John, List: As usual, the oblique criticisms expressed below are methodological rather than substantive, and ultimately seem to reflect a desire to have it both ways.
JFS: Unless Peirce explicitly stated that some earlier remark was wrong, we must consider it to be compatible with his later developments. I agree, but would add the qualification, "unless it clearly *cannot *be reconciled with them." It also works the other way around--we must consider Peirce's later writings to be compatible with his earlier writings, unless they clearly cannot be reconciled. This is simply a form of the hermeneutical principle of charity <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity>. Again, my approach is to give *more weight* to his later writings as presumably reflecting his *more considered* views, not to ignore his earlier writings altogether. The latter would be just as illegitimate as relying entirely on earlier passages and ignoring the later ones--right? JFS: Similarly, we must also consider the possibility that some of his later ideas might have been revised if he had lived longer. I agree, and this entails that we must also consider the possibility that he would have embraced some of the modifications to his ideas that others have proposed over the intervening century. We cannot reject those adjustments out of hand for the sole reason that Peirce himself did not formulate them exactly that way. Instead, each must be evaluated on its own merits as a *purported* further development of his thought. That process requires paying careful attention to what he *did *write in order to understand and apply his insights accurately. JFS: I'm sure that Peirce would cringe at most, if not all attempts to paraphrase his thoughts. How could anyone today be *sure *of that? Does Peirce explicitly state it somewhere in his writings? If not, then this assertion is inconsistent with itself--it amounts to an attempt to paraphrase his *supposed *thoughts, which is a lot less justifiable than attempting to paraphrase his *recorded *thoughts. Here is another example from the same post. JFS: He would be horrified at the thought that anybody would attempt to pick and choose some rigid set of quotations as a definitive formulation of his thought. Where does Peirce express such horror? This is pure conjecture, once more putting words in his mouth. Regardless, I have never claimed to be attempting "a definitive formulation of his thought"; on the contrary, I have explicitly *denied *having any such objective. Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this one) that they are expressions of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of his writings. JFS: I believe that your six principles (copied below) are in the spirit of Peirce's way of thinking. Edwina's six principles are neither presented as nor supported by direct quotations from Peirce, so they likewise constitute attempts to paraphrase his thoughts. Are they somehow among the few, if any, at which Peirce would *not* cringe? If so, again, how could anyone know this? Why the double standard? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 11:46 PM John F. Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Edwina, > > Peirce insisted that every theory of science, philosophy, or common sense > is fallible. He maintained that much of what we believe is true to the > extent that we have tested it. But he also maintained that we can never > be certain that any belief is absolutely true. > > He applied that principle to his own ideas, which were evolving up to the > very end. He often picked up an idea he had mentioned years earlier and > reinvigorated it from an entirely new perspective. Unless Peirce > explicitly stated that some earlier remark was wrong, we must consider it > to be compatible with his later developments. Similarly, we must also > consider the possibility that some of his later ideas might have been > revised if he had lived longer. In fact, some of his still undigitized > MSS might contain such ideas. > > I believe that your six principles (copied below) are in the spirit of > Peirce's way of thinking. He would be horrified at the thought that > anybody would attempt to pick and choose some rigid set of quotations as a > definitive formulation of his thought. > > And by the way, various people have quoted from some of my publications, > and others have paraphrased them. But I have never seen any paraphrase > that I completely agree with, and I cringe at many of them. I'm sure that > Peirce would cringe at most, if not all attempts to paraphrase his thoughts. > > John > > _________________________________ > > ET:: > > 1]I feel that you [JAS] are confusing my referring to a 'dynamic semiosic > process' ' by which I mean an active semiosic process, which is always > triadic - with the use of the word in Peirce of 'dynamical action or action > of brute force' which of course is dyadic. For you to confine the word > 'dynamic' to only ONE meaning is linguistically untenable. > > 2] Furthermore - you ignore the functionality of this dynamic semiosic > process - which is to enable diversity, adaptation, evolution and > complexity of both matter and thought. > > 3] We've been over this topic of 'relations' before and there is no need, > in my view, to redo it again. We disagree. > > 4] I also disagree with your merging of the term 'representamen' and > 'sign' - for the one, in my view, refers to the mediative process and the > other refers to the triadic actions. I think it's absolutely vital to > differentiate the two. > > 5] As for your assertion that you are referring to the logical rather than > temporal sequence of the three interpretants, I don't think that this > changes my view, that the Final Interpretant has to be open to novelty, ie, > to the development and the adaptation of its laws - and that this openness > means that it cannot determine the previous interpretants. All that the > outline of Peirce that you provide asserts is that IF, for example in a > particular situation, the FI is in a mode of 1ns, then, of course, the II > and DI must also be in that same categorical mode etc. But this says > nothing about the function and nature of the FI and its role in the > semiosic process of forming mind/matter. > > 6] I continue to feel that Peirce's many terms used in the Interpretant > phase of the semiosic process are viable - in that they refer to the > categorical modes of each stage of II, DI, FI. >
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