Edwina, List: I agree that we should not rehash our past debates; I am simply offering my own alternative views.
I have never endorsed your model of semiosis, with its emphasis on data input/output, because my personal opinion is that it is not authentically Peircean. In particular, I have consistently maintained that the Sign *is *the Representamen, which *has *relations with its Object and Interpretant; the latter are not *parts* of the Sign itself. As such, a Sign is *triadic*, but not a triad. It is not merely according to *me *that the Dynamic Object of a Legisign *must* also be in a mode of 3ns; that is what Peirce *himself *wrote to Lady Welby in 1908 (EP 2:481). As I have suggested before, you seem to embrace the 1903 taxonomy with its three trichotomies and ten Sign classes, and reject the later versions that had six or ten trichotomies and 28 or 66 Sign classes. What would be an example of a Legisign--not an instantiated replica thereof, which is a Sinsign--with a Dynamic Object that is in a mode of 1ns or 2ns? Note that I am talking about the mode of the Dynamic Object itself, not its relation with the Sign; the latter is the Icon/Index/Symbol distinction. Hence an Argument is *not *the only Sign class whose relation with its *Object *is in a mode of 3ns; *all *Symbols fall under that description, including Rhematic Symbols (terms) and Dicent Symbols (propositions). However, an Argument *is *the only Sign class whose relation with its *Interpretant *is in a mode of 3ns. Regards, Jon On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 7:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon - I have told myself that I wouldn't enter into debates with you but > will make one try. You are missing the point of semiosis which is that > there is no such thing as a singular 'point' or node that exists all by > itself; Peircean semiosis and therefore reality is triadic. There are three > nodes/three relations acting 'as one'. You didn't read my post: > > ...."my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to the > Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness. > Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of Signs > that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'. > But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of > Thirdness." > > Again, the TERM 'legisign' refers only to the Representamen > relation-in-itself. Not to the whole triad. > > And think about it. What pragmatic function would there be for the > MEDIATION action of the Representamen...which is, as a Legisign, operating > in Thirdness, and therefore providing normative rules by which to interpret > the incoming data from that Dynamic Object.....what pragmatic function > would there be if that same Representamen was confined as you think, NOT to > mediate and 'mould' that incoming data by applying its normative > rules...but..could only..what...pass along the set of rules from that > Dynamic Object..which according to you, MUST also be in a mode of Thirdness? > > What would be the function of the Representamen in such a triad? Useless, > just a mechanical transfer rather than a dynamic transformation. > > The whole strength of the semiosic triad is that mediative process where > Rules are applied to incoming data from the Dynamic Object...and that > incoming data can be in a mode of Firstness....and the Representamen as a > Legisign will constrain, mould, 'normalize' that haphazard free data into a > coherent Interpretant, i.e, an Iconic legisign or a rhematic indexical > legisign.... > > Furthermore, the only triad where the Object Relation is in a mode of > Thirdness is in the pure Argument - which is a strictly mental process. > > Again, the semiosic Sign is a triad. The 'parts' of it don't exist on > their own; the whole thing is a dynamic relation. > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> ; cl...@lextek.com > *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 9:38 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and > Particular//Singular/Individual > > Edwina, Clark, List: > > ET: That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as a > general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated *in such a manner > that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. vSo, the Legisign > in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness]. > > > My understanding from Peirce's later work on semeiotic--with six or ten > trichotomies and 28 or 66 sign classes, rather than three and ten, > respectively--is that a legisign, *as *a legisign, *cannot *refer to an > Existent (2ns); it can *only *refer to a Necessitant (3ns). When it is > instantiated, it is embodied as a replica--a sinsign (2ns), not a legisign > (3ns); this is, of course, the familiar type/token distinction. An > indexical legisign thus can only represent a Necessitant (3ns) as its > object, but the *relation *between the sign and its object is > nevertheless "in a mode of 2ns." > > CSP: Sixth, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is any general type or law, > however established, which requires each instance of it to be really > affected by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that > Object. Each Replica of it will be a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a > peculiar kind. The Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign represents > it as an Iconic Legisign; and so it is, in a measure--but in a very small > measure. (CP 2.259, EP 2:294; 1903) > > > The CP editors suggested "a demonstrative pronoun" as an example. The > object of "this" or "that" (as a legisign) is necessarily *general*, > because it can refer to *anything*. It can only refer to something *in > particular*--something *actual*--when embodied (as a sinsign) in a > specific context. At that point, it is obviously not a *concept*--and my > contention remains that all objects of concepts are general to some > degree. Is there an example of a concept whose object is absolutely > singular--determinate in every respect? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Clark, my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to >> the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness. >> >> Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of Signs >> that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'. >> >> But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of >> Thirdness. >> >> For example, take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative >> pronoun]. Here, the relation between the representamen-Object is in a mode >> of Secondness [Indexical]. The relation between the >> representamen-Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness [rhematic]. The >> Representamen-in-itself is in a mode of Thirdness. >> >> As outlined by Peirce, this triad is "any general type or law, however >> established, which requires each instance of it to be *really affected* >> by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object" >> [2.259 my emphasis] That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself >> operating as a general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated* >> in such a manner that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. >> So, the Legisign in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of >> Secondness]. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> >> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and >> Particular//Singular/Individual >> >> On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I >> think you’re talking about. >> >> >> Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent >> an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant. >> >> Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned >> about building up signs out of subsigns. >> >> My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to semantics. >> That is there’s an element of equivocation in play. >> >> If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the >> general to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s >> semiotics. (This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist >> debate doesn’t matter as much as some think) >> >> I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later. >> Right now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is. >> >>
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