> On Feb 3, 2019, at 6:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > MF: Yes, in my counter argument I rejected the part of Peirce's > generalization that included the whole universe as a sign. > > I thought that you were rejecting the major premise, not the minor premise.
I was talking about your major premise, For an example of why, I offer the following syllogism, then I draw some parallels with yours. Starting with "Furthermore" I add a new point to consider. Every real thing is ephemeral. God is a real thing. God is ephemeral. What we call God is a natural thing. In the major premise, you will probably reject the over generalization. By generalizing the subject, "real thing", out to include 'every' real thing, I include God as one of the subjects qualified by the predicate. Yes, God was introduced in the minor premise, but I designed this syllogism to have its major premise over-generalize so to include God as subject to the predicate, "is ephemeral". Here's your syllogism. * Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself. * The entire Universe is a Sign. * Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself. * And this we call God. I said, "I rejected the part of Peirce's generalization that included the whole universe as a sign." This meant, In the major premise, I reject the over generalization. By generalizing the subject, "Sign", out to include 'every' sign, you (and presumably Peirce) include the Universe as one of the subjects qualified by the predicate. Yes, the Universe was introduced in the minor premise, but it appears that you subconsciously, but nonetheless gratuitously, designed this syllogism to have its major premise over-generalized so to include the Universe as subject to the predicate, "is determined by an Object other than itself." Furthermore, I question your assumption of what "other than" can mean. Peirce acknowledged two traditional ways of classifying otherness: by a 'real distinction' and by a 'formal distinction'. (The term, "real", in 'real distinction', is an unfortunate term which really means existent.) For example, a single triangle drawn in blue on a page has these two formally distinguished elements, blueness and triangleness. These elements are "other than" each other only by a formal distinction; there is no 'real distinction' between them. If you accept the idea that God is real but not existent, then you can't say He, as the object of the universe, is distinguished from the universe by a "real (existent) distinction". So that leaves the possibility that God and the Universe are formal distinctions. Pantheism fits the bill here. You offered another explanation, viz., transcendence of all three universes, but doesn't that exclude His reality? Or wouldn't 'reality' need to be redefined to accommodate this transcendence? Matt
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