Clark, list:
“It seems to me that 1907’s famous MS 318 is pretty key to all this the more I think about it. That’s partially because he speaks of three habit-interpretants and changes how he talks of habit somewhat.” Yes! J one two three… C A B… utterer interpreter commens… esthetics ethics logic… very nice, J On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 5:22 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > On more thing before I leave for the weekend. It seems to me that 1907’s > famous MS 318 is pretty key to all this the more I think about it. That’s > partially because he speaks of three habit-interpretants and changes how he > talks of habit somewhat. Part of the manuscript is in EP 2:398. I didn’t > see it available online anywhere. The primary focus is the pragmatic maxim, > but I think he gets at many of the issues we’re discussing. > > The main focus is the relationship between the inner world and outer world > in terms of the effect of a sign. > > It is to be noted that in calling a habit “self-controlled,” I do not mean > that it is in the power of the man who has it to cast it off,— to cease, in > the example just given, to try to make his decorations beautiful; for we > well know that he has no such power,— but what I mean is that it has been > developed under the process just described in which critical feelings as to > the results of inner or outer exercises stimulate to strong endeavors to > repeat or to modify those effects. I may mention that I do not recognize > pleasure and pain as specific feelings but only as being whatever feelings > may stimulate efforts, in the one case to reproduce or continue them, or, > as we say, “attractive” feelings, and in the other case to annul and avoid > them, or, as we say, “repulsive” feelings. (MS 319 EP 2.431-2, 1907) > > Now Peirce is explicitly talking here of humans and not general semiosis > as we’re concerned with. So I recognize we have to be careful. > > reiterations in the inner world―fancied reiterations―if well-intensified > by direct effort, produce habits, just as do reiterations in the outer > world; and these habits will have power to influence actual behaviour in > the outer world; especially, if each reiteration can be accompanied by a > peculiar strong effect that is usually likened to issuing a command > to one’s future self. (MS 319: 94; CP: 5.487, 1907) > > Also > > Habit. Involuntary habits are not meant, but voluntary habits, i.e., such > as are subject (in some measure to self-control). Now under what conditions > is a habit subject to self-control? Only if what has been done in one > instance with the character, its consequences, and other circumstances, can > have a triadic influence in strengthening or weakening the disposition > to do the like on a new occasion. This is as much to say that voluntary > habits is conscious habit. For what is consciousness? In the first place > feeling is conscious. But what is a feeling, such as blue, whistling, sour, > rose-scented? It is nothing but a quality, character, or predicate which > involves no reference to any other predicate or other things than the > subject in which it inheres, but yet positively is. [...] Our own feelings, > if there were no memory of them for any fraction of a second, however > small, if there were no triadic time-sense to testify with such assurance > to their existence and varieties, would be equally unknown > to us. Therefore, such a quality may be utterly unlike any feeling we are > acquainted with, but it would have all that distinguish all our feelings > from everything else. In the second place, effort is conscious. It is at > once a sense of effort on the part of the being who wills and is a sense of > resistance on the part of the object upon which the effort is exerted. But > these two are one and the same consciousness. Otherwise, all that has been > said of the feeling consciousness is true of the effort consciousness; and > to say that this is veracious means less if possible than to say that a > thing is whatever it may be. > > There is, then, a triadic consciousness which does not supersede the lower > order, but goes bail for them and enters bonds for their veracity. > Experiment upon inner world must teach inner nature of concepts as > experiment on outer world must teach nature of outer things. > > Meaning of a general physical predicate consists in the conception of the > habit of its subject that it implies. And such must be the meaning of a > psychical predicate. > > The habits must be known by experience which however exhibits singulars > only. > > Our minds must generalize these. How is this to be done? > > The intellectual part of the lessons of experimentation consists in the > consciousness or purpose to act in certain ways (including motive) on > certain conditions. (MS 318 EP: 2.549–550, 1907) > > > But feeling simply is chance for Peirce as seen from the inside. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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