Jeff, List: My interpretative hypothesis is not intended to have any effect on Sign classification, other than a particular understanding of the one trichotomy that corresponds to the Sign itself. I am proposing that it is best conceived as a division according to the (phenomenological) "Mode of Apprehension" or "Mode of Presentation" of the Sign, as Peirce stated in *some *of his late 1908 draft letters to Lady Welby--*not *the (ontological) "Mode of Being" of the the Sign, as Peirce stated in *other* drafts and most of his previous writings about it, going back to 1903 when he first introduced it. The other nine trichotomies, including Icon/Index/Symbol, remain in place such that there would still potentially be 66 classes of Signs.
As for your fanciful (but plausible) scenario, I am not sure how to parse it analytically into various Signs, their Replicas, and their Dynamic Interpretants. As I have said before, such an exercise is always somewhat arbitrary, since Real semiosis is continuous. Is it the Sign itself that is "erroneous," or its Replicas, or the man's Habits of Interpretation--e.g., misidentifying the Dynamic Object because of his unique Collateral Experience? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 11:38 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, List, > > It appears that I may be missing something when it comes to understanding > the suggestion Jon S is making with respect to interpreting the claim that "a > sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904). As such, let me raise some > straightforward questions about the thesis that Peirce revised his > definition of the sign in the hopes of getting clearer about the > suggestion. For the sake of generalizing the point, let's state it in the > following way: "all signs have the character of a general rule, and only > things that have the character of a general rule are signs." > > 1. Is the interpretative hypothesis being restricted only to the > classification of signs based on the manner of the apprehension of the sign > itself? That is, does it apply only to representamens that are apprehended > as general types? > > 2. Or, should one go further and say that the interpretative hypothesis > applies to other ways of classifying signs, including: > > (a) the nature of the dynamical object, > > (b) the nature of the dynamical interpretant, > > (c) the relation that holds between the representamen and the dynamical > object, > > (d) the relation that holds between the representamen and the final > interpretant. > > If the interpretative hypothesis is applied across the board to the 10 > respects in which signs are being classified in the mature theory (circa > the later letters to Lady Welby), then it would appear that there is really > only one class of signs, all of which have the following character: > copulative, relative, collective, type, usual, indicative, logical, > symbolic, argument, form. This is at odds with Peirce's general approach in > his later writings in semiotics, which is to provide a classification of 66 > different natural classes of signs. > > If the interpretative hypothesis is restricted in some way, such as to the > manner in which the representamen is apprehended and to the relation that > holds between the representamen and the dynamical object, then all signs > are symbolic types, but (admittedly) there would be several classes of such > signs. I don't see a reason to restrict the application of the > interpretative hypothesis to these two respects without making it seem like > an arbitrary restriction. What is more, the number of different classes of > signs--while larger than one--still seems unduly restricted as an > interpretation of Peirce's late writings in semiotics. > > Having raised these questions about the apparent lack of fit between the > interpretative hypothesis and the character of Peirce's mature > classification of 66 different classes of signs, let me make a quick reply > to the general suggestion that only representamens that are symbolic are > really signs, because all signs must be related to their dynamical > objects via some general rule that governs the relation. Consider cases > involving what might be called an "accidental index." Here is one that I > have fabricated. Suppose a person is walking down the sidewalk and a bird > dropping lands on his right shoulder. As he stops to see what has happened, > he notices a bicyclist veering out of control and he sees that the > bicyclist has just missed him--and only because he had stopped to take a > look. To the extent that the bird's dropping did draw his attention to his > good fortune in stopping just in time to be missed by the bike, is it an > accidental indexical sign? > > Let's take the example a step further and suppose that the fortunate event > had such an impact on this fellow that in future instances when a bird > dropping landed on his shoulder, he would stop and look for > bicyclists--even if only to chuckle for a moment in memory of his past good > luck. Is the bird dropping now something of an indexical legisign (a > general type of sign) for this fellow, even if it is an erroneous sign in > some respects? > > I raise this somewhat fanciful example because Peirce clearly holds that > most of the relations that hold between the facts in this world are, to > some degree, accidental in character. This is true even if there is much > that is governed by general laws. As such, I'm wondering about the role of > accidents in the semiotic theory--especially when it comes to noticing > surprising phenomena that are more accidental in character. > > Yours, > > Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 >
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