Auke, List: AvB: Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if only the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count heavier for Peirce?
Reality, of course; but this misses my point. I already acknowledged (twice) that there may very well be something in reality that conforms to Robert's description; but if so, it is plainly *not* what Peirce calls "the commens" (EP 2:478, 1906). AvB: man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture and, as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which the commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits. The implication here that "the commens" is synonymous with "culture" is likewise inconsistent with Peirce's definition. AvB: The commens for Peirce is, in short, too much colored by his preoccupation with truth and too little with everyday business where the truth seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of greed and other motives. That is an opinion, and even if valid, it does not change the fact that Peirce invented and defined "the commens." I find it misleading to use his peculiar term to mean something else. AvB: If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we may say that he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did err when he discarded A. As I have said before, I believe that the proper approach--in accordance with the hermeneutic principle of charity--is to assume that Peirce's writings *never *contradict each other, unless and until this turns out to be untenable. At that point, I agree that a case can sometimes be made for either side; but my default assumption is that his later writings reflect his *more considered* views, and hence should be given *slightly *more weight accordingly. AvB: Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this promising road of inquiry? Peirce tells us in his Logic Notebook why he abandons the "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant. Again, I believe that he was experimenting with different terminology and (to a lesser extent) different conceptualizations for the *three *interpretants that he perceived to be *logically necessary* counterparts of the one sign and its two objects, as demonstrated by Robert's podium diagram and accompanying analysis. Intentional/effectual/communicational was only one such attempt, and he evidently found it unsatisfactory, perhaps precisely because it is too specific to *human *semeiosis--like his later "sop to Cerberus" (EP 2:478, 1908). Immediate/dynamical/final seems to be more readily generalizable. AvB: As a backwoodsman, his work is fragmentary going in and coming from all kinds of directions. I agree, which is why I sometimes go beyond his ideas myself; but I always try to acknowledge when and how I am doing so. All I ask is that others do the same. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 5:58 AM <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List, > > RM: We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and > therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of > minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout > our lives. > > JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains > all these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it > is *not* what Peirce calls "the commens." Again, he explicitly defines > it as a "mind" that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds. > Moreover, Peirce's concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of > *individual* minds, perhaps even encompassing what you are describing. > As Andre De Tienne has written > <https://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol3-3/De_Tienne.pdf>, "Peirce in > many places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a > technical phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind' > is only a special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that > logic, or semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but > those of that much more general entity" (p. 40). > > Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if > only the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect > understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count > heavier for Peirce? > > In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the natural. > Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If a person avant > la lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be no surprise to find > terms that are at odds with later developments. I think the commens is > such a term. Especially the concept of culture in the antropological sense > was lacking, but arising. And when it did arise in the early 1900's it was > taken as a monilitic concept, even by cultural relativists like Boas. > > Peirce's commens fits in with this development and there are striking > similarities with this first cultural antropological movement: > > 1. man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture > and, as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which > the commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits. > > 2. The monolitic character of the commens. Peirce, I side with Short > here, was so much occupied with the project of science that it hindered > him in completing his system. The commens for Peirce is, in short, to much > colored by his preoccupation with truth and to little with everyday > bussiness where the truth seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of > greed and other motives. > > It was in 1946 that the concept of plural culture was coined by Furnivall. > Even that idea did pass Peirce's mind, but only at some moments and not > persued for longer periods as to its concequences. It was when he was > contemplating the intended, effectual en cominterpretant. You summerize > what I wrote above with Peirce quote's: > > JAS: Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus > of writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all > three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 > letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" > interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant"). > The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his > Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a > few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the > intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate > Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant > of *another* sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that* > sign" (R 339:414[276r]). > > -- > > If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we may say > that he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did err > when he discarded A. I do side with Robert in this case. > > Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this promissing > road of inquiry? Probably his devotion to logic in which the apprehension > of the sign as an object is of no importance and where we assume a quasi > mind. So, probably his discarding of a may have been done in a specific > context and a particular line of thought. As a backwoodsman, his work is > fragmentary going in and comming from all kinds of directions. > > Best, > > Auke >
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