Gary R., Edwina, Clark, List:
Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of
determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas,
or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns, "whatever has
its Being in itself alone"--are "incapable of perfect actualization on
account of [their] essential vagueness" (EP 2:478-479; 1908). I found this
distinction very helpful in sorting out Peirce's cosmology when we were
discussing it on the List last fall.
As I said back then, I believe that we should interpret Peirce's earlier
writings on the subject, including "A Guess at the Riddle" (1887-8) and the
Monist metaphysical series (1891-3), in light of his later writings,
including the RLT lectures (1898) and "A Neglected Argument" (1908). So I
agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is primordial *overall*, but I think
that both of us agree with Edwina that all three Categories were present
from the very beginning of our *existing *universe. On that basis, the
three of us also seem to agree that while chance as 1ns can *break up*
habits, it does not *create *new ones, since that is a matter of 3ns.
Gary quoted Clark as having written, "I think Peirce has [two] categories
of chance. One is discontinuous whereas the other is continuous. This ends
up being important in various ways." However, I do not recall seeing that
statement in any of Clark's messages, and it also does not show up in the
List archive. More importantly, where does this notion arise in Peirce's
writings?
Clark's earlier observation that "chance is the outward aspect of that
which within itself is feeling" (CP 6.265; 1892) points the way to one
possible translation of the three modes of Interpretants in human semeiosis
(feeling/action/thought) to the physico-chemical and biological realms.
- 1ns could be chance, spontaneity, freedom, indeterminism, "sporting";
the question then becomes how this can be a possible/actual/habitual *effect
*produced by a Sign, since we usually associate such concepts with
the *absence
*of a (sufficient) cause.
- 2ns was always the clearest, as there are obviously
physical/existential actions and reactions in nature, and we can also
recognize Peirce's use of "law" as brute determinism here.
- 3ns could be habit-taking or what Clark called "the statistical
tendency," although my working hypothesis is that all (and only)
*Final *Interpretants
are habits. I guess that we would then have the Immediate Interpretant as
a range of *possible *habit-takings, the Dynamic Interpretant as any *actual
*habit-taking, and the Final Interpretant as a *habit *of habit-taking;
but is this sufficiently analogous to possible/actual/habitual *thoughts
*in human semeiosis?
I see that Clark also commented yesterday, "If law were primordial it
wouldn’t need to be explained whereas Peirce is explicit that it must be
explained." This suggests that if *continuity *is indeed primordial, then
it does not need to be explained--and it seems to me that this is basically
what Peirce was arguing in CP 6.490 (1908), although there he referred
instead to "super-order" and "super-habit" as "any general state of things
whatsoever." I understand his claim to be that the Reality of God--or
Mind, as Edwina prefers to say--as *Ens necessarium* is the only postulate
or premise that can account for the reality of the three Universes of
Experience, *without *already assuming it. On the other hand, if we take
all three Categories to be primordial overall, then *none *of them needs to
be explained--and I suspect that Peirce would reject this as blocking the
way of inquiry.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:40 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Jon S, List,
>
> What you just wrote ("that the "womb of indeterminacy" is "the original
> continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and habit as "a generalizing
> tendency" emerges from that primordial continuity") reminded me that
> Aristotle's notion of potentiality is more like Peirce's idea of
> "would-be's" (3ns) than it is like the notion of simple possibility, or,
> "may-be's" (1ns).
>
> Both these thinkers argued that the distinction between simple
> possibilities *versus* potentialities hinges on the idea that the later
> (unlike simple possiblities) can come into being of their own accord, so to
> speak, only when the conditions are ripe for this (emergence, evolution) to
> happen and nothing interferes with it happening.
>
> So, in several papers and on this list I have sometimes extended Peirce's
> term "would-be's" in just this direction by writing that we should think of
> potentialites as "would-be's *were* the conditions in place for their
> coming into being."
>
> One of the fundamental conditions for this emergence is "that primordial
> continuity" which you noted. Something likes this seems to me essential in
> consideration of all emergence, evolution, autopoiesis, etc.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R.
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 6:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> > wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> I have been tied up all day, and may have more to say later. For now, I
>> just want to point out what Peirce wrote about continuity, potentiality,
>> and habit in the last RLT lecture.
>>
>> CSP: This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a
>> generalization, and as such a general, and as such a continuum or
>> continuity. It must have its origin in the original continuity which is
>> inherent in potentiality. Continuity, as generality, is inherent in
>> potentiality, which is essentially general. (CP 6.204; 1898)
>>
>>
>> My understanding of Peirce is thus that the "womb of indeterminacy" is
>> "the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and habit as
>> "a generalizing tendency" emerges from that primordial continuity.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 5:07 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Edwina, Clark, John S, List,
>>>
>>> Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> I think Peirce has [two] categories of chance. One is discontinuous
>>> whereas the other is continuous. This ends up being important in various
>>> ways.
>>>
>>>
>>> I see a change, shall we say an evolution, in Peirce's thinking towards
>>> a much greater emphasis on continuity as his studies of the mathematical
>>> concept deepens. His later cosmological writings, esp. RLT but also the
>>> N.A, as well as the many papers and MSS where he discusses continuity,
>>> strongly suggest to me that Peirce comes to emphasize *3ns as
>>> continuity *(and generality) while earlier he had associated it
>>> principally with habit (and lawfulness). So in the latter part of his
>>> career one reads such passages as this:
>>>
>>> 1898 | Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things:
>>> Detached Ideas continued and the Dispute between Nominalists and Realists
>>> | RLT 160
>>>
>>> … the continuum is all that is possible, in whatever dimension it be
>>> continuous (in Commens dictionary)
>>>
>>> And as Eliseo Fernandez remarks. Peirce generalizes the idea of
>>> generalization such that continuity is seen by him to the highest form of
>>> generality. http://www.lindahall.org/media/papers/fernandez/
>>> habit_and_generalization.pdf
>>>
>>> "Peirce’s logical and mathematical investigations, especially his
>>> unfinished theory on the mathematical continuum, and his existential
>>> graphs, led him to his doctrine of synechism, and to consider mathematical
>>> continuity as the highest form of generality"
>>>
>>>
>>> And see this Abstract from a "Panel Proposal for SAAP 2010."
>>> http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SAAP/CLT/PD04.htm
>>>
>>>
>>> [T]here is an unfortunate tendency to reduce Thirdness to habit,
>>> ignoring the various other examples of Thirdness Peirce gives, such as
>>> continuity, generality, and law. . . Habit, after all, is [but] one sort
>>> of Thirdness. . .
>>>
>>> [One panelist's paper] aims to explore Peirce’s conception of a habit
>>> in light of his cenopythagorean categories and also post-1900 attempts to
>>> classify the various kinds of signs. . . . Here the inquiry will follow
>>> three paths: the relationship between the different examples of Thirdness
>>> (continuity, generality, law, etc.), *the relationship between the
>>> three categories (that a proper Thirdness includes Secondness and
>>> Firstness*)
>>> [*I would correct this to "involves" rather than "includes" GR*], and
>>> finally *an especial focus on the notion of degenerate forms of a
>>> category to see what kind of Thirdness habits are*. In other words,
>>> instead of the usual procedure of appealing to habits to illustrate
>>> Thirdness, this section [of the paper] attempts to use an account of
>>> Thirdness to clarify Peirce’s understanding of what constitutes a habit
>>> (emphasis added).
>>>
>>>
>>> Edwina wrote:
>>>
>>> Gary R - I agree with your comment re 'chance creates habit'. I don't
>>> see how this could happen. Chance enables the development of different
>>> habits.
>>> But habit-taking is primordial.
>>>
>>>
>>> Ah, I thought for a moment that we were going to be in complete
>>> agreement here, Edwina (but I'm glad to see that we too seem to be coming
>>> to agreement in at least certain matters); however, you continued:
>>>
>>> ET: My only difference is that I think that the tendency to behave
>>> within Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness - each of which are different
>>> behaviours - all three are primordial. I don't see that Thirdness is
>>> privileged in this set; i.e., First-in-line.
>>>
>>>
>>> As I've previously argued, I don't see "habit-taking" but, rather,
>>> continuity as primordial, again this following from Peirce's argumentation
>>> in the 1898 RLT.
>>>
>>> And in terms of the categories I tend to agree with the seminar paper
>>> author in the passage highlighted "that a proper Thirdness includes
>>> Secondness and Firstness," this in the sense of involution as Peirce
>>> argues for it as propelling the generation of the categories in "The Logic
>>> of Mathematics" paper; namely, that--and as opposed to "Hegelian evolution"
>>> (i.e., loosely, dialectic) where the path is 1ns -> 2ns -> 3ns--that in the
>>> generation of the categories that the path is just the oppose: *3ns
>>> involves 2ns and 1ns and 2ns involves 1ns*.
>>>
>>> So, it's not so much a matter of 3ns being "first-in-line" but rather
>>> it's involving (in the mathematical sense just mentioned) the other
>>> categories.
>>>
>>> And, again, I am here most interested in what I see to be the primordial
>>> nature of that* most general form* of 3ns, continuity which "is all
>>> that is possible, in whatever dimension it be continuous."
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>> *C 745*
>>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 3:56 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Gary R - I agree with your comment re 'chance creates habit'. I don't
>>>> see how this could happen. Chance enables the development of different
>>>> habits.
>>>>
>>>> But habit-taking is primordial. My only difference is that I think that
>>>> the tendency to behave within Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness - each
>>>> of which are different behaviours - all three are primordial. I don't see
>>>> that Thirdness is privileged in this set; i.e., First-in-line.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>> --
>>>> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
>>>> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>>>>
>>>> http://www.primus.ca
>>>>
>>>> On Fri 07/04/17 1:58 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>>>>
>>>> Clark, Jon S, Gary F, Edwina, John S, list,
>>>>
>>>> This is a most interesting discussion, but for now I'd like only to
>>>> repeat a point which, as I recall, Jon S recently made in response to you.
>>>> You wrote:
>>>>
>>>> It’s also the case that chance creates habit.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But, as I see it, this is not at all the case. Chance may break up old
>>>> habits--and this is essential, for example, for evolution to occur--but I
>>>> don't see that "chance creates habit" either in Peirce's early cosmological
>>>> musings, nor once *this* universe--our universe--is underway. The
>>>> habit-taking tendency (3ns) is there from the get-go, either as primordial
>>>> (in the sense that all three categories are) or, to put it somewhat
>>>> differently and with a different emphasis, in the sense that one can derive
>>>> monadic and dyadic relations from triadic ones, but that stringing together
>>>> monads and dyads (although properly speaking monads can't even be strung
>>>> together) could never produce triads (nor a fortiori produce all
>>>> higher -adities according to Peirce's 'reduction thesis').
>>>>
>>>> While some would disagree, Jon S and I have argued here near the close
>>>> of last year that the 'black board' metaphor in the final lecture of RLT
>>>> strongly suggests that if one associates continuity with 3ns (which Peirce
>>>> in places explicitly does), then continuity (so 3ns) is primal and the two
>>>> other categories are either derived from--or inscribed upon--that
>>>> ur-continuity or, in some obscure way contained within it (potentially)
>>>> from the outset--although this last matter remains quite unclear to me at
>>>> present (alathough I think Jon S might say 'inscribed upon it').
>>>>
>>>> But, again, my present question is, why do you continue to say that
>>>> "chance creats habit"?
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Gary R
>>>>
>>>> [image: Blocked image]
>>>>
>>>> Gary Richmond
>>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>>>> Communication Studies
>>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>>>> C 745
>>>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 1:00 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On Apr 5, 2017, at 10:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I would suggest that 1ns is better characterized as spontaneity, life,
>>>>> and freedom than as pure chance in the sense of randomness, especially as
>>>>> it relates to mind as 3ns.
>>>>>
>>>>> I’ve been trying to think the best way to get into this subject. I
>>>>> recognize it’ll diverge from Edwina’s discussion so I’m changing the
>>>>> subject. It’ll definitely get into ontology and a careful analysis of
>>>>> terminology which I know Edwina doesn’t enjoy so that’ll help keep the
>>>>> discussions separate.
>>>>>
>>>>> The question ends up being even if we can make a distinction between
>>>>> the terms what the cash value is. That is if meaning is given by a careful
>>>>> application of the pragmatic maxim, what does it mean here?
>>>>>
>>>>> First off I’m not sure there’s as big a divide as you think in those
>>>>> quoted texts. Particulary this one.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thus, when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term to
>>>>> express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or
>>>>> spontaneity. (CP 6.201; 1898)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think that while Peirce may not have been familiar with Gibb’s
>>>>> development over Boltzmann of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, he
>>>>> did have pretty clear and particular views on what the mathematics of
>>>>> chance was. That is he was a frequentist and thought the outward aspect
>>>>> mathematically was this frequentist conception. The inner aspect is
>>>>> feeling.
>>>>>
>>>>> Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there in the same proportion
>>>>> feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that which
>>>>> within itself is feeling.
>>>>> [—]
>>>>> …diversification is the vestige of chance-spontaneity; and wherever
>>>>> diversity is increasing, there chance must be operative. On the other
>>>>> hand,
>>>>> wherever uniformity is increasing, habit must be operative. (“Man’s Glassy
>>>>> Essence”, CP 6.265-6, 1892)
>>>>>
>>>>> Chance […] as an objective phenomenon, is a property of
>>>>> a distribution. That is to say, there is a large collection consisting,
>>>>> say, of colored things and of white things. Chance is a particular manner
>>>>> of distribution of color among all the things. But in order that this
>>>>> phrase should have any meaning, it must refer to some definite arrangement
>>>>> of all the things. (“Reasoning and the Logic of Things”, CP 6.74, 1898)
>>>>>
>>>>> Given this, while I understand the desire to distinguish spontaneity
>>>>> from chance as Peirce uses it they are synonymous. That means that the
>>>>> distinction you find in say the free will literature between chance and
>>>>> libertarian free will (either at an event level or agent level) It’s also
>>>>> the case that chance creates habit. So habit is a kind of relationship
>>>>> between determinism and indeterminism (chance).
>>>>>
>>>>> In terms of meaning, I just don’t see any basis for a distinction in
>>>>> content between chance, spontaneity or so forth. The only difference is
>>>>> that Peirce’s ontology sees “feeling” or absolute firstness as the inner
>>>>> quality of this.
>>>>>
>>>>
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