Jon AS, Gary f,
Jon wrote:
JAS: I am currently adopting the specific point of view that all Signs are
Types and seeing how far I can get with that interpretative hypothesis.
I am tending to find myself more and more disposed toward your line of
thinking, Jon, especially as articulated in your last several posts.
However, some questions remain for me. For example, imagining that the word
'the' was once *first* spoken (or written, but more likely I think,
spoken), *what* was the type that that first spoken "the" was token of,
*where* does one locate *its* reality?
Despite this and a few other reservations which I'll comment on below, I
found your argument refuting Gary f's examples of what he saw as signs
which were not types rather convincing. As you summarized your position
near the end of your post:
JS: No one ever *actually *speaks, writes, hears, reads, or thinks a word
(the Sign itself); we only *actually *speak, write, hear, read, and think
Instances thereof. . . . when we do [such things], we usually say that we
speak, write, hear, read, or think the word/Sign (not the Instance). This
is the problematic inconsistency, in my view--not so much a criticism of
Peirce as of our everyday colloquial usage of such terminology. I* am
basically advocating greater precision in logical/semeiotic inquiry by
carefully distinguishing (individual) Instances of Signs from (general)
Signs themselves *(emphasis added).
This may be leaping a bit ahead, but the thought occurred to me that if all
Signs are *legislative* types which are expressed (i.e., find their being)
as *existential* tokens (with attached *qualitative* tones), and if "The
entire universe is perfused, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" ("The
Basis of Pragmaticism," footnote, CP 5.448, 1906), then the deepest and,
as it were, most *necessary *Reality being, shall we say, *universal
legislative types *(3ns), *this* Reality would seem to find *its *being in
that Mind which underlies existential reality, manifests.
As I noted, however, some questions remain for me regarding this view,
perhaps the most important relating to the nature and purpose of semiotic
evolution. Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon which they are
rooted?
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs,
particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of
likenesses and symbols. . . . So it is only out of symbols that a new
symbol can grow. *Omne symbolum de symbolo (What Is a Sign?, 1894)*
This quotation now strikes me as perhaps more akin to Hegelian dialectical
"evolution", than to Peirce's involution where indices and indexes are
always-already involved in symbols. But on the other hand, Peirce wrote
that, for example, biological evolution begins with "sporting" with 1ns
(see, "A Guess at the Riddle." Admittedly both this and "What Is a Sign?"
were written earlier than the late semeiotic material we've been reflecting
on. Anyhow, this is just to point to the kinds of questions that have been
coming to mind in light of your "interpretive hypothesis" that all signs
are types.
Enough for now. Suffice it to say that I am finding this a most interesting
and valuable inquiry.
Best,
Gary R
PS You were correct about the two proof-reading errors you found in my post
of yesterday. I hurriedly threw it together just before a medical
appointment with scarcely time to read it over once.
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*
On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 1:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Gary F., List:
>
> GF: I think the more charitable approach is to say that Peirce’s usage of
> terms varies with its context--as indeed it must in order to keep the focus
> of the argument on the same object (semiosis) while investigating various
> aspects of it from various points of view.
>
>
> I agree, and did not mean to imply otherwise. I am currently adopting the
> specific point of view that all Signs are Types and seeing how far I can
> get with that interpretative hypothesis.
>
> GF: You ask for some examples of Signs that are not Types. Well, this
> reply to your post is one example, and the post I am replying to is another.
>
>
> Which version of your reply is the Sign itself? The one that you sent?
> The one that I received? The one that someone else on the List received?
> The one that is archived? The answer, of course, is none of these; they
> are all Instances of the same Sign, which does not *exist *apart from
> them, yet cannot be identified with any *single *one of them.
>
> GF: An individual weathercock, as seen by an individual observer at a
> particular time and place, is another.
>
>
> I already addressed this example, citing Peirce himself. That is also an
> Instance of a Sign, not a Sign itself.
>
> GF quoting CSP: A Sign may *itself *have a “possible” Mode of Being;
> e.g., a hexagon inscribed in or circumscribed about a conic. (EP 2:480;
> 1908)
>
>
> What Peirce describes here is a *general *Type, and any *actual *diagram
> of it is a Token of that Type--i.e., an Instance of the Sign.
>
> GF quoting CSP: An Actual sign I call a Token; a Necessitant Sign a Type.
> (EP 2:480; 1908)
>
>
> "Actual sign" is self-contradictory unless we understand it as a synonym
> for Sign-Replica, since a Sign only exists (i.e., is actual) in its
> Replicas (i.e., Instances).
>
> GF quoting CSP: When the Dynamoid Object is an Occurrence (Existent thing
> or Actual fact of past or future), I term the Sign a *Concretive*; any
> one barometer is an example, and so is a written narrative of any series of
> events. (EP 2:480; 1908)
>
>
> A barometer (or thermometer) is of the same nature as water ripples and a
> weathercock--an Instance of a Sign. It is an Index of the air pressure
> (or temperature) *here and now* only because there is a *general *law of
> nature that governs its behavior, which makes it capable of being
> interpreted as such *no matter where it is located or when it is observed*.
> Any written narrative is likewise an Instance of a Sign, not a Sign itself;
> it can be copied or translated to produce another Instance of the same Sign.
>
> GF quoting CSP: *Actisigns*, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced *hic
> et nunc*; such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence
> of a single paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a book. There
> may be repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another
> place. But that other occurrence is not *this *word. The book may be
> printed in an edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy.
> (CP 8.347, EP 2:483; 1908)
>
>
> Ironically, this corresponds to Peirce's favorite example *supporting *my
> contention that all Signs are Types. Every time "the" (or any other
> specific word) appears on a printed page, it is a different Instance of the
> same Sign--not a different Sign. The repetition of a whole paragraph is a
> different Instance of the same Sign--not a different Sign. THIS word in my
> copy of a book is a different Instance of the same Sign from the
> corresponding word in the other 9,999 printings--not a different Sign. The
> following has become a key passage for my understanding of all this.
>
> CSP: A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed
> book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty
> *the*'s on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another
> sense of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the
> English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on
> a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single
> thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do
> exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a *Type*. A
> Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one
> happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any
> one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
> occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
> single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
> call a *Token*. An indefinite significant character such as a tone of
> voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a
> Sign a *Tone*; In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in
> a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the
> Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an *Instance *of
> the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page.
> The term (Existential) *Graph *will be taken in the sense of a Type; and
> the act of embodying it in a *Graph-Instance* will be termed *scribing *the
> Graph (not the Instance), whether the Instance be written, drawn, or
> incised. (CP 4.537; 1906)
>
>
> No one ever *actually *speaks, writes, hears, reads, or thinks a word
> (the Sign itself); we only *actually *speak, write, hear, read, and think
> Instances thereof. Likewise, no one ever *actually *writes, draws, or
> incises an Existential Graph; we only *actually* write, draw, or incise
> Graph-Instances. Nevertheless, when we do the latter, we say that we
> scribe the Graph (not the Instance); and when we do the former, we usually
> say that we speak, write, hear, read, or think the word/Sign (not the
> Instance). This is the problematic inconsistency, in my view--not so much
> a criticism of Peirce as of our everyday colloquial usage of such
> terminology. I am basically advocating greater precision in
> logical/semeiotic inquiry by carefully distinguishing (individual)
> Instances of Signs from (general) Signs themselves.
>
> GF: We should also bear in mind that the Type/Token distinction is
> *relative* whenever there is a hierarchy of types, so that a token of one
> general type may be at the same time a type to which tokens of lower
> generality may conform. I gave an example (using quotes from Peirce) in
> this blog post: http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/08/type-sign-and-word/.
>
>
> I am afraid that I do not see where that linked blog post says anything
> about "a hierarchy of types." In fact, it quotes the very same passage
> from Peirce that I cited last night as strong evidence for my position (EP
> 2:203).
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 8:20 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> If you choose to take Peirce’s terminology during the “New Elements”
>> period as your baseline, and say that his usage at other times was
>> “inconsistent” with that, I won’t try to talk you out of it. I’m just
>> pointing out that it would be equally reasonable (and equally uncharitable)
>> to say that his “New Elements” usage was itself “inconsistent” with the
>> usage of his “Syllabus”, or with his 1908 terminology. The choice of
>> ‘baseline’ is quite arbitrary. I think the more charitable approach is to
>> say that Peirce’s usage of terms varies with its context — as indeed it
>> *must* in order to keep the focus of the argument on the same object
>> (semiosis) while investigating various aspects of it from various points of
>> view.
>>
>> You ask for some examples of Signs that are *not *Types. Well, this
>> reply to your post is one example, and the post I am replying to is
>> another. An individual weathercock, as seen by an individual observer at a
>> particular time and place, is another. If you’re asking for examples of
>> non-Types specifically designated as “signs” by Peirce, here are a few
>> quoted from the Welby letters of 1908:
>>
>> - A Sign may *itself* have a “possible” Mode of Being; e.g., a
>> hexagon inscribed in or circumscribed about a conic.
>> - An Actual sign I call a *Token*; (a Necessitant Sign a* Type.*)
>> - When the Dynamoid Object is an Occurrence (Existent thing or Actual
>> fact of past or future), I term the Sign a *Concretive*; any one
>> barometer is an example, and so is a written narrative of any series of
>> events.
>> - B. *Actisigns,* or Objects which are Signs as Experienced *hic et
>> nunc;* such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence
>> of a single paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a book. There
>> may be repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another
>> place. But that other occurrence is not *this* word. The book may be
>> printed in an edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy.
>>
>> We should also bear in mind that the Type/Token distinction is *relative*
>> whenever there is a hierarchy of types, so that a token of one general type
>> may be at the same time a type to which tokens of lower generality may
>> conform. I gave an example (using quotes from Peirce) in this blog post:
>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/08/type-sign-and-word/.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>> p.s. I trust you will not find any of the above “insulting” despite my
>> use of the second=person pronoun.
>>
>
>
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