Jon S, Gary, R, List,
Jon S: Possibility is not a matter of "seeming," but of speculating (in the sense of theorizing) on the mode of Being of what it was that seemed or might have seemed, based on collateral experience rather than only that which is immediately present to the mind. Are there other senses of "possibility" in addition to the one you have articulated? For aspects of our experience involving vagueness, are there a range of possibilities lurking in the bushes? How about the experience of what has potentiality--such as is involved in the experience of the growth of our understanding? How about the experience of something that is continuous, such as the experience of things being at a place in space and at a time? In each of these sorts of cases, I take Peirce to be claiming that our experience involves a range of possibilities. I would think that each of these sorts of cases involves an experience of possibilities that is different, in important respects, from the sense that you've articulated. Am I missing something about what it is that you are trying to suggest in making your interpretative claim? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Thursday, December 7, 2017 4:14:21 PM To: Gary Richmond Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14) Gary R., List: Thanks for the link to the paper by de Tienne; I downloaded and (presumably) read it more than a year ago, but it does not ring a bell, and in any case makes more sense now. The following quote from page 7 gets at why I believe that any discussion of "an unrealized possibility" cannot properly fall within phaneroscopy. ADT: Since observation must be single-minded and pure, description will be devoid of speculations of any sort, and will only be an honest account of whatever was observed. The ethical demand made on phaneroscopists is twofold: they should not lie when reporting their observation, and they should make sure that their report states only what actually “seemed,” without speculating on what it was that seemed or might have seemed. Possibility is not a matter of "seeming," but of speculating (in the sense of theorizing) on the mode of Being of what it was that seemed or might have seemed, based on collateral experience rather than only that which is immediately present to the mind. Regards, Jon S. On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 4:15 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Jon S, Gary f, list, I will have to mull over your comments, Jon, and have nothing to add to my previous remarks at the moment. Yesterday I came upon this paper by André De Tienne which I had read some time ago and, as I recall, Joe Ransdell commented on at some length on the list in dialogue with André. In may be helpful in the current discussion of at least the phaneroscopic part of what we've been and, hopefully, will be discussing. But the last sentence of the Abstract. "Is Phaneroscopy as a Pre-Semiotic Science Possible?" http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf ABSTRACT Peirce thought that, after mathematics, the most fundamental of all sciences was phenomenology, or phaneroscopy as he dubbed it to escape from Hegel. But phaneroscopy as a research activity isn’t practiced anywhere and hasn’t attracted any wide following; its results are neither taught nor disseminated; and no scientist has begged for its conclusions with any urgency. Peirce scholars are divided about what that science is supposed to be and to do, and about how exactly it relates to semiotics. Some have even questioned its scientificity. The fact that it hasn’t become a major field of research raises the question of whether there is any actual need for it, whatever it is, and of whether it has any future, assuming it ever had a past. This paper attempts to address some of these questions candidly. It tries to determine what it is that Peirce held phaneroscopy to be, what type of discourse it is bound to produce, and whether its activity can be said to be scientific by Peirce’s own standards. It examines its place between mathematics and the normative sciences, especially semiotics, and takes stock of both the type and the method of analysis Peirce associated with it. Also studied are the peculiar qualities required from anyone who wants to become a phaneroscopist, and the reason why Peirce thought that everyone was capable of doing original work in it. The connection between phaneroscopy and the existential graphs is also addressed. Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690<tel:(718)%20482-5690> On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 2:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Garys, List: "Division" is Peirce's own term (along with "classification") for sorting the indecomposable elements of the Phaneron into their different kinds (CP 1.288, c. 1908, on Gary F.'s website), so I am inclined to stick with it. I can understand why one might prefer "aspect" in phaneroscopy, but it strikes me as a poor fit in normative science and metaphysics. I am also not convinced (so far) that possibility is something that "appears" in the Phaneron, except as a mode of Being within metaphysics. Notice that in Lowell 3.2, Peirce refers to the quality of hardness as "an unrealized possibility," which is clearly (to me) a metaphysical statement, not properly a phaneroscopic one. From that standpoint, as I have suggested previously, all three branches of philosophy could be called phenomenology--quality/reaction/mediation are phenomena in their 1ns, feeling/volition/thought are phenomena in their 2ns, and possibility/actuality/regularity are phenomena in their 3ns. Thanks, Jon S. On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Gary f., Jon, list, I am still troubled by a few things in Jon's proposal while still thinking that it might prove highly useful. I'll employ Gary f's most recent comments to make a couple of points concerning what yet troubles me. Gf: I think your proposal looks pretty good, considering that (as you said in your response to Gary R), there tends to be a lot of overlap between the language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics — especially when the metaphysics takes principles from logic and logic takes principles (or “categories”) from phenomenology, as is the case in Peirce’s classification of sciences. In my view, not only does "there tend to be a lot of overlap between the language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics," but that in the matter of categorial 'aspects' (I think Gary f's terminology is sound) that they are all (or almost all) 'given' in phenomenology, Then, as Gary notes, metaphysics takes categorial principles from logic which has taken categorial principles from phenomenology, and in return in Peirce's Classification of Sciences, logic and phenomenology may take examples from metaphysics; while phenomenology can also receive examples ---and undoubtedly other help--from logic. But the categorial elements (including 'possibility---and in the section of Lowell 3 I referred to in my earlier post, Peirce is discussing not metaphysics, but pointedly, phenomenology), these categorial aspects first appear in some phaneron. Gf continues: Gf: However in phaneroscopy, rather than “divisions of phenomena,” I would say aspects of phenomena, or even better, aspects of the phaneron. Phaneroscopy does not divide phenomena into Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, but abstracts from them the Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness which is present in anything “before the mind” in any way. I agree that at least in phaneroscopy that one might better say 'aspects' rather than 'divisions' of phenomena. Andre De Tinne, Director and General Editor of PEP, in a paper, 'Iconoscopy: Between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic', has argued that once one has 'experienced' such aspects in the phaneron that one can then single individual aspects out and give them names (and, perhaps, do further analysis: e.g. to retrospectively see that in the simplest theoretical mathematics that they appear as monod/dyad/triad and, further, that Peirce's Reduction Thesis makes this division necessary and sufficient for further -adities; and, moreover, in my view it is this retrospective mathematical analysis which gives warrant to our referring to them as 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns in phenomenology when the categorial aspects first appear). (Btw, in his paper De Tienne suggests, and I think he's correct, that 'Iconoscopy' is not quite the proper term in this context and suggests that it ought better be something closer to 'Imagoscopy' which, however, is probably too weird and ugly a term; still, Iconoscopy, in referencing a term in semeiotic, is at least misleading). I have also suggested that there may be a 3rd branch of phenomenology. Joe Ransdell suggested that i call that branch 'Category Theory' and I immediately took his advice. In this branch of phenomenology one goes beyond Iconoscopy/Imagoscopy and arranges trichotomies of aspects identified in that branch. The paper and ppt presentation I linked to in my last post from the Arisbe site offers suggestions as to the kinds of content that this 3rd branch of phenomenology might concern itself with. Gf concludes: Gf: In their Firstness, by the way, there is no difference between a phenomenon and the experience of it, but there is in their Secondness (which may be more or less degenerate). I think that Gf is essentially correct in this if one remembers that it is phaneroscopy proper which treats phenomenon in their 1ns. Further analysis, especially that using the tools of logic as semeiotic (and even a logica utens), can analyze phenomena in consideration of the other categories as well allowing for the two other possible branches just mentioned. Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690<tel:(718)%20482-5690> On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:05 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: Jon, I think your proposal looks pretty good, considering that (as you said in your response to Gary R), there tends to be a lot of overlap between the language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics — especially when the metaphysics takes principles from logic and logic takes principles (or “categories”) from phenomenology, as is the case in Peirce’s classification of sciences. However in phaneroscopy, rather than “divisions of phenomena,” I would say aspects of phenomena, or even better, aspects of the phaneron. Phaneroscopy does not divide phenomena into Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, but abstracts from them the Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness which is present in anything “before the mind” in any way. In their Firstness, by the way, there is no difference between a phenomenon and the experience of it, but there is in their Secondness (which may be more or less degenerate). Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 5-Dec-17 22:16 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14) List: For the sake of spurring further discussion, here is a proposal for parsing out Peirce's philosophical terminology. * In phaneroscopy, we discover the three Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns as divisions of Phenomena according to the elements of experience: quality/reaction/mediation. * In the normative sciences, we discover the three Ideals of esthetic/ethical/logical goodness as divisions of Ends according to the contents of consciousness: feeling/volition/thought. * In metaphysics, we discover the three Universes of Ideas/Facts/Habits as divisions of Reality according to the modes of Being: possibility/actuality/regularity. Criticize away! Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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