Helmut, List
If I can tell Helmut there are no two concepts. A sign is always a real
thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived ... Why
wouldn't a sign as a representation" be a real thing? Let's look at the
statue that is at the entrance to New York Harbor ... Isn't that an
existing thing so a real thing? And yet when you perceive it your mind is
occupied by the idea of Liberty (and more but we will leave it at that).
Why would you do that? As a result of your collateral experience that is
earlier and external at the time of perception. It has led you to
internalize a convention shared by billions of individuals that is a
reality in the shared social space, independent of these billions of minds,
what I think Peirce calls the commens. I have already made arguments for
that and I will give more. However, the experience of my debates has taught
me at least one thing is that one cannot make an assertion involving Peirce
without a few quotations. I will quote just three that support my point, it
seems to me, but it is up to you to judge.
Let's go to CP 3.359:
*CP 3.359"**A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to
the mind. If this triple relation is not of a degenerate species, the sign
is related to its object only in consequence of a mental association, and
depends upon a habit. Such signs are always abstract and general, because
habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected. They
are, for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general
words, the main body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment. For
the sake of brevity I will call them tokens."*
What is described here is the sign as representation that concerns you.
So a sign, a thing conceived by convention (what does convention mean?) or
even arbitrarily can represent an idea. We need the commens here to
"contain" all these conventions and therefore it cannot depend on the only
minds that communicate; it is out of minds. We discover it when we are
born and then internalize it throughout our lives. That was the substance
of my direct debate with Jon Alan and perhaps indirect with a few others.
We continue:
*CP 3.361 But if the triple relation between the sign, its object, and the
mind, is degenerate, then of the three pairs sign object sign mind object
mind two at least are in dual relations which constitute the triple
relation. One of the connected pairs must consist of the sign and its
object, for if the sign were not related to its object except by the mind
thinking of them separately, it would not fulfill the function of a sign at
all. Supposing, then, the relation of the sign to its object does not lie
in a mental association, there must be a direct dual relation of the sign
to its object independent of the mind using the sign. In the second of the
three cases just spoken of, this dual relation is not degenerate, and the
sign signifies its object solely by virtue of being really connected with
it. Of this nature are all natural signs and physical symptoms. I call such
a sign an index, a pointing finger being the type of the class.*
What is described here is " sign-as-event, which would be a real thing"
that you also care about."
Are you afraid of some dualism? No, because there's another case.
*CP 362. The third case is where the dual relation between the sign and its
object is degenerate and consists in a mere resemblance between them. I
call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an
icon. *
In this case it is a quality of "the concrete thing that represents" that
makes the sign; as a red thing to represent the quality of being red, or
the blood of a person represented by a trace or the communism on the flag
of China.
If you continue reading you will find some very interesting things about
algebraic notations...
Best regards,
Robert
Le mar. 9 juin 2020 à 18:35, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> a écrit :
> Gary F., Edwina, List,
>
> Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so
> much, but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary"
> is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last
> discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one
> entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual,
> intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters
> utterer, interpreter, and both combined.
>
> Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it is useful to
> compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I
> think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic
> with other mathematics.
>
> So I think, it is not a waste of time for new list members to not only
> read Peirce, but- not "advance" and "channel", but compare his thoughts
> with the thoughts of others. Because new list members may know other
> philosophers from school or from voluntary reading, and not yet Peirce so
> well.
>
> I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation,
> which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real
> thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter. I am close to
> asking myself, is the more or less complete ignorance of the latter concept
> not a hidden form of dualism??
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>
> 09. Juni 2020 um 16:57 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *wrote:*
>
> Gary F,
>
> I'll disagree with you. I think that debates about method are important.
> The only 'method' I've seen that JAS outlines, is to provide quotations
> from Peirce texts. But does interpretation of these texts consist only of
> repeating them and declaring that 'it means this'? Rather Saussurian.
> Is such a method enough to validate that particular interpretation? As some
> of us have been saying, as a method - it is weak, and requires real life
> pragmatics [Secondness] examples. Therefore - methodology is important.
>
> So- one can have one's own ideology about semiosis - and, quite frankly,
> one can support this personal ideology with many quotations from Peirce.
> BUT, these quotations can be a complete misinterpretation of what Peirce
> was really saying, because the quotations, lifted from the page, can take
> on a new meaning in this 'new page'. That is - a lot of what we see here is
> all about 'special interests' .. Now - who can evaluate whether these
> 'interpretations' are valid to Peirce, or valid for the personal 'special
> interest' ideology? That's not a simple task.
>
> When some of us, for example, ask repeatedly for real world examples of
> the interpretations offered - and don't get them, are we supposed to accept
> that the conclusions of this rather authoritarian method [I say this, and
> so, it is so] - must be accepted as valid? Jon Awbrey's recent outline of
> methods was, I felt, rather important and relevant to this situation.
>
> With regard to the debate between Robert and JAS - I don't see that it
> came to a 'natural end' [whatever that means]. It ended because the two
> participants have extremely different views both on Peircean semiosis, and
> on the methods of arriving at those views - and could come to no common
> ground. Yes, they were civil about it, and nodded graciously and said nice
> things about each other - but the real issue was: two completely different
> views on Peircean semiosis AND methodology.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue 09/06/20 10:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Jon A.S., list,
>
> I can’t speak for Gary the moderator or anyone else on the list, but I
> think the principles you’ve outlined here are pretty much self-evident for
> any serious Peirce scholarship, and I would certainly prefer not to be
> subjected to further debates about them. If a list member feels that he or
> she can advance the understanding of Peirce’s thought by somehow
> ‘channeling’ him instead of carefully reading and quoting what he actually
> wrote (and citing its context), they are free to say so and to apply the
> results to whatever special interests they have; but the rest of us are
> free to ignore such posts and any threads that may result from them.
>
> Personally I’d like to extend this a bit further and suggest that
> experienced list members are obligated to ignore the kind of
> “methodological criticisms” you refer to. I hope, in other words, that list
> members who feel drawn into debate on such issues do their debating
> offlist, as you suggest, and save the rest of us the trouble of skimming
> and deleting such debates.
>
> I suggest this because such debates are a complete waste of time, not so
> much for those of us who ignore and delete them, but especially for newer
> members of the list who may not immediately recognize their futility. They
> deserve more substantial content on the Peirce list, and indeed require it
> if they are going to learn as much from participation onlist as you and I
> did in our early years with it. Your recent exchange with Robert, for
> instance, did feature some substantial content, and didn’t get drowned out
> with irrelevant debates — and came to a natural end before devolving into
> fruitless repetition. For the sake of those relatively new to the list, I’d
> like to see more of that. And for my part, I’ll pledge not to make any more
> meta-posts like this one.
>
> Gary f.
>
> } Entering is the source, and the source means from beginning to end.
> [Dogen] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the transition
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt
> Sent: 8-Jun-20 20:51
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Way of Thinking (was Theory and Analysis of
> Semeiosis)
>
>
>
> John, List:
>
>
>
> I will spell out my position one more time, but I continue to find these
> strictly methodological criticisms tiresome, and I suspect that many others
> on the List would prefer not to be subjected to further debates about
> them. I respectfully request that in the future any such exchanges be kept
> off-List.
>
>
>
> JFS: But when trying to understand what Peirce wrote, it's essential to
> interpret his words according to his way of thinking.
>
>
>
> The only way to ascertain Peirce's way of thinking in the first place is
> by interpreting his words.
>
>
>
> JFS: The reason why you always agree with Jon is that you both happen to
> think in the same way.
>
>
>
> Gary R. does not always agree with me, and we do not think in exactly the
> same way. What we do have in common are certain methodological principles
> for interpreting Peirce or any other author, which are very widely accepted
> within the entire community of scholars.
>
>
>
> JFS: Robert and I are not claiming that your way is a bad way. We're
> just saying that it's not the way Peirce was thinking. Therefore, it's
> unreliable as a method for deriving any conclusions from his writings.
>
>
>
> Robert can speak for himself, and no one can authoritatively declare what
> is and is not "the way Peirce was thinking" except by quoting his own
> words. Again, his writings constitute the only definitive evidence
> available, so we must appeal to them when making our respective cases.
>
>
>
> JFS: I strongly agree with Robert's objections to a "literalist' method
> of just quoting words.
>
>
>
> Robert raised no particular objections, he simply made an offhand
> reference to my alleged "incessant 'literalist' activism." In any case,
> what alternative would somehow better support one's interpretations of
> Peirce's writings than quoting his own words? After all, someone once
> asserted <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-04/msg00118.html>
> (albeit without textual warrant) that "Peirce would cringe at most, if not
> all attempts to paraphrase his thoughts," and then later claimed
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00301.html> never
> to have "seen any paraphrase of Peirce's words that was clearer or more
> precise than his own." If both quotes and paraphrases are disallowed, then
> what else is left? No reputable scholar would seriously advocate such an
> impossibly restrictive approach.
>
>
>
> JFS: Since Jon has an engineering background, he would have had enough
> training in science and mathematics that he could learn to appreciate
> Peirce's way of thinking.
>
>
>
> I have indeed learned to appreciate Peirce's way of thinking, which is why
> I have spent so much time contemplating it and then writing about it, both
> here and in various publications. In particular, my series of articles on
> "The Logic of Ingenuity" (beginning here
> <https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373>, with links to the other three
> parts) is a direct application of it to the way of thinking that we
> engineers routinely employ. Peirce even did some structural calculations
> himself in the mid-1890s, for George S. Morison's proposed (but never
> constructed) bridge over the Hudson River (see here
> <https://www.structuremag.org/?p=11048> and here
> <https://www.structuremag.org/?p=11401>).
>
>
>
> JFS: Unfortunately, Peirce's late writings present his conclusions
> without going into the details of how he derived his results. Those
> writings are good for learning Peirce's conclusions, but they don't show
> how to draw any further inferences from them.
>
>
>
> I strongly disagree. Since most of those late writings are in various
> manuscripts and letters, including unsent drafts, they do not merely
> "present his conclusions," they embody his way of thinking. The images
> of his original pages are especially enlightening, showing his
> self-corrections, marginal notes, and various false starts. Like me and
> many others, Peirce wrote to find out what he thought, going so far as to
> state that his inkstand was as essential to his thinking as any lobe of his
> brain. Oops, that is a paraphrase, so here is a quote of the relevant
> passage for good measure.
>
>
>
> CSP: A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale me
> alienum puto) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says,
> "You see your faculty of language was localized in that lobe." No doubt it
> was; and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to
> continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts
> would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in
> my inkstand. It is localization in a sense in which a thing may be in two
> places at once. On the theory that the distinction between psychical and
> physical phenomena is the distinction between final and efficient
> causation, it is plain enough that the inkstand and the brain-lobe have the
> same general relation to the functions of the mind. (CP 7.366, 1902)
>
>
>
> Studying Peirce's own words is the best--really, the only--method for
> learning his way of thinking. Accordingly, quoting Peirce's own words is
> the best--really, the only--method for supporting one's interpretations of
> his writings.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
>
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