Peircers, I will go ahead and post this sample of discussions from January as I already had it prepared. Then onward to the latest remarks! I am going to make one more try at getting this business clear in my own head, maybe enough to venture a series of blog posts.
Regards, Jon o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o January 2017 JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00013.html I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his opposition to various forms of nominalism. He seems to have consistently preferred the term “general” to “universal” (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone ever tried to figure out why? In a new book, Peirce's Empiricism : Its Roots and Its Originality, Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that “it might be that he thinks ‘general’ is a better translation of Aristotle's katholou”, or because “laws are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the most”, and “propositions expressing such laws are not universal propositions … but are general propositions which can admit of exceptions” (p. 51). On the flip side, “universal” is usually contrasted with “particular”, while “general” is opposed to “singular”. All of these identify types of propositions — singular when the subject is determinate, general when it is indeterminate; and the latter further divided into universal (all) and particular (some). Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type of generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically, individuals are actualized from a continuum of potentiality. Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be appreciated. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00055.html I see that some earlier discussions along these lines have slid off the edge of the web into remoter memory. If I did not have a nagging sense that characteristic features of Peirce's thought still slip by us without due notice I might let them go, but the nagging sense persists, and so I will take some pains to recover it. Here is the earliest notice I found, back in the days when we cross-posted at will across many interrelated discussions hither and yon on the web: http://web.archive.org/web/20020322102614/http://www.virtual-earth.de/CG/cg-list/msg03592.html o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00062.html I've been looking over my previous encounters with these issues of substance and/or terminology and think it may be time to give them another look, hopefully adding a few bits of clarification and elaboration. Peirce's observations about the doctrine of individuals, together with the maxims that “Whatever has comprehension must be general” and “Whatever has extension must be composite”, pulls the rug out from under the stance of nominal thinkers that ontological security rests with individual names, which nominal thinkers tend to confuse with the names of individuals, to turn their own phrase back on them. http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2%80%A2_Doctrine_Of_Individuals o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00058.html I've been away and haven't been able to track the entire thread but it's ground we've been over many times before and the bits I've been able to sample seem to fall into familiar patterns. Generally speaking I haven't observed that much difficulty with the use of these words in logic, math, science, or even to a large extent in ordinary language, probably because practical use demands a modicum of flexibility and context-sensitivity from the relevant language users. It is only when people try to make metaphysical hay out of these simple signs that a certain rigidity sets in and disputes of a quasi-religious character begin to rule the day. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00059.html I imagine Peirce happy and it's not simply the struggle that was enough to fill his heart. Rather, he knew that the harvest has come, at last, and to him, that harvest seems a wild one. His discovery was a tool to enhance movement. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00060.html Indeed, there is a strong resonance from Peirce to Camus — https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/03/26/a-determined-soul/ https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/03/30/pragmatism-meets-absurdity/ https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/04/11/slip-slidin-away/ https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/04/22/absurdum-quid/ https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/04/23/revolt-freedom-passion/ https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/05/06/rock-on/ https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/05/22/strangers-in-paradise/ And Peirce of course has mapped out the mountain — https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/05/31/definition-and-determination-4/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00063.html We've been through the nominalism versus realism question so many times that I can't think of anything fresh to say about it. When the use of words like Universal, General, Continuous vs. Particular, Singular, Individual comes up I find it more useful to focus on the pragmatics of language use relative to the context of interpretation, frame of reference, sign relational space, or universe of discourse at hand than to go chasing after ontological absolutes. But I did find this previous comment on Houser on Forster on Peirce while I was looking for something else, and it reflects my sense that Peirceans have more trouble controlling that slippery slide toward what I've called “essentialism” or “ontologism” than they do checking nominalistic drift. https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/09/21/nominalism-and-essentialism-are-the-scylla-and-charybdis-that-pragmatism-must-navigate-its-middle-way-between/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o ET: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00064.html JR: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00065.html CG: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00066.html JR: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00067.html KM: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00068.html o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00070.html I'm still looking for better terms than “essentialism” or “ontologism” to explain the problem that I'm seeing here. Essentialism is not the same thing as Platonism or any realism about supra-individual entities. I personally don't have any objection to realism about Platonic Forms or Ideas, maybe because I'm doing most of my thinking in mathematical forms, where Pythagoras rules. The problem I'm trying to point out has to do with the excessive or even exclusive reliance on monadic predicates applied to putative individuals to describe everything. In many ways, then, the kind of essentialism or ontologism I'm talking about has the same defects as nominalism, because it falls into the same lack of critical reflection about individuals and fails to take the reality of supra-individual entities or relations into account. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00072.html Would "individualism" perhaps be a more appropriate term for the tendency that you have in mind? As I hinted earlier in the discussion, I see Peirce as having made an important distinction between "singular" as that which is absolutely determinate (including place and time) vs. "individual" as that which is determinate in some respects and indeterminate (i.e., general) in others (including place and time). Peirce took the singular in this complete sense to be an ideal, rather than a reality. By contrast, it seems to me that nominalism treats these two concepts as largely equivalent. What is the remedy for "excessive or even exclusive reliance on monadic predicates applied to putative individuals to describe everything"? Presumably it is necessary, but not sufficient, to recognize the reality of the corresponding medads — qualities that are what they are independent of anything else. We also need to recognize the reality of dyads, triads, and other relations, including habits and laws that *govern* individuals. Is this your concern, or is there even more to it than that? o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JFS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00074.html The issues about universals and essences have been with us for a couple of millennia, and nobody has a proposed useful definition that everyone can accept. Peirce developed his semiotic as a foundation that *avoids* those terms. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o CG:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00080.html Do you mean it in more Aristotelean terms? I guess I'm missing something here. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o CG:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00100.html As I think through the dispute I think really what we're getting at is Peirce's notion of the Universe of Discourse. The question then becomes what distinguishes or differentiates one universe of discourse from an other? We recognize that there is not just one universe of discourse. For Peirce to denote is to put the sign in relation to the object of common communication. That is, a universe of discourse. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00102.html I believe this is getting close to the heart of the issue. Already by 1870 Peirce introduces a radical departure in the status of individuals, and everything based on them. Namely, he shifts individuality from a category of being to a category of description, relative to a particular discourse situation that we may variously conceive as a context of interpretation, an extended sign relation, a frame of reference, or a universe of discourse. Another way of saying it is that individuality becomes interpretive and relative rather than ontological and absolute. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o ET: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00108.html o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00112.html http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Limited_Mark_Universes o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00116.html https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/01/17/survey-of-relation-theory-%e2%80%a2-3/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o SRC:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00201.html Peirce was more than a pingpong ball in a long and repetitive exegetical battle involving I suppose the core group of this forum. But I have had enough. I simply will not open mail from the correspondents until something that is not a binary ether-or argument that dwells on "what Peirce thinks" as though he has not changed himself in a century. Sorry for the rant and if I am alone in my reaction then I will willingly confess to having lost patience and being somewhat saddened by it all. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00208.html https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/08/02/%e2%98%af-quantum-mechanics-%e2%98%af/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o EC:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00218.html I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or disarm) longstanding philosophical problems. With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that I think people respond to things (without any a priori dualistic privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a collection, or just a collection of "reals"? I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue is at argument here .... or, if someone is feeling even more adventurous, by explaining what practical difference it makes in my action which side of this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I firmly believe one way or the other?). o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00219.html Looking back over the month and the last couple of decades on the List I think the interminable quality of many debates about Nominalism vs. Realism are due to the attempts by many to pin Peirce down on a map of the Ancient World, philosophically speaking, whereas Peirce was one of the leading figures in a movement that reshaped that map in radically new ways. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00224.html https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-theoretical-entities-1/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JFS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00237.html For a nominalist, a function or relation *is* a set of n-tuples. For a realist, the _intension_ of a function or relation is a rule, law, principle, or axiom. The _extension_ is the set of tuples determined by that rule, law, principle, or axiom. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00238.html The distinction between nominal thinking and real thinking is distinct from the distinction between extensional thinking and intensional thinking, as one can see from the fact that extreme nominalists do not admit sets as entities. Peirce admitted both extensions and intensions of concepts, as integrated in his theory of information. This is just another one of the ways that Peirce was able to bypass the whole aporia, boondoggle, debacle, gridlock, whatever you want call it that had bedeviled the issue of universals up to that time. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JFS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00241.html o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00245.html The following post from about this time 2 years ago pretty well summarizes my current view of the whole nominalism vs. realism controversy. To be as brief as possible, I do not see the issue as reflecting some cosmic battle between good and evil, but simply a matter of what rules are best to adopt for the direction of our ingenuities. We are all nominalists, or Ockhamists, to the extent that we recognize the practical sensibility of guiding our inquiries according to one or another principle of economy. It is only the extreme nominalist who turns Ockham's Razor into Ockham's Chainsaw Massacre, but there the problem lies with the extremism, not with the practical utility of the Razor. We are all realists to the extent that we do not go about kicking everything that “looks like a rock” just to see if it “really is a rock”. But not all descriptions describe anything and problems arise when we confuse the being of a sign for the sign of a being. https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-theoretical-entities-1/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JC: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00250.html o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00263.html Speaking of continua, I lost a week of continuity to travel and another to some bug that I picked up in transit — Michigan is a harsh mistress, especially in some of her seasonal affections, and she exacted full retribution on me for my dalliance in southerly latitudes. I started this post to answer one of John Sowa's recent remarks but as I traced the train of thought backward I ran into a motley array of side-tracks and questions left unanswered from my days away and otherwise out of commission. I assembled a few choice mementos in this post by way of keeping the more salient themes in mind. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o EC:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00270.html I don't mean to seem obtuse or obstructionist, but this still seems like exactly the type of conflict that Pragmatism should be able to render moot, rather than have a side on. I note that while no one above has made quite so bold a statement, a few people seem to have chimed in to say that they think the distinction is of little importance. ... In that context, once you have Peirce's definition of "real", the only coherent thing the philosophical nominalist could be arguing is that there will be no end-time-agreement about what types of things are worth labeling or what any labels should be. Is that what is going on here? o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00278.html I added a few items to my ledger of loose threads and critical points. As the fog clears — in my head, not so much out-of-doors — I begin to see that one of the biggest talking (past-each-other) points turns on the difference between metaphysical and methodological applications of maxims like Ockham's Razor and the Pragmatic Maxim. For my part, I treat them as critical or heuristic maxims for guiding inquiry and the big question is how to apply them judiciously on an ongoing basis. This makes for a more modest application than their use as components of some all-encompassing Weltanschauung. As far as that goes, and as far as the current state of human wisdom goes, I cannot see that the human race has evolved far enough to say anything compelling about Being Its Own Self. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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