Mike, Jon S, list,
MB: I question whether this
list should be used for "terminological proposals" or
attempts to create some sort of faux consensus on
various points of Peircean scholarship.
While I think that attempting to reach consensus on matters
of Peircean scholarship in this forum is likely to be an
exercise in futility, as list moderator I see no reason why
participant members shouldn't offer "terminological
proposals"--or really anything so long as it is
Peirce-related--especially when this is offered in the
interest of stimulating discussion on some given point. That
Jon explicitly does from the get go. He initially prefaced
his proposal with "For the
sake of spurring further discussion, here is a proposal
for parsing out Peirce's philosophical terminology"
He concluded this initial
post urging "Criticize away!" That I and several others here
have done just that is obvious. More recently Jon has
commented.
JAS: Again, my proposal is not
intended to capture accurately Peirce's usage of the various terms
throughout his writings, but to suggest how we might employ them today in a way
that more clearly distinguishes the three branches of
philosophy. Of course, whether such an objective is
achievable and worthwhile is open to debate
(emphasis added).
Whether or not "such an
objective" as Jon's "is achievable and worthwhile" here or in
the Peirce community more generally is indeed open to debate,
and that debate has clearly begun here. I have found it
worthwhile to consider it on its own merits as well as on
several other levels including the meta-level that this
message is concerned with (so the 'it' here is really both
Jon's proposal and the discussion of it).
However, as I see it as list
moderator, to stipulate "no terminological proposals!" on
Peirce-L would constitute a kind of censorship on the list
which I am not at all willing to support. As for the other
part of your critique, Mike, you wrote:
MB: Through
the years my observation has been there is rarely
consensus on most any matter raised on this list, and the
participants on the list are only a subset of those with
insight and informed views of Peirce.
As I have observed the
activity of this forum for over a couple of decades now, not
only is there, as you wrote, "rarely consensus on most any
matter raised on this list," but the seeming consensus here
has typically--I mean nearly always if not in fact
always--been short-lived and has quickly evanesced. (I would
be interested if anyone here can find in the archives any
sustained consensus on any matter.)
That the Peirce-L
participant list members represent "only a subset" of Peirce
scholars is patent. On the other hand, it is not unusual for
forum members to refer to other Peirce scholars and their
work, to quote them, etc. In short, some of the best
discussions here are done with an awareness of the work not
only of Peirce himself, but of the greater community of Peirce
scholars. You continued:
MB: That is
not to say that the list should not be a source of
discovery and lively debate, for which I enjoy it very
much and get personal value, but I think what can actually
be achieved via the list needs to be tempered with a bit
of realism. I think what especially concerns me is that
some apparent agreement between just a few list
participants may be taken as consensus of the community,
which often, in my humble view, it is decidedly not.
Still, as noted by both of
us, consensus is rarely if ever "achieved via the list," while
the "apparent agreement between just a few list participants"
is also, in my experience and as just remarked, not only rare
but rarely sustained. And while I agree that when such
fleeting seeming consensus occurs it ought not "be
taken as consensus of the community," I see no scientific or
democratic reason, or really any reason, to try to
stifle the attempt at agreement on matters Peircean. It seems
to me that science and scholarship generally advance when
there is at least the attempt at some general agreement in
principle, that Peirce's theory of inquiry would have us act
as if such (albeit, fallibilistic) agreement were not only
possible but. moreover, desirable (not, however, that we can
expect much if any of that to happen here).
(I just thought that an
interesting and perhaps useful exercise would be to see if fok
here could identify any Peircean principle on which consensus
has been reached in the Peirce community taken more generally.
I might quickly offer 'fallibilism'.)
Finally, in the present
matter, even while I am tending to disagree with at least
facets of Jon's proposal (although not the whole tout
court as you and perhaps some others here apparently do,
Mike), I have been personally stimulated to do some thinking I
might otherwise not have done had he not made it, and I
personally thank him for that.
And I thank you also for
your criticism, Mike, as it too has stimulated my thinking in
quite this other meta-matter.
Gary Richmond (writing as
list moderator)
