John S, List, While I very much approve of your project of making Peircean semeiotic terminology more accessible to those unlikely to plunge into the philosophical/semeiotic literature associated with Peirce's semeiotic, I do have a couple of questions related to two of the terms you've chosen.
1. While 'Mark' is probably an improvement on 'Qualisign', it strikes me as suggesting something more existential (so, relating more to 2ns than to 1ns) than an alternative term Peirce also used, namely, "Tone." Employing 'Tone' here would also provide a kind of mnemonic device since, in relation to the Sign itself (your, 1. Material) one would have 3 'T's, namely, Tone, Token, and Type. So the question is, why did you settle on 'Mark' rather than 'Tone'? 2. 'Assertion' seems to me to gloss over the distinction between a 'Proposition' and an 'Assertion'. As, for example, Joe Ransdell argued, there is a subtle difference between the two: A 'Proposition' is a statement of which one can ask if is it true or false, while an 'Assertion" is a statement which claims to be true. So, "The sun is shining" is a proposition (which is not an assertion), while if I step out of my apartment and see that "The sun is shining," the context makes it clear that I am asserting this to be true. So, again, why did you settle on 'Assertion' rather than 'Proposition' in your chart of 9? (I would note that Frederik Stjernfelt in his book, *Natural Propositions*, which was our last slow read, employs the terminology of 'Propostion' and 'Dicisign' fairly interchangably). Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 10:53 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > On 4/2/2017 4:54 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > >> imitation is so central that perhaps a case can be made >> for a more accurate representation of what we really mean. >> > > I certainly agree. > > But I would make a distinction between Peirce's fundamental > terminology and the open-ended variety of terms that can be > explained in terms of the fundamentals. I have no objection > to using his system to define 'imitation' or any other word > that may be useful. > > In my article "Signs and Reality", I was addressing readers > who have been using an open-ended variety of terminology > from several millennia of philosophy to design ontologies > for computer systems. I was trying to make several points: > > 1. The philosophical terminology is large and growing. > It was developed by many different authors, who often use > the terms in diverse, sometimes inconsistent ways. > > 2. The short book I cited (by David Armstrong) was addressed > to *graduate students* in philosophy. But most computer > scientists who need to use ontology have little background > in philosophy. They would not read such a book, and they > would not learn enough from it to use those words precisely. > > 3. However, everybody who uses an applied ontology knows and > uses some notation for logic (or a computer notation that > has a well-defined logical foundation). > > 4. As a pioneer in modern logic, Peirce developed terminology > that is compatible with the versions of logic used for computer > systems. It provides a broader and more systematic foundation > for defining the categories of applied ontologies. > > 5. Therefore, my goal in that article was to extract a convenient > subset of Peirce's terminology that could be taught to students > who know some notation for logic, but have little or no training > in philosophy. > > 6. My claim is that Peirce's triple trichotomy (attached table), > together with any notation for logic that students already > know, is sufficient for teaching a course on applied ontology. > (Note that I replaced 5 of the terms with more familiar terms > that Peirce used in other writings.) > > I would hope that students would continue to study more by Peirce > and other philosophers. But I believe that applied ontology on > a Peircean foundation would be a more solid basis than what they > are studying today. See http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf . > > John > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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