Jon- again, you misunderstand me. I do NOT talk about 'entities' but about
Relations.
My view is that nothing exists 'per se' isolate from other 'things'; everything
is interactive, even a grain of sand. That grain of sand is both a Dynamic
Object, and Immediate Object, carries within it the habits of a Representamen,
and is also an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant....in interaction as it is
with the water, more grains of sand and so on.
A Dynamic Interpretant is the existential result of the semiosic relations.
As for your question
can anyone identify an example of a concept or other Legisign (not embodied as
a Sinsign) whose Dynamic Object is in a mode of 1ns or 2ns?
The answer is: an Iconic Legisign [the DO is in a mode of Firstness]; a
Rhematic Indexical Legisign [the DO is in a mode of Secondness]; a Dicent
Indexical Legisign [the DO is in a mode of Secondness] .
We'll have to end it there. Our views are totally different.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2017 2:48 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
Particular//Singular/Individual
Edwina, List:
"Reductionist," "mechanical," "individual," "nominalist," and "isolate" are
all your pejorative labels for my views, and I am not convinced that they are
accurate. I see the primary difference between us as triadic relations (my
view) vs. triadic entities (your view). Something is not a Representamen
unless it has a triadic relation with an Object and an Interpretant. Objects
can exist without necessarily serving as Dynamic Objects for Signs, and many
Dynamic Objects are not Existents (2ns) at all--they are Possibles (1ns) or
Necessitants (3ns). Interpretants, by definition, can only come about as
results of semeiosis; but only Dynamic Interpretants exist as something
actual--Immediate Interpretants are real possibilities, and Final Interpretants
are real habits.
To repeat my question below and (hopefully) get us back on topic--can anyone
identify an example of a concept or other Legisign (not embodied as a Sinsign)
whose Dynamic Object is in a mode of 1ns or 2ns? If not, then my contention
would seem to be correct that all objects of concepts are generals (3ns); and
since some objects of concepts are real, it must be the case that some generals
are real. Furthermore, since everything that is real can (in principle) be the
object of a concept, everything that is real must be general (to some degree).
The nominalist alternative is to claim that no objects of concepts are real, or
at least that there are some real things that cannot be the objects of concepts
and thus are incognizable. Of course, Peirce flatly rejected such an approach
as blocking the way of inquiry.
Regards,
Jon
On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon - I think this debate won't go far, as it's not really a debate but two
opposing views.
I have never endorsed YOUR model of semiosis, which to me, is reductionist
and mechanical and sees everything as individual units [which is why I see you
as nominalist] and ignores the necessarily interrelated, correlated, dynamic,
evolutionary, adaptable format of the Peircean semiosis.
I disagree with you that the Representamen can be, all alone, 'the Sign'.
The Representamen doesn't exist per se, and Peirce has himself written that [i
don't have the time to dig up the reference].
Equally, the Object - Dynamic or not - does NOT exist, all alone, but is
existent as that Dynamic Object ONLY within semiosic interactions when it
becomes that Dynamic Object in the interaction!
Same with the Interpretant; it doesn't exist all on its individual own but
only within the semiosic interaction.
Your semiosis is a mechanical one, where each entity exists 'per se', on
its isolate own, and enters into interactions with other separate entities.
This, to me, is not Peircean.
So- two views. There's really nothing to debate.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2017 9:38 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
Particular//Singular/Individual
Edwina, List:
I agree that we should not rehash our past debates; I am simply offering
my own alternative views.
I have never endorsed your model of semiosis, with its emphasis on data
input/output, because my personal opinion is that it is not authentically
Peircean. In particular, I have consistently maintained that the Sign is the
Representamen, which has relations with its Object and Interpretant; the latter
are not parts of the Sign itself. As such, a Sign is triadic, but not a triad.
It is not merely according to me that the Dynamic Object of a Legisign
must also be in a mode of 3ns; that is what Peirce himself wrote to Lady Welby
in 1908 (EP 2:481). As I have suggested before, you seem to embrace the 1903
taxonomy with its three trichotomies and ten Sign classes, and reject the later
versions that had six or ten trichotomies and 28 or 66 Sign classes. What
would be an example of a Legisign--not an instantiated replica thereof, which
is a Sinsign--with a Dynamic Object that is in a mode of 1ns or 2ns?
Note that I am talking about the mode of the Dynamic Object itself, not
its relation with the Sign; the latter is the Icon/Index/Symbol distinction.
Hence an Argument is not the only Sign class whose relation with its Object is
in a mode of 3ns; all Symbols fall under that description, including Rhematic
Symbols (terms) and Dicent Symbols (propositions). However, an Argument is the
only Sign class whose relation with its Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns.
Regards,
Jon
On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 7:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Jon - I have told myself that I wouldn't enter into debates with you
but will make one try. You are missing the point of semiosis which is that
there is no such thing as a singular 'point' or node that exists all by itself;
Peircean semiosis and therefore reality is triadic. There are three nodes/three
relations acting 'as one'. You didn't read my post:
...."my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to
the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness.
Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of
Signs that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'.
But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of
Thirdness."
Again, the TERM 'legisign' refers only to the Representamen
relation-in-itself. Not to the whole triad.
And think about it. What pragmatic function would there be for the
MEDIATION action of the Representamen...which is, as a Legisign, operating in
Thirdness, and therefore providing normative rules by which to interpret the
incoming data from that Dynamic Object.....what pragmatic function would there
be if that same Representamen was confined as you think, NOT to mediate and
'mould' that incoming data by applying its normative rules...but..could
only..what...pass along the set of rules from that Dynamic Object..which
according to you, MUST also be in a mode of Thirdness?
What would be the function of the Representamen in such a triad?
Useless, just a mechanical transfer rather than a dynamic transformation.
The whole strength of the semiosic triad is that mediative process
where Rules are applied to incoming data from the Dynamic Object...and that
incoming data can be in a mode of Firstness....and the Representamen as a
Legisign will constrain, mould, 'normalize' that haphazard free data into a
coherent Interpretant, i.e, an Iconic legisign or a rhematic indexical
legisign....
Furthermore, the only triad where the Object Relation is in a mode of
Thirdness is in the pure Argument - which is a strictly mental process.
Again, the semiosic Sign is a triad. The 'parts' of it don't exist on
their own; the whole thing is a dynamic relation.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky ; cl...@lextek.com
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 9:38 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
Particular//Singular/Individual
Edwina, Clark, List:
ET: That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating
as a general type, nevertheless requires being instantiated in such a manner
that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. vSo, the Legisign in
this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness].
My understanding from Peirce's later work on semeiotic--with six or
ten trichotomies and 28 or 66 sign classes, rather than three and ten,
respectively--is that a legisign, as a legisign, cannot refer to an Existent
(2ns); it can only refer to a Necessitant (3ns). When it is instantiated, it
is embodied as a replica--a sinsign (2ns), not a legisign (3ns); this is, of
course, the familiar type/token distinction. An indexical legisign thus can
only represent a Necessitant (3ns) as its object, but the relation between the
sign and its object is nevertheless "in a mode of 2ns."
CSP: Sixth, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is any general type or
law, however established, which requires each instance of it to be really
affected by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that
Object. Each Replica of it will be a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar
kind. The Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign represents it as an
Iconic Legisign; and so it is, in a measure--but in a very small measure. (CP
2.259, EP 2:294; 1903)
The CP editors suggested "a demonstrative pronoun" as an example.
The object of "this" or "that" (as a legisign) is necessarily general, because
it can refer to anything. It can only refer to something in
particular--something actual--when embodied (as a sinsign) in a specific
context. At that point, it is obviously not a concept--and my contention
remains that all objects of concepts are general to some degree. Is there an
example of a concept whose object is absolutely singular--determinate in every
respect?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Clark, my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers
only to the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness.
Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of
Signs that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'.
But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a
mode of Thirdness.
For example, take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative
pronoun]. Here, the relation between the representamen-Object is in a mode of
Secondness [Indexical]. The relation between the representamen-Interpretant is
in a mode of Firstness [rhematic]. The Representamen-in-itself is in a mode of
Thirdness.
As outlined by Peirce, this triad is "any general type or law,
however established, which requires each instance of it to be really affected
by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object"
[2.259 my emphasis] That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself
operating as a general type, nevertheless requires being instantiated in such a
manner that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. So, the Legisign
in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness].
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
Particular//Singular/Individual
On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and
that’s what I think you’re talking about.
Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot
represent an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant.
Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I
mentioned about building up signs out of subsigns.
My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to
semantics. That is there’s an element of equivocation in play.
If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from
the general to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s
semiotics. (This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist
debate doesn’t matter as much as some think)
I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more
later. Right now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is.
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