Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Fri, 08 Dec 2017 07:31:55 -0800

Hi Jon, List,

I always appreciate the points and commentary on this list, but I question whether this list should be used for "terminological proposals" or attempts to create some sort of faux consensus on various points of Peircean scholarship.

Through the years my observation has been there is rarely consensus on most any matter raised on this list, and the participants on the list are only a subset of those with insight and informed views of Peirce. That is not to say that the list should not be a source of discovery and lively debate, for which I enjoy it very much and get personal value, but I think what can actually be achieved via the list needs to be tempered with a bit of realism. I think what especially concerns me is that some apparent agreement between just a few list participants may be taken as consensus of the community, which often, in my humble view, it is decidedly not.

Just saying . . .

Mike


On 12/8/2017 9:22 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Jeff, List:

Once more, I am not making an interpretative claim, but a terminological proposal.  Indeed, there are other senses of "possibility" besides the one that I have articulated, but I am suggesting that--at least in some circumstances--it would be better for the sake of clarity if we only use the word "possibility" when referring to the metaphysical mode of Being that is distinct from actuality and regularity.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:31 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

Jon S, Gary, R, List,

Jon S:  Possibility is not a matter of "seeming," but of speculating (in the sense of theorizing) on the mode of Being of what it was that seemed or might have seemed, based on collateral experience rather than only that which is immediately present to the mind.

Are there other senses of "possibility" in addition to the one you have articulated? 

For aspects of our experience involving vagueness, are there a range of possibilities lurking in the bushes? How about the experience of what has potentiality--such as is involved in the experience of the growth of our understanding? How about the experience of something that is continuous, such as the experience of things being at a place in space and at a time? 

In each of these sorts of cases, I take Peirce to be claiming that our experience involves a range of possibilities. I would think that each of these sorts of cases involves an experience of possibilities that is different, in important respects, from the sense that you've articulated. 

Am I missing something about what it is that you are trying to suggest in making your interpretative claim?

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

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