between >> nominalists and Peirce’s realism it’s because nominalists are fine to >> potentially quantify over future experienced entities. That is the way they >> conceive of possibilities is much more in an Aristotilean fashion. >> Potential is just an openness to new finite entities. Peirce is thinking >> much more logically. So it’s with his pragmatic maxim that I think you see >> his thinking regarding nominalism develop most. >> >> The original pragmatic maxim starts with meaning be how you do measure >> something. But that’s clearly problematic as a rock is hard whether you >> measure it or not. He then moves to a moderate realism by invoking >> counterfactuals. It’s hard *if I could measure it*. But he keeps >> thinking through these questions of potentialities and realizes he has to >> deal with a continuous set of possibilities. Further that an entity’s >> properties are independent of what I think about it. That is when I ask >> about a property scientifically I’m not merely making a claim about a >> future measurement but a claim about the entity itself. >> >> It’s at that point that I think the traditional nominalistic tendencies, >> especially within science, start to split off. In one sense it doesn’t >> matter because all we can test are potential measurements. Yet the >> significance of those measurements are the properties of the thing itself. >> >> This is also where I think Peirce (and later Dewey) chart a third way >> between the traditional poles of realism and idealism such as were found in >> the early 20th century. Especially in the United States. >> >> I bring all this up because my sense is that it’s to the pragmatic maxim >> we have to look for all these terms. >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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