Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,
> RM: We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and > therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of > minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout our > lives. > JAS: Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains all these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it is not what Peirce calls "the commens." Again, he explicitly defines it as a "mind" that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds. Moreover, Peirce's concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of individual minds, perhaps even encompassing what you are describing. As Andre De Tienne has written https://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol3-3/De_Tienne.pdf , "Peirce in many places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this is a technical phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar 'mind' is only a special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that logic, or semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but those of that much more general entity" (p. 40). Jon, Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if only the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count heavier for Peirce? In Peirce's days the social sciences were not as developed as the natural. Something every historian of ideas will take account of. If a person avant la lettre is thinking the concept through, it must be no surprise to find terms that are at odds with later developments. I think the commens is such a term. Especially the concept of culture in the antropological sense was lacking, but arising. And when it did arise in the early 1900's it was taken as a monilitic concept, even by cultural relativists like Boas. Peirce's commens fits in with this development and there are striking similarities with this first cultural antropological movement: 1. man as a growing sign, being a token that is part of a common culture and, as a person, not an individual, only survives in the measure in which the commens or culture is enriched with interpretive habits. 2. The monolitic character of the commens. Peirce, I side with Short here, was so much occupied with the project of science that it hindered him in completing his system. The commens for Peirce is, in short, to much colored by his preoccupation with truth and to little with everyday bussiness where the truth seeking drive may be totally absent in favor of greed and other motives. It was in 1946 that the concept of plural culture was coined by Furnivall. Even that idea did pass Peirce's mind, but only at some moments and not persued for longer periods as to its concequences. It was when he was contemplating the intended, effectual en cominterpretant. You summerize what I wrote above with Peirce quote's: JAS: Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant"). The "intentional" (or "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]). -- If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we may say that he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did err when he discarded A. I do side with Robert in this case. Of course this leads to the question why he did abandon this promissing road of inquiry? Probably his devotion to logic in which the apprehension of the sign as an object is of no importance and where we assume a quasi mind. So, probably his discarding of a may have been done in a specific context and a particular line of thought. As a backwoodsman, his work is fragmentary going in and comming from all kinds of directions. Best, Auke > Op 10 juni 2020 om 4:49 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Helmut, Robert, List: > > Returning to substantive matters ... > > > > > HR: Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which > Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did? > > > > > > Yes, of course; but this is a Peirce list, so in general our discussions > tend to focus on topics about which he did write. > > > > > HR: For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is > named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but > if you look it up in the dictionary, there is only one entry about it (the > "commens"), and the three interpretants effectual, intentional, > communicational, that accord to the three interpreters utterer, interpreter, > and both combined. > > > > > > Indeed, as I have pointed out before, in Peirce's entire vast corpus of > writings he used "commens" only twice and "commind" only once; and all three > occurrences are in two consecutive paragraphs of a single 1906 letter, which > is also the only place where he mentions the "effectual" interpretant and > "communicational" interpretant (or "cominterpretant"). The "intentional" (or > "intended") interpretant turns up in some of his Logic Notebook entries from > around the same time, as well; most notably a few weeks later, when he > explicitly abandons it because "So far as the intention is betrayed in the > Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so > betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense > the interpretant of that sign" (R 339:414[276r]). > > > > > HR: I still am struggeling with the two concepts of > sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, > which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and > interpreter. > > > > > > The distinction is between the sign in itself, which is "not a real > thing," versus a sign token, which is a real thing that conforms to a sign > type and is determined by the dynamical object to determine a dynamical > interpretant. > > > > > RM: A sign is always a real thing that represents > because to be sign it must be perceived > > > > > > This assertion directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "a sign > is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas" (EP > 2:303, 1904). To clarify, I do not believe that he is thereby denying the > reality of a sign in itself, but rather its existence as a concrete thing > apart from its instantiations in replicas (tokens). This assertion also > directly contradicts Peirce's plain statement that "If a sign has no > interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it would > determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907). Something > need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is capable > of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an immediate > interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter" > (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, "the effect the Sign would produce > upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit it to work out its full > effect" (SS 110, 1909) . > > > > > RM: It has led you to internalize a convention shared by > billions of individuals that is a reality in the shared social space, > independent of these billions of minds, what I think Peirce calls the commens. > > > > > > There may very well be such a "shared social space, independent of these > billions of minds," but it is not what Peirce calls "the commens." Again, he > explicitly defines "the commens" (or "the commind") as "that mind into which > the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any > communication should take place," which "consists of all that is, and must > be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in order > that the sign in question should fulfill its function" (EP 2:478, 1906). > Taking the statue that stands in New York Harbor as "the sign in question," > the otherwise distinct minds of its utterer--presumably the sculptor, > Frédéric Bartholdi--and each interpreter "are at one (i.e., are one mind) in > the sign itself ... In the Sign they are, so to say, welded" (CP 4.551, > 1906). The result is that the idea of liberty is communicated from the > utterer to all the different interpreters. > > > > > RM: I will quote just three that support my point, it > seems to me, but it is up to you to judge. > > > > > > The quoted passage (CP 3.359-362) is from 1885--coincidentally, the same > year in which the disassembled Statue of Liberty arrived in New York from > France. Although generally consistent with Peirce's later writings about > semeiotic, we need to interpret it carefully in light of those many > subsequent texts. It is especially important to recognize that what he means > by "tokens" in CP 3.359 are what he eventually calls "symbols." From 1906 > on, he instead uses "tokens" for the concrete embodiments of signs, which he > calls "sinsigns" and "replicas" in 1903-5. > > > > > RM: So a sign, a thing conceived by convention (what > does convention mean?) or even arbitrarily can represent an idea. > > > > > > "By convention" and "arbitrarily" are almost synonymous in this context. > As CP 3.359 says, a symbolic sign denotes its object solely by virtue of a > habit. As Menno Hulswit has written https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320717 , > its dyadic relation with its dynamical object is that of final causation. > There is nothing about the form or material of the physical statue in New > York Harbor that is efficiently caused by or directly connected with the idea > of liberty that it represents. It performs that function only because that > is its purpose. > > > > > RM: We need the commens here to "contain" all these > conventions and therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that > communicate; it is out of minds. We discover it when we are born and then > internalize it throughout our lives. > > > > > > Again, there may very well be something "out of minds" that "contains all > these conventions," which we "internalize throughout our lives," but it is > not what Peirce calls "the commens." Again, he explicitly defines it as a > "mind" that results from the fusing or welding of distinct minds. Moreover, > Peirce's concept of "mind" is much broader than the notion of individual > minds, perhaps even encompassing what you are describing. As Andre De Tienne > has written https://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol3-3/De_Tienne.pdf , > "Peirce in many places ... prefers to talk about the 'quasi-mind,' and this > is a technical phrase used expressly to indicate that the more familiar > 'mind' is only a special instantiation of a more general phenomenon, and that > logic, or semiotic, really analyzes not the workings of the human mind, but > those of that much more general entity" (p. 40). > > > > > RM: What is described here is "sign-as-event, which > would be a real thing" that you also care about. > > > > > > No, that would be a sinsign or token; what Peirce describes in CP 3.361 > is an indexical sign, as the last quoted sentence plainly states. Its > distinction from a symbolic sign is not according to the nature of the sign > itself, but rather its dyadic relation with its dynamical object, which is > that of efficient causation. A properly functioning weathercock points in a > certain direction because the wind is actually blowing from that way and > forces it to do so accordingly. > > > > > RM: In this case it is a quality of "the concrete thing > that represents" that makes the sign > > > > > > No, that would be a qualisign or tone; what Peirce describes in CP 3.362 > is an iconic sign, as again the last quoted sentence plainly states. Hulswit > refers to its dyadic relation with the dynamical object as that of "necessary > condition," but in my view it can also be characterized as that of formal > causation. A diagram token embodies the form of the relations among the > parts of whatever it represents. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran > Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Jun 9, 2020 at 3:11 PM Robert Marty < robertmarty...@gmail.com > mailto:robertmarty...@gmail.com > wrote: > > > > Helmut, List > > If I can tell Helmut there are no two concepts. A sign is always a > > real thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived ... Why > > wouldn't a sign as a representation" be a real thing? Let's look at the > > statue that is at the entrance to New York Harbor ... Isn't that an > > existing thing so a real thing? And yet when you perceive it your mind is > > occupied by the idea of Liberty (and more but we will leave it at that). > > Why would you do that? As a result of your collateral experience that is > > earlier and external at the time of perception. It has led you to > > internalize a convention shared by billions of individuals that is a > > reality in the shared social space, independent of these billions of minds, > > what I think Peirce calls the commens. I have already made arguments for > > that and I will give more. However, the experience of my debates has taught > > me at least one thing is that one cannot make an assertion involving Peirce > > without a few quotations. I will quote just three that support my point, it > > seems to me, but it is up to you to judge. > > > > Let's go to CP 3.359: > > > > CP 3.359"A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted > > and to the mind. If this triple relation is not of a degenerate species, > > the sign is related to its object only in consequence of a mental > > association, and depends upon a habit. Such signs are always abstract and > > general, because habits are general rules to which the organism has become > > subjected. They are, for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They > > include all general words, the main body of speech, and any mode of > > conveying a judgment. For the sake of brevity I will call them tokens." > > > > What is described here is the sign as representation that concerns > > you. > > > > So a sign, a thing conceived by convention (what does convention > > mean?) or even arbitrarily can represent an idea. We need the commens here > > to "contain" all these conventions and therefore it cannot depend on the > > only minds that communicate; it is out of minds. We discover it when we > > are born and then internalize it throughout our lives. That was the > > substance of my direct debate with Jon Alan and perhaps indirect with a few > > others. > > > > We continue: > > > > CP 3.361 But if the triple relation between the sign, its > > object, and the mind, is degenerate, then of the three pairs sign object > > sign mind object mind two at least are in dual relations which constitute > > the triple relation. One of the connected pairs must consist of the sign > > and its object, for if the sign were not related to its object except by > > the mind thinking of them separately, it would not fulfill the function of > > a sign at all. Supposing, then, the relation of the sign to its object does > > not lie in a mental association, there must be a direct dual relation of > > the sign to its object independent of the mind using the sign. In the > > second of the three cases just spoken of, this dual relation is not > > degenerate, and the sign signifies its object solely by virtue of being > > really connected with it. Of this nature are all natural signs and physical > > symptoms. I call such a sign an index, a pointing finger being the type of > > the class. > > > > What is described here is " sign-as-event, which would be a real > > thing" that you also care about." > > > > Are you afraid of some dualism? No, because there's another case. > > > > CP 362. The third case is where the dual relation between the > > sign and its object is degenerate and consists in a mere resemblance > > between them. I call a sign which stands for something merely because it > > resembles it, an icon. > > > > In this case it is a quality of "the concrete thing that > > represents" that makes the sign; as a red thing to represent the quality of > > being red, or the blood of a person represented by a trace or the communism > > on the flag of China. > > > > If you continue reading you will find some very interesting things > > about algebraic notations... > > Best regards, > > Robert > > > > Le mar. 9 juin 2020 à 18:35, Helmut Raulien < h.raul...@gmx.de > > mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de > a écrit : > > > > > > > Gary F., Edwina, List, > > > > > > Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did > > > not write so much, but other writers did? For example, the online > > > "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic > > > of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there > > > is only one entry about it (the "commens"), and the three interpretants > > > effectual, intentional, communicational, that accord to the three > > > interpreters utterer, interpreter, and both combined. > > > > > > Peirce did not write much about interpreters. So I think it > > > is useful to compare him with e.g. Uexküll and systems theoreticians. For > > > the advanced I think it also is good to compare Peirce´s mathematics and > > > relation logic with other mathematics. > > > > > > So I think, it is not a waste of time for new list members to > > > not only read Peirce, but- not "advance" and "channel", but compare his > > > thoughts with the thoughts of others. Because new list members may know > > > other philosophers from school or from voluntary reading, and not yet > > > Peirce so well. > > > > > > I still am struggeling with the two concepts of > > > sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing" versus sign-as-event, > > > which would be a real thing and include the real things utterer and > > > interpreter. I am close to asking myself, is the more or less complete > > > ignorance of the latter concept not a hidden form of dualism?? > > > > > > Best, > > > Helmut > > > > > > > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
