Jeff, List:

Once more, I am not making an interpretative claim, but a terminological
proposal.  Indeed, there are other senses of "possibility" besides the one
that I have articulated, but I am suggesting that--at least in some
circumstances--it would be better for the sake of clarity if we only use
the word "possibility" when referring to the metaphysical mode of Being
that is distinct from actuality and regularity.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:31 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, Gary, R, List,
>
> Jon S:  Possibility is not a matter of "seeming," but of speculating (in
> the sense of theorizing) on the mode of Being of what it was that seemed or
> might have seemed, based on collateral experience rather than only that
> which is immediately present to the mind.
>
> Are there other senses of "possibility" in addition to the one you have
> articulated?
>
> For aspects of our experience involving vagueness, are there a range of
> possibilities lurking in the bushes? How about the experience of what has
> potentiality--such as is involved in the experience of the growth of our
> understanding? How about the experience of something that is continuous,
> such as the experience of things being at a place in space and at a time?
>
> In each of these sorts of cases, I take Peirce to be claiming that our
> experience involves a range of possibilities. I would think that each of
> these sorts of cases involves an experience of possibilities that is
> different, in important respects, from the sense that you've articulated.
>
> Am I missing something about what it is that you are trying to suggest in
> making your interpretative claim?
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
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