Helmut, Robert, List: Returning to substantive matters ...
HR: Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did? Yes, of course; but this is a *Peirce *list, so in general our discussions tend to focus on topics about which he *did *write. HR: For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined. Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant"). The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of *another* sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that* sign" (R 339:414[276r]). HR: I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter. The distinction is between the sign *in itself*, which is "not a real thing," versus a sign *token*, which is a real thing that conforms to a sign *type* and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a dynamical interpretant. RM: A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP 2:303, 1904). To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the *reality* of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete *thing *apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens). This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it *would* determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907). Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the effect the Sign *would *produce upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909). RM: It has led you to internalize a convention shared by billions of individuals that is a reality in the shared social space, independent of these billions of minds, what I think Peirce calls the commens. There may very well be such a "shared social space, independent of these billions of minds," but it is *not *what Peirce calls "the commens." Again, he explicitly defines "the commens" (or "the commind") as "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place," which "consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function" (EP 2:478, 1906). Taking the statue that stands in New York Harbor as "the sign in question," the otherwise distinct minds of its utterer--presumably the sculptor, Frédéric Bartholdi--and each interpreter "are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself ... In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*" (CP 4.551, 1906). The result is that the idea of liberty is *communicated *from the utterer to all the different interpreters. RM: I will quote just three that support my point, it seems to me, but it is up to you to judge. The quoted passage (CP 3.359-362) is from 1885--coincidentally, the same year in which the disassembled Statue of Liberty arrived in New York from France. Although generally consistent with Peirce's later writings about semeiotic, we need to interpret it carefully in light of those many subsequent texts. It is especially important to recognize that what he means by "tokens" in CP 3.359 are what he eventually calls "symbols." From 1906 on, he instead uses "tokens" for the concrete embodiments of signs, which he calls "sinsigns" and "replicas" in 1903-5. RM: So a sign, a thing conceived by convention (what does convention mean?) or even arbitrarily can represent an idea. "By convention" and "arbitrarily" are almost synonymous in this context. As CP 3.359 says, a symbolic sign denotes its object solely by virtue of a habit. As Menno Hulswit has written <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320717>, its dyadic relation with its dynamical object is that of *final *causation. There is nothing about the form or material of the physical statue in New York Harbor that is *efficiently *caused by or *directly *connected with the idea of liberty that it represents. It performs that function only because that is its *purpose*. RM: We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout our lives. Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains all these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it is *not* what Peirce calls "the commens." Again, he explicitly defines it as a "mind" that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds. Moreover, Peirce's concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of *individual* minds, perhaps even encompassing what you are describing. As Andre De Tienne has written <https://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol3-3/De_Tienne.pdf>, "Peirce in many places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a technical phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind' is only a special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that logic, or semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but those of that much more general entity" (p. 40). RM: What is described here is "sign-as-event, which would be a real thing" that you also care about. No, that would be a sinsign or token; what Peirce describes in CP 3.361 is an *indexical *sign, as the last quoted sentence plainly states. Its distinction from a symbolic sign is not according to the nature of the sign itself, but rather its dyadic relation with its dynamical object, which is that of *efficient *causation. A properly functioning weathercock points in a certain direction because the wind is *actually *blowing from that way and forces it to do so accordingly. RM: In this case it is a quality of "the concrete thing that represents" that makes the sign No, that would be a qualisign or tone; what Peirce describes in CP 3.362 is an *iconic *sign, as again the last quoted sentence plainly states. Hulswit refers to its dyadic relation with the dynamical object as that of "necessary condition," but in my view it can also be characterized as that of *formal *causation. A diagram token embodies the *form *of the relations among the parts of whatever it represents. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jun 9, 2020 at 3:11 PM Robert Marty <robertmarty...@gmail.com> wrote: > Helmut, List > > If I can tell Helmut there are no two concepts. A sign is always a real > thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived ... Why > wouldn't a sign as a representation" be a real thing? Let's look at the > statue that is at the entrance to New York Harbor ... Isn't that an > existing thing so a real thing? And yet when you perceive it your mind is > occupied by the idea of Liberty (and more but we will leave it at that). > Why would you do that? As a result of your collateral experience that is > earlier and external at the time of perception. It has led you to > internalize a convention shared by billions of individuals that is a > reality in the shared social space, independent of these billions of minds, > what I think Peirce calls the commens. I have already made arguments for > that and I will give more. However, the experience of my debates has taught > me at least one thing is that one cannot make an assertion involving Peirce > without a few quotations. I will quote just three that support my point, it > seems to me, but it is up to you to judge. > > > > Let's go to CP 3.359: > > > > *CP 3.359"**A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to > the mind. If this triple relation is not of a degenerate species, the sign > is related to its object only in consequence of a mental association, and > depends upon a habit. Such signs are always abstract and general, because > habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected. They > are, for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general > words, the main body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment. For > the sake of brevity I will call them tokens."* > > > > What is described here is the sign as representation that concerns you. > > > > So a sign, a thing conceived by convention (what does convention mean?) > or even arbitrarily can represent an idea. We need the commens here to > "contain" all these conventions and therefore it cannot depend on the only > minds that communicate; it is out of minds. We discover it when we are > born and then internalize it throughout our lives. That was the substance > of my direct debate with Jon Alan and perhaps indirect with a few others. > > > > We continue: > > > > *CP 3.361 But if the triple relation between the sign, its object, and > the mind, is degenerate, then of the three pairs sign object sign mind > object mind two at least are in dual relations which constitute the triple > relation. One of the connected pairs must consist of the sign and its > object, for if the sign were not related to its object except by the mind > thinking of them separately, it would not fulfill the function of a sign at > all. Supposing, then, the relation of the sign to its object does not lie > in a mental association, there must be a direct dual relation of the sign > to its object independent of the mind using the sign. In the second of the > three cases just spoken of, this dual relation is not degenerate, and the > sign signifies its object solely by virtue of being really connected with > it. Of this nature are all natural signs and physical symptoms. I call such > a sign an index, a pointing finger being the type of the class.* > > > > What is described here is " sign-as-event, which would be a real thing" > that you also care about." > > > > Are you afraid of some dualism? No, because there's another case. > > > > *CP 362. The third case is where the dual relation between the sign and > its object is degenerate and consists in a mere resemblance between them. I > call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an > icon. * > > > > In this case it is a quality of "the concrete thing that represents" that > makes the sign; as a red thing to represent the quality of being red, or > the blood of a person represented by a trace or the communism on the flag > of China. > > > > If you continue reading you will find some very interesting things about > algebraic notations... > > Best regards, > > Robert > > Le mar. 9 juin 2020 à 18:35, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> a écrit : > >> Gary F., Edwina, List, >> >> Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so >> much, but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" >> is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last >> discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one >> entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, >> intentional, communicational, that accord to the three interpreters >> utterer, interpreter, and both combined. >> >> Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it is useful to >> compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For the advanced I >> think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and relation logic >> with other mathematics. >> >> So I think, it is not a waste of time for new list members to not only >> read Peirce, but- not "advance" and "channel", but compare his thoughts >> with the thoughts of others. Because new list members may know other >> philosophers from school or from voluntary reading, and not yet Peirce so >> well. >> >> I still am struggeling with the two concepts of sign-as-representation, >> which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, which would be a real >> thing and include the real things utterer and interpreter. I am close to >> asking myself, is the more or less complete ignorance of the latter concept >> not a hidden form of dualism?? >> >> Best, >> Helmut >> >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
