Gary R., List: I just re-read John's paper yesterday, so it is fresh in my mind that he prefers "mark" to "tone" because of the latter's auditory connotation. Perhaps you are thinking of the RLT lectures, where Peirce described our existing universe as "a discontinuous mark" (2ns). Of course, he also referred to the initial pure possibilities (1ns) as "marks" on the blackboard, and in such cases it was not the mark *itself* that was a discontinuity, but its *boundary*. Perhaps we should thus conceive of a Qualisign as a mark with no such boundary.
I agree that "proposition" is preferable to "assertion" for a Dicent Symbol. The latter seems to pertain more to the *other *Sign-Interpretant relation, where the Sign is urged (2ns) rather than presented (1ns) or submitted (3ns). Peirce assigned Rheme/Dicent/Argument to the S-If relation and presented/urged/submitted (or Suggestive/Imperative/Indicative) to the S-Id relation, yet noted in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby (L 463, http://www.unav.es/gep/Welby12.10.04.html) that only an Argument may be submitted, an Argument or Dicent may be urged, and a Rheme can only be presented. This implies that Rheme/Dicent/Argument comes *before *presented/urged/submitted in the order of determination, and T. L. Short came to same conclusion in *Peirce's Theory of Signs*; but it seems to me that the S-If relation should come *after *the S-Id relation. I also think that Rheme/Dicent/Argument as how the Interpretant represents the Sign (EP 2:291) is more consistent with "the Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Interpretant," while presented/urged/submitted seems like a better fit for "the Nature of the Influence of the Sign" (EP 2:490). Consequently, my current working hypothesis is instead to associate Rheme/Dicent/Argument with S-Id and presented/urged/submitted with S-If. I recognize that this is a clear deviation from Peirce, but it makes the most sense to me right now, and my impression is that he never managed to work out the various Interpretant trichotomies (let alone their proper sequence) to his own complete satisfaction anyway. I would certainly welcome feedback on this adjustment, which only affects the 10-trichotomy/66-sign classification, not the 3-trichotomy/10-sign classification. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 2:37 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > John S, List, > > While I very much approve of your project of making Peircean semeiotic > terminology more accessible to those unlikely to plunge into the > philosophical/semeiotic literature associated with Peirce's semeiotic, I do > have a couple of questions related to two of the terms you've chosen. > > 1. While 'Mark' is probably an improvement on 'Qualisign', it strikes me > as suggesting something more existential (so, relating more to 2ns than to > 1ns) than an alternative term Peirce also used, namely, "Tone." Employing > 'Tone' here would also provide a kind of mnemonic device since, in relation > to the Sign itself (your, 1. Material) one would have 3 'T's, namely, Tone, > Token, and Type. So the question is, why did you settle on 'Mark' rather > than 'Tone'? > > 2. 'Assertion' seems to me to gloss over the distinction between a > 'Proposition' and an 'Assertion'. As, for example, Joe Ransdell argued, > there is a subtle difference between the two: A 'Proposition' is a > statement of which one can ask if is it true or false, while an 'Assertion" > is a statement which claims to be true. > > So, "The sun is shining" is a proposition (which is not an assertion), > while if I step out of my apartment and see that "The sun is shining," the > context makes it clear that I am asserting this to be true. So, again, why > did you settle on 'Assertion' rather than 'Proposition' in your chart of 9? > (I would note that Frederik Stjernfelt in his book, *Natural Propositions*, > which was our last slow read, employs the terminology of 'Propostion' and > 'Dicisign' fairly interchangably). > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 10:53 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> On 4/2/2017 4:54 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: >> >>> imitation is so central that perhaps a case can be made >>> for a more accurate representation of what we really mean. >>> >> >> I certainly agree. >> >> But I would make a distinction between Peirce's fundamental >> terminology and the open-ended variety of terms that can be >> explained in terms of the fundamentals. I have no objection >> to using his system to define 'imitation' or any other word >> that may be useful. >> >> In my article "Signs and Reality", I was addressing readers >> who have been using an open-ended variety of terminology >> >> from several millennia of philosophy to design ontologies >> for computer systems. I was trying to make several points: >> >> 1. The philosophical terminology is large and growing. >> It was developed by many different authors, who often use >> the terms in diverse, sometimes inconsistent ways. >> >> 2. The short book I cited (by David Armstrong) was addressed >> to *graduate students* in philosophy. But most computer >> scientists who need to use ontology have little background >> in philosophy. They would not read such a book, and they >> would not learn enough from it to use those words precisely. >> >> 3. However, everybody who uses an applied ontology knows and >> uses some notation for logic (or a computer notation that >> has a well-defined logical foundation). >> >> 4. As a pioneer in modern logic, Peirce developed terminology >> that is compatible with the versions of logic used for computer >> systems. It provides a broader and more systematic foundation >> for defining the categories of applied ontologies. >> >> 5. Therefore, my goal in that article was to extract a convenient >> subset of Peirce's terminology that could be taught to students >> who know some notation for logic, but have little or no training >> in philosophy. >> >> 6. My claim is that Peirce's triple trichotomy (attached table), >> together with any notation for logic that students already >> know, is sufficient for teaching a course on applied ontology. >> (Note that I replaced 5 of the terms with more familiar terms >> that Peirce used in other writings.) >> >> I would hope that students would continue to study more by Peirce >> and other philosophers. But I believe that applied ontology on >> a Peircean foundation would be a more solid basis than what they >> are studying today. See http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf . >> >> John >> >
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