Bernard, List: BM: I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is pursuing.
Thanks for clarifying this, I did not think that was your intent. BM: Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it needs to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with Robert on this. I agree that a sign must be perceived in order to *act *as such--i.e., it must be embodied in an *actual *token that determines an *actual *(dynamical) interpretant--but that is not what Robert stated. Here is the relevant part of our exchange again. RM: A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived JAS: Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue of having an immediate interpretant ... and a final interpretant ... My point was that a sign need not be perceived in order to *be *a sign. BM: If it is possible to speak seriously about signs without referring explicitly to their technical definitions, what does it mean to practice "applied semiotics"? This is an excellent question for those who routinely complain about the supposedly excessive emphasis on semeiotic theory in List discussions. We cannot properly *apply *Peirce's ideas to today's problems unless we first establish *what *those ideas were, which requires paying careful attention to his technical definitions of the relevant terms. BM: If signs need an observer, who is this observer if not a sign himself? Indeed, as I have noted previously, Peirce often uses "quasi-mind" in lieu of "mind" when referring to both the utterer and the interpreter of a sign; and he says that "every sign even if external to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign" (SS 195, 1906). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 1:35 PM Bernard Morand <morand.bern...@neuf.fr> wrote: > > Le 10/06/2020 à 18:08, John F. Sowa a écrit : > > > > Bernard Morand summarized the meaningful content of this debate in one > sentence plus one image: > > > > BM> In place of the old, often recurring debates on this subject I > propose to muse over a painting from René Magritte entitled "Le sens > > des réalités" > > > > That image, which shows a large boulder suspended in the middle of the > clouds, is an excellent illustration of the way JAS assembles > > "fireworks of quotations" (RM's phrase) to state a hypothesis (AKA > guess) and defend as if it were gospel truth. > > > John, List > > I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is persuing. > > I wanted to ask by means of the painting: what does "Real" mean ? With the > consequence: What is "Real" in the nature of signs? > > This latter question seems to me to be at the core of the Peirce's way of > thinking. > > Going back to the Magritte's painting, I think impossible that the boulder > may be "suspended in the middle of the clouds" as John see it. > > Because it would be a manifest violation of the law of universal > gravitation. The boulder is falling down to the earth that we see > distinctly on the lower part of the image, may be it is some kind of > meteorite. > > So we have from the beginning an image of the Reality: that which will > hurt you -and perhaps kill you- if you stay under the boulder. > > But we can imagine some other senses of realities apart this one that has > been derived from the necessity of law. > > The boulder is really an event, here and there on the painted scene, -it > is an intrusion- and as such it causes an effect of surprise for the > audience (this effect is also initiated by Magritte himself to make the > spectator think about the scene). This intrusive event is also a sense of > realities: to be able of observation. > > Finally one latter sense of reality may consist in the consideration of > the painting as recalling to our memories the extinction of the dinosaurs. > A possibility already envisaged by scientists. > > Sure, all of this comment of the Magritte painting is highly problematic. > Many more stories could be presented in illustration of the painting, > probably as much as people commenting it. > > Sure, there is in this example nothing which proves that Peirce's semiotic > is a truth. As a matter of fact common sense has already recognized that > "an example is not a proof". > > Nevertheless one can see that his semiotic elementary distinctions > -immediate and dynamic object, immediate dynamic normal interpretant, sign- > are there, behind. I just choose to escape technical terms in this mail. > > Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it needs > to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with Robert on > this. > > I finish with two questions of which I have quite no answer: > > 1) If it is possible to speak seriously about signs without referring > explicitely to their technical definitions, what does it mean to pratice > "applied semiotics"? > > 2) If signs need an observer, who is this observer if not a sign himself? > > Regards >
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