Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, List,
It appears that I may be missing something when it comes to understanding the suggestion Jon S is making with respect to interpreting the claim that "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904). As such, let me raise some straightforward questions about the thesis that Peirce revised his definition of the sign in the hopes of getting clearer about the suggestion. For the sake of generalizing the point, let's state it in the following way: "all signs have the character of a general rule, and only things that have the character of a general rule are signs." 1. Is the interpretative hypothesis being restricted only to the classification of signs based on the manner of the apprehension of the sign itself? That is, does it apply only to representamens that are apprehended as general types? 2. Or, should one go further and say that the interpretative hypothesis applies to other ways of classifying signs, including: (a) the nature of the dynamical object, (b) the nature of the dynamical interpretant, (c) the relation that holds between the representamen and the dynamical object, (d) the relation that holds between the representamen and the final interpretant. If the interpretative hypothesis is applied across the board to the 10 respects in which signs are being classified in the mature theory (circa the later letters to Lady Welby), then it would appear that there is really only one class of signs, all of which have the following character: copulative, relative, collective, type, usual, indicative, logical, symbolic, argument, form. This is at odds with Peirce's general approach in his later writings in semiotics, which is to provide a classification of 66 different natural classes of signs. If the interpretative hypothesis is restricted in some way, such as to the manner in which the representamen is apprehended and to the relation that holds between the representamen and the dynamical object, then all signs are symbolic types, but (admittedly) there would be several classes of such signs. I don't see a reason to restrict the application of the interpretative hypothesis to these two respects without making it seem like an arbitrary restriction. What is more, the number of different classes of signs--while larger than one--still seems unduly restricted as an interpretation of Peirce's late writings in semiotics. Having raised these questions about the apparent lack of fit between the interpretative hypothesis and the character of Peirce's mature classification of 66 different classes of signs, let me make a quick reply to the general suggestion that only representamens that are symbolic are really signs, because all signs must be related to their dynamical objects via some general rule that governs the relation. Consider cases involving what might be called an "accidental index." Here is one that I have fabricated. Suppose a person is walking down the sidewalk and a bird dropping lands on his right shoulder. As he stops to see what has happened, he notices a bicyclist veering out of control and he sees that the bicyclist has just missed him--and only because he had stopped to take a look. To the extent that the bird's dropping did draw his attention to his good fortune in stopping just in time to be missed by the bike, is it an accidental indexical sign? Let's take the example a step further and suppose that the fortunate event had such an impact on this fellow that in future instances when a bird dropping landed on his shoulder, he would stop and look for bicyclists--even if only to chuckle for a moment in memory of his past good luck. Is the bird dropping now something of an indexical legisign (a general type of sign) for this fellow, even if it is an erroneous sign in some respects? I raise this somewhat fanciful example because Peirce clearly holds that most of the relations that hold between the facts in this world are, to some degree, accidental in character. This is true even if there is much that is governed by general laws. As such, I'm wondering about the role of accidents in the semiotic theory--especially when it comes to noticing surprising phenomena that are more accidental in character. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Wednesday, August 8, 2018 6:08 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing Gary R., List: GR: ... imagining that the word 'the' was once first spoken (or written, but more likely I think, spoken), what was the type that that first spoken "the" was token of, where does one locate its reality? Where does one "locate" the Reality of any general Type? Every Instance of the word "the"--first, last, and each one in between--is a Replica of the same Sign. The Type is not dependent on its Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a diamond is dependent on its ever actually being scratched. Such is the nature of a Real "would-be." GR: Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon which they are rooted? What does it mean in this context to say that "symbols grow"? In order for them to get "larger," we must have a way to "measure" their size. Conveniently, Peirce provided one with the concept of Information as "area"--the product of a Sign's Logical Breadth and Depth. I am reminded again of Eco's comment that I quoted last week--"from interpretant to interpretant, the sign is more and more determined both in its breadth and in its depth." In other words, although every Sign (as a general) is indeterminate to some degree, it can "grow"--i.e., approach (however distantly) the ideal state of Substantial Information--by becoming more determinate. CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ... Not determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be understood. What logically follows? ... A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is to say, is a representation that seeks to make itself definite, or seeks to produce an interpretant more definite than itself ... ... the interpretant aims at the object more than at the original replica and may be truer and fuller than the latter. The very entelechy of being lies in being representable ... A symbol is an embryonic reality endowed with power of growth into the very truth, the very entelechy of reality. (EP 2:322-324; 1904) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Jon AS, Gary f, Jon wrote: JAS: I am currently adopting the specific point of view that all Signs are Types and seeing how far I can get with that interpretative hypothesis. I am tending to find myself more and more disposed toward your line of thinking, Jon, especially as articulated in your last several posts. However, some questions remain for me. For example, imagining that the word 'the' was once first spoken (or written, but more likely I think, spoken), what was the type that that first spoken "the" was token of, where does one locate its reality? Despite this and a few other reservations which I'll comment on below, I found your argument refuting Gary f's examples of what he saw as signs which were not types rather convincing. As you summarized your position near the end of your post: JS: No one ever actually speaks, writes, hears, reads, or thinks a word (the Sign itself); we only actually speak, write, hear, read, and think Instances thereof. . . . when we do [such things], we usually say that we speak, write, hear, read, or think the word/Sign (not the Instance). This is the problematic inconsistency, in my view--not so much a criticism of Peirce as of our everyday colloquial usage of such terminology. I am basically advocating greater precision in logical/semeiotic inquiry by carefully distinguishing (individual) Instances of Signs from (general) Signs themselves (emphasis added). This may be leaping a bit ahead, but the thought occurred to me that if all Signs are legislative types which are expressed (i.e., find their being) as existential tokens (with attached qualitative tones), and if "The entire universe is perfused, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" ("The Basis of Pragmaticism," footnote, CP 5.448, 1906), then the deepest and, as it were, most necessary Reality being, shall we say, universal legislative types (3ns), this Reality would seem to find its being in that Mind which underlies existential reality, manifests. As I noted, however, some questions remain for me regarding this view, perhaps the most important relating to the nature and purpose of semiotic evolution. Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon which they are rooted? Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of likenesses and symbols. . . . So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo (What Is a Sign?, 1894) This quotation now strikes me as perhaps more akin to Hegelian dialectical "evolution", than to Peirce's involution where indices and indexes are always-already involved in symbols. But on the other hand, Peirce wrote that, for example, biological evolution begins with "sporting" with 1ns (see, "A Guess at the Riddle." Admittedly both this and "What Is a Sign?" were written earlier than the late semeiotic material we've been reflecting on. Anyhow, this is just to point to the kinds of questions that have been coming to mind in light of your "interpretive hypothesis" that all signs are types. Enough for now. Suffice it to say that I am finding this a most interesting and valuable inquiry. Best, Gary R PS You were correct about the two proof-reading errors you found in my post of yesterday. I hurriedly threw it together just before a medical appointment with scarcely time to read it over once. Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690
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