Gary F., List: I have already acknowledged that Peirce was not consistent about using the term "Sign" only for a Type and not for its Instances. I concede that this could be counted as evidence *against *what I am advocating--which is basically that every Tone is involved in a Token, and that every Token is involved in a Type.
On the other hand, Peirce evidently abandoned the specific names Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign after 1904, which is when he wrote "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" and "New Elements." I have also pointed out previously that by 1908 the corresponding trichotomy was not necessarily a division according to the (ontological) mode of being of the Sign, but at least sometimes according to its (phenomenological) "Mode of Apprehension" or "Mode of Presentation" instead. In any case, what would be some examples of Signs that are *not *Types? I have already addressed "natural Signs" like ripples on a lake or the orientation of a weathercock. Their *generality *is reflected by their suitability for expression as subjunctive conditionals; e.g., if the wind *were *to blow across a lake (or weathercock), the resulting ripples (or orientation) *would *indicate its direction. Peirce even hinted at what I am suggesting in 1903, using "Representamen" because at that point he still considered it a generalization of "Sign" by virtue of not necessarily having a mental Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273). CSP: The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203) Likewise, if two sets of ripples are different Signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different bodies of water, or to the same one at different times--i.e., they are different Instances of the same Sign. As Peirce continued ... CSP: A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented. In other words, a Sign (Representamen) is not a real Thing (that which has a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition). Regards, Jon S. On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 6:34 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, > > You appear to be arguing that in 1904, or whenever he wrote “New > Elements,” Peirce decided that only Types (or Legisigns) were properly > called “signs,” i.e. Replicas (or Sinsigns) should not be called “signs.” > But several of the classes *of signs* he named in 1906-08 are not Types > or Legisigns; so Peirce must have changed his mind about that, if he really > meant in 1904 that only Types are signs. This brings up two questions: > > When and why do you think Peirce changed his mind about only Types being > signs? > > Why should we take Peirce’s usage in “New Elements” as governing his > entire semiotic theory from then on, rather than taking it as a peculiarity > of that particular moment of his thinking? > > Gary f. > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* 7-Aug-18 18:13 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: Determination in Logic as Semeiotic vs Biosemiotic, was, > [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants > > > > Jeff, List: > > I understand the reasoning behind that interpretation, but I have argued > against it previously on the basis that Peirce went on to discuss Icons and > Indices as Signs at EP 2:306-307, not just Symbols. A degenerate Sign is > still a Sign, and later in the same paragraph where he said that "a sign is > not a real thing," he talked about "Giving to the word *sign *the full > scope that reasonably belongs to it for logical purposes ..." (although I > acknowledge that his subsequent examples were all Symbols). > > As I have said before, somewhat controversially, I currently view *every *Sign > as a Type--such that what Peirce called a Sinsign in 1903 is always an > Instance or Replica of a Sign (i.e., a Token of a Type), and what he called > a Qualisign in 1903 is a significant character that is embodied in such an > Instance or Replica (i.e., a Tone of a Token). The ripples on a lake (or > the orientation of a weathercock) are an Index of the direction of the wind > *here > and now* only because there is a *general *law of nature that governs > them, which makes them capable of being interpreted as such *no matter > where they are located or when they are observed*. Again as Peirce put > it, "A real thing does not so exist in replica" (EP 2:303; 1904). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 4:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > > Jon S., Edwina, Gary R, List, > > There are a number of ways of interpreting the claim that: "a sign is > not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904) > > Jon suggests that the emphasis should be placed on "thing," rather than on > "real," which seems like a reasonable suggestion. Another option, > compatible with this, would be to interpret Peirce as using the more > general term "sign" in a manner that implied something more restricted like > "legisign" or "symbolic sign." > > The interpretative suggestion I am making may seem strained, but I find > that Peirce at times is using a more general term (e.g., genuine triad) > when it is clear that he really means to restrict what is being claimed > (e.g., to thoroughly genuine triads). As far as I can tell, he seems to > think the context is sufficient to indicate that the more restricted class > is meant--although I admit that this could be a misinterpretation of the > plain meaning of what is said in the texts. > > One reason I am drawn to this interpretation is that Peirce says > (somewhere, I can't put my finger on it) that every individual object that > stands in an existential relation to another individual object *can* > serve as an index. If we take the interpretative approach that I'm > suggesting, then it makes perfect sense to say that a symbolic legisign is > not a real individual thing. Having said that, a genuine indexical sinsign > is an existing individual thing. What is more, some indexical sinsigns may > stand in existential and dynamical relations (i.e., dyadic relations) to > their objects. That, at least, is how I tend to interpret Peirce's claims > about indexical sinsigns that have the capacity to be interpreted in a mind > (e.g., the ripples on the lake as an index of the direction of the > wind)--but have not, at least not yet. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > >
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