Jon Alen,

I don't fight your: Moreover, my point continues to be that it is not necessary 
for something to be actually perceived in order to qualify as a sign.

I saw those quotes, but I know the scope of the pragmatism article which is the 
meaning of intellectual concepts and a quasi mind is assumed. In a quasi mind 
we may abstract from the apprehension of the sign as an object.

At p. 410 in EP I read: "In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object 
and emotional interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are 
"subjective"; both, too, appertain to all signs without exeption."(emphasis 
AvB). 

It is the difference between a potential sign and a sign in actu. The example 
in the footnote on p. 413 (Herbert Peirce extinguishing a dress on fire and 
telling afterwards that he often in his imagination went through what ought to 
be done in such cases after he heard of such a thing happened to ms Longfellow) 
works with maybe's as a play in the imagination. 

A sign must be able to arouse a feeling (emotional interpretant). in oder to 
qualify as a sign. That is a requisite for your (1). Leaving this context out 
or just implied hides an important aspect of Peirce's semiotics. 

JAS: It is sufficient that (1) it may determine a dynamical interpretant under 
various circumstances by virtue of having animmediate interpretant, and (2) it 
would determine a dynamical interpretant under ideal circumstances by virtue of 
having a final interpretant.

Best,

Auke

> Op 15 juni 2020 om 2:30 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>:
> 
>     Auke, List:
> 
>     That is my concise summary of my understanding of Peirce's opinion as 
> expressed in his writings.  I provided some supporting quotes in this same 
> thread a few days ago, as follows (Robert, please forgive the repetition).
> 
> 
>         > >         RM:  A sign is always a real thing that represents 
> because to be sign it must be perceived
> > 
> >     > 
> 
>         > >         JAS:  This assertion also directly contradicts Peirce's 
> plain statement that "If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a 
> 'would be,' i.e., is what it would determine in the interpreter if there were 
> one" (EP 2:409, 1907).  Something need not be perceived in order to qualify 
> as a sign, as long as it is capable of determining a dynamical interpretant 
> by virtue of having an immediate interpretant, "its peculiar Interpretability 
> before it gets any Interpreter" (SS 111, 1909), and a final interpretant, 
> "the effect the Sign would produce upon any mind upon which circumstances 
> should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS 110, 1909).
> > 
> >     > 
>      In fact, several years earlier Peirce already seems to recognize that an 
> actual interpretant is not necessary, instead repeatedly calling it merely 
> "possible."
> 
> 
>         > >         CSP:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic 
> relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible 
> Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the 
> possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same 
> triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 
> , EP 2:290, 1903, bold added)
> > 
> >     >      
> 
>     Later he explicitly affirms that "there must be a sign without an utterer 
> and a sign without an interpreter" (EP 2:404, 1907).  Kinds of "signs without 
> utterers" include "symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of 
> experiences serving as premisses, etc."  "Signs without interpreters" include 
> pictures woven by a Jacquard loom that catch fire and are "consumed before 
> anyone can see them," "conditions and results" of experiments with model 
> boats that are "automatically recorded" but  "nobody takes the trouble to 
> study," and "the books of a bank" when a balance sheet is not drawn up from 
> them.  An example of my own is that ripples on the surface of a remote lake 
> at night are a sign of the direction of the wind, despite there being no one 
> there to observe them.
> 
>     Consequently, "neither an utterer, nor even, perhaps, an interpreter is 
> essential to a sign" (ibid).  Peirce proceeds to "inquire whether there be 
> not some ingredient of the utterer and some ingredient of the interpreter 
> which not only are so essential, but are even more characteristic of signs 
> than the utterer and the interpreter themselves."  He takes several pages to 
> identify the essential ingredient of the utterer as the object (EP 2:404-409) 
> and just two paragraphs to identify the essential ingredient of the 
> interpreter as the interpretant (EP 2:409-410).  Every sign has a 
> conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and thus a possible (immediate) 
> interpretant, even if it never has an actual (dynamical) interpretant because 
> there does not happen to be an interpreter present to be determined by it. 
> 
>     Regards,
> 
>     Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>     Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>     -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
>     On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 3:59 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@upcmail.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl > wrote:
> 
>         > > 
> >         Jon Alen,
> > 
> >         Is this your opinion or Peirce's?
> > 
> >             > > >             Moreover, my point continues to be that it is 
> > not necessary for something to be  actually perceived in order to qualify 
> > as a sign.  It is sufficient that (1) it may determine a dynamical 
> > interpretant under various circumstances by virtue of having an immediate  
> > interpretant, and (2) it would determine a dynamical interpretant under 
> > ideal circumstances by virtue of having a final  interpretant.
> > >              
> > > 
> > >         > > 
> >         I am particular interested in where to find the source.
> > 
> >         best,
> > 
> >         Auke
> > 
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