Auke, List: I have been specifically addressing sign classification using a linear order of trichotomies, which (again) I personally no longer believe is the most fruitful approach for speculative grammar. Nevertheless, here are some examples of a necessitant determining a possible.
- 1903 taxonomy - any ordinary term as a rhematic symbol. - Hexadic taxonomy per my ordering - a sign that ideally would produce a further sign (temperative), but whose actual effect is merely a feeling (sympathetic). - Hexadic taxonomy per Robert's ordering - a sign that ideally would produce only a feeling (gratific), but whose actual effect is a further sign (usual), which I find implausible. As for the application to art, I am inclined to agree with T. L. Short's assessment that "pure" art is properly classified as a possible according to all the interpretants; i.e., it is intended only to evoke a feeling, and it never does anything more than evoke a feeling. Of course, there are other kinds of art that are intended to provoke thought and/or action, and my ordering (unlike Robert's) recognizes that they may nevertheless only evoke a feeling in some interpreters. Regards, Jon S. On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 10:50 AM <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > Jon S., > > How do you apply this scheme to art? it is by the fruit that one knows the > tree. I don't see constraints that limit in semiotics, I see possibilies > that evolve. You wrote "a neccesitant can determine ... a possible." > > Under what circumstances can we say that 'the' or 'a' necessitant actually > determines a possible? I need some meat on the terminological bones. > > Auke > > Op 14 april 2020 om 15:10 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, List: > > It implies that a necessitant can determine a necessitant, an existent, or > a possible; an existent can determine an existent or a possible; and a > possible can only determine a possible. That is why, in the 1903 taxonomy, > a symbol can be an argument, a dicent, or a rheme; an index can be a dicent > or a rheme; and an icon can only be a rheme. > > In the hexad, signs are classified according to the purpose of the final > interpretant, the mode of being of the dynamic interpretant, and the mode > of presentation of the immediate interpretant; and I believe that the *logical > *order of determination for these three trichotomies is If-->Id-->Ii. > For If and Id, a temperative can be a usual, a percussive, or a > sympathetic; an actuous can be a percussive or a sympathetic; and a > gratific can only be a sympathetic. Likewise, for Id and Ii, a usual can > be a relative, a categorical, or a hypothetic; a percussive can be a > categorical or a hypothetic; and a sympathetic can only be a hypothetic. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 6:27 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > > Sorry, nasty typo : But, does this imply that a Neccesitant determines a > Possible? > > Op 14 april 2020 om 11:55 schreef a.bree...@chello.nl: > > Jon Alan, > > You wrote: > > "Constrains" refers to the rule of determination-- -"It is evident that a > Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a > Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481). > > But, thus this imply that a Neccesitant determines a Possible? > > Auke > > Op 14 april 2020 om 2:42 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, List: > > I am not sure that I understand your objection. In my current view, the > final and normal interpretants are one and the same--whatever the sign > *necessarily > would* signify under ideal circumstances; namely, in the ultimate opinion > after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. This indeed does not > entail that it is "inescapable," because it may never *actually *have > that effect; it is "final" in the sense of a final cause, not something > that comes last in a series. "Nature" in this context means *purpose *for > the final interpretant, *mode of being* for the dynamical object or > interpretant, and *mode of presentation* for the immediate object or > interpretant; in each case belonging to one of three > universes--possibles, existents, or necessitants (EP 2:478-490, 1908). > "Constrains" refers to the rule of determination--"It is evident that a > Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a > Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 6:03 PM < a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > > Jon wrote: > > In other words, the nature of the final interpretant constrains the > possible natures of the dynamic and immediate interpretants, just as the > nature of the dynamical object constrains the possible nature of the > immediate object. > > Jon, > > That is quite some statement, I wonder whether Trump would agree, look at > his deeds. And, I mean this in a very real sense. It was not just a joke > that Peirce also wrote: we have to choose between mamon and god. At most, > it is our duty to find the final interpretant, it is not an inescapable > end. Nature of ...? What means nature here? Without nature and with normal > instead of final, I could consider to agree. But then we are only at the > level of the legisign aspect ( the involved sign aspects included of > course) or, in other words, dealing with habits of interpretation. > > Best regards, > > Auke van Breemen > >
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