Garys, List: "Division" is Peirce's own term (along with "classification") for sorting the indecomposable elements of the Phaneron into their different kinds (CP 1.288, c. 1908, on Gary F.'s website), so I am inclined to stick with it. I can understand why one might prefer "aspect" in phaneroscopy, but it strikes me as a poor fit in normative science and metaphysics.
I am also not convinced (so far) that possibility is something that "appears" in the Phaneron, except as a mode of Being within metaphysics. Notice that in Lowell 3.2, Peirce refers to the quality of hardness as "an unrealized possibility," which is clearly (to me) a metaphysical statement, not properly a phaneroscopic one. From that standpoint, as I have suggested previously, all three branches of philosophy could be called phenomenology--quality/reaction/mediation are phenomena in their 1ns, feeling/volition/thought are phenomena in their 2ns, and possibility/actuality/regularity are phenomena in their 3ns. Thanks, Jon S. On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary f., Jon, list, > > I am still troubled by a few things in Jon's proposal while still thinking > that it might prove highly useful. I'll employ Gary f's most recent > comments to make a couple of points concerning what yet troubles me. > > Gf: I think your proposal looks pretty good, considering that (as you > said in your response to Gary R), there tends to be a lot of overlap > between the language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics — especially > when the metaphysics takes principles from logic and logic takes principles > (or “categories”) from phenomenology, as is the case in Peirce’s > classification of sciences. > > In my view, not only does "there tend to be a lot of overlap between the > language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics," but that in the matter > of categorial 'aspects' (I think Gary f's terminology is sound) that they > are all (or almost all) 'given' in phenomenology, > > Then, as Gary notes, metaphysics takes categorial principles from logic > which has taken categorial *principles* from phenomenology, and in return > in Peirce's Classification of Sciences, logic and phenomenology may take > *examples* from metaphysics; while phenomenology can also receive > examples ---and undoubtedly other help--from logic. But the categorial > elements (including 'possibility---and in the section of Lowell 3 I > referred to in my earlier post, Peirce is discussing not metaphysics, but > pointedly, phenomenology), these categorial aspects *first* appear in > some phaneron. Gf continues: > > Gf: However in phaneroscopy, rather than “*divisions* of phenomena,” I > would say *aspects *of phenomena, or even better, *aspects of the > phaneron*. Phaneroscopy does not divide phenomena into Firsts, Seconds > and Thirds, but *abstracts* from them the Firstness, Secondness and > Thirdness which is present in anything “before the mind” in any way. > > I agree that at least in phaneroscopy that one might better say 'aspects' > rather than 'divisions' of phenomena. Andre De Tinne, Director and General > Editor of PEP, in a paper, 'Iconoscopy: Between Phaneroscopy and > Semeiotic', has argued that once one has 'experienced' such aspects in the > phaneron that one can then single individual aspects out and give them > names (and, perhaps, do further analysis: e.g. to retrospectively see that > in the simplest theoretical mathematics that they appear as > monod/dyad/triad and, further, that Peirce's *Reduction Thesis* makes > this division necessary and sufficient for further -adities; and, moreover, > in my view it is this retrospective mathematical analysis which gives > warrant to our referring to them as 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns in phenomenology when > the categorial aspects first *appear*). > > (Btw, in his paper De Tienne suggests, and I think he's correct, that > 'Iconoscopy' is not quite the proper term in this context and suggests that > it ought better be something closer to 'Imagoscopy' which, however, is > probably too weird and ugly a term; still, Iconoscopy, in referencing a > term in semeiotic, is at least misleading). > > I have also suggested that there may be a 3rd branch of phenomenology. Joe > Ransdell suggested that i call that branch 'Category Theory' and I > immediately took his advice. In this branch of phenomenology one goes > beyond Iconoscopy/Imagoscopy and arranges trichotomies of aspects > identified in that branch. The paper and ppt presentation I linked to in my > last post from the Arisbe site offers suggestions as to the kinds of > content that this 3rd branch of phenomenology might concern itself with. Gf > concludes: > > Gf: In their Firstness, by the way, there is no difference between a > phenomenon and the experience of it, but there is in their Secondness > (which may be more or less degenerate). > > I think that Gf is essentially correct in this if one remembers that it is > phaneroscopy proper which treats phenomenon in their 1ns. Further analysis, > especially that using the tools of logic as semeiotic (and even a *logica > utens*), can analyze phenomena in consideration of the other categories > as well allowing for the two other possible branches just mentioned. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:05 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Jon, >> >> I think your proposal looks pretty good, considering that (as you said in >> your response to Gary R), there tends to be a lot of overlap between the >> language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics — especially when the >> metaphysics takes principles from logic and logic takes principles (or >> “categories”) from phenomenology, as is the case in Peirce’s classification >> of sciences. >> >> However in phaneroscopy, rather than “*divisions* of phenomena,” I would >> say *aspects* of phenomena, or even better, *aspects of the phaneron*. >> Phaneroscopy does not divide phenomena into Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, but >> *abstracts* from them the Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness which is >> present in anything “before the mind” in any way. In their Firstness, by >> the way, there is no difference between a phenomenon and the experience of >> it, but there is in their Secondness (which may be more or less degenerate). >> >> Gary f. >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] >> *Sent:* 5-Dec-17 22:16 >> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell >> Lecture 2.14) >> >> List: >> For the sake of spurring further discussion, here is a proposal for >> parsing out Peirce's philosophical terminology. >> >> >> - In phaneroscopy, we discover the three Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns as >> divisions of Phenomena according to the elements of experience: >> quality/reaction/mediation. >> - In the normative sciences, we discover the three Ideals of >> esthetic/ethical/logical goodness as divisions of Ends according to the >> contents of consciousness: feeling/volition/thought. >> - In metaphysics, we discover the three Universes of >> Ideas/Facts/Habits as divisions of Reality according to the modes of >> Being: possibility/actuality/regularity. >> >> Criticize away! >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >
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