BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list
My view is that I don't disagree with Peirce; I disagree with
JAS's interpretation of Peirce. Again, no-one, neither I nor JAS can
unilaterally declare that their analysis is 'the correct analysis of
Peirce'.
I don't agree that Peirce reduced matter to a separate entity, an
isolate Secondness, ie, 'brute reaction. Remember his view that
protoplasm not only feels but shows all the capacities of Mind.
[6.255]. And his 4.551 claim that 'thought is not necessarily
connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals
and throughout the purely physical world". Secondness is one of the
three categories, and to my understanding, ALL three are a part of
the realities and existential entities of our universe. That is, even
Secondness would include 1ns...which is feeling, an aspect of Mind.
His dictionary definitions are intended for the general public and
are not, to my understanding, part of his theoretical outlines.
His theoretical outlines, as I read them, do not substantiate that
Mind was functional or operative on its own BEFORE the appearance of
Matter. Nor that Matter was functional/operative on its own BEFORE
Mind. My reading of that cosmological section is that Mind-as-Matter
was functional but without habits, without the generalizing tendency
and therefore, could be understood as not existing, since each
particle might appear for only a nano-second. See also his outline in
1.410--
My reading of Peirce is that a major definition of Mind is not
simply its reaching out' within what can be called Feeling [1ns] but
its action of taking and promoting habit formation. And this seems to
be exactly what happened. Peirce's outline of cosmology refers to
the 'womb of indeterminacy ' 1.412, and, by the principle of 1ns,
'flashes' appeared, [which would be instantiations and therefore
Matter in 2ns,, but without habits [3ns]...And then habits or 3ns
then developed. That is, my reading of his cosmology is that BOTH
Mind and Matter co-appeared and co-evolved, working together. Neither
is primordial.
I am fully aware that this differs from JAS's reading, but I repeat,
neither he nor I have the right to unilaterally declare that our
reading of Peirce is 'the correct one'. We are both reading the same
texts - and our interpretations differ.
Not much else can be said. I don't see the point of continuing this
what can only be called a DEBATE, since both of us read Peirce
differently.
Edwina
On Mon 27/09/21 12:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
John, Edwina, List:
Peirce provided the entries for form, matter, and mind in the
Century Dictionary. Here are his definitions of each that seem to be
the most pertinent to the current discussion.
form, n. 8. In general, arrangement of or relationship between the
parts of anything, as distinguished from the parts themselves:
opposed to matter, but not properly to substance (unless it be the
intention of the writer to identify substance with matter).
matter, n. 1. Sensible substance; that which offers resistance to
touch or muscular effort; that which can be moved, strained, broken,
comminuted, or otherwise modified, but which cannot be destroyed or
produced; that which reacts against forces, is permanent, and
preserves its identity under all changes.
2. In philos.: (a) That which is in itself nothing definite, but is
the subject of change and development, and by receiving a form
becomes a substance; that out of which anything is made. See form.
Matter in this sense (a translation of Aristotle's word ϋλη,
originally wood) is termed by the scholastics matter ex qua (out of
which), to distinguish it from matter circum quam (concerning which),
or the object of any action or power, as well as from matter in qua
(in which), or the subject of any attribute.
mind, n. 1. That which feels, wills, and thinks; the conscious
subject; the ego; the soul.2. The intellect, or cognitive faculty or
part of the soul, as distinguished from feeling and volition;
intelligence.
Peirce equates his second definition of "matter" with Aristotle's
usage (hylo-) and opposes it to his eighth definition of "form"
(-morphism), such that every substance is conceived as a composite of
the two. It is form that is the "arrangement of ... the parts of
anything," i.e., "an organizing system of matter"; he gives no such
definition of mind. There is no entry for "hylopathy," but he
contributed the one for "hylopathism," as well as the one for
"sentient."
hylopathism, n. The doctrine that matter is sentient.
sentient, a. and n. I. a. 1. Capable of sensation or of
sense-perception; having the power of feeling.
II. n. The mind as capable of feeling.
Although Peirce sometimes employs "mind" in accordance with his
second definition--where it corresponds only to cognition, rather
than also encompassing feeling and volition--when he describes matter
as a peculiar sort of mind, he is evidently employing the first
definition of each. Matter is "that which offers resistance" and
"reacts against forces," while mind is "that which feels, wills, and
thinks." Moreover, by embracing "hylopathy, otherwise called monism,"
Peirce is specifically affirming that matter is a peculiar sort of
"mind as capable of feeling." In fact, he emphasizes this aspect of
mind in the cosmological summary that he provides just a few
paragraphs later in the very same article.
CSP: Such are the materials out of which chiefly a philosophical
theory ought to be built, in order to represent the state of
knowledge to which the nineteenth century has brought us. Without
going into other important questions of philosophical architectonic,
we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately
be constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most ancient
and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic
Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning--infinitely
remote--there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being
without connection or regularity would properly be without existence.
This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would
have started the germ of a generalizing tendency. Its other sportings
would be evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue. Thus, the
tendency to habit would be started; and from this, with the other
principles of evolution, all the regularities of the universe would
be evolved. At any time, however, an element of pure chance survives
and will remain until the world becomes an absolutely perfect,
rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last
crystallized in the infinitely distant future. (CP 6.33, EP 1:297,
1891)
According to Peirce, the beginning is "infinitely remote," not an
event that occurred a finite number of years ago, whether six
thousand or 13.7 billion. The initial state of things was "a chaos of
unpersonalized feeling ... without existence"--strictly mind, no
matter. The only kind of arbitrary "sporting" that was more than
"evanescent" at first was "the germ of a generalizing tendency,"
i.e., "the tendency to habit"--strictly the psychical law, not the
physical law. However, this enabled the evolution of "all the
regularities of the universe," mind becoming matter, inveterate
habits becoming physical laws. The ideal limit of this process would
be when "mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant
future"--strictly matter, no mind. In other words, "dead matter would
be merely the final result of the complete induration of habit
reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of
effort to complete death" (CP 6.201, 1898).
These are Peirce's explicitly stated beliefs--mind is primordial,
such that matter is a peculiar sort of mind; the psychical law is
primordial, such that the physical law is derived and special; and at
any assignable date, our universe of existence is evolving from utter
chaos in the infinite past toward utter regularity in the infinite
future. Anyone is free to disagree with him about this, but not to
ascribe a different view to him. The claim that his words on the
subject are hopelessly vague and ambiguous, such that any other
"interpretation" of them whatsoever must be treated as equally valid,
is patently absurd.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Sat, Sep 25, 2021 at 8:39 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Mike, list
Thanks for your comments. And yes- that's exactly how I view Mind,
as an organizing system of matter - whether in crystals or protoplasm
or even human societies.
And I consider that Aristotle's 'form' and 'spirit' is analogous
with Peirce's 'Mind'...which would include the term of 'hylopathy'.
But JAS and I do differ in our interpretation of 6.24. JAS, to my
understanding views the relation between Mind and Matter as one of
'idealism' where Mind is primordial. I, on the other hand, interpret
that section - and other sections in Peirce- as 'objective idealism'
and understand this phrase to mean that Mind and Matter are monist,
i.e., correlates and that neither is primordial. Indeed, in my view,
neither can 'be' without the other. ..so, it would be impossible to
conclude that either is primordial.
I think this is a big difference.
And, I'd also comment that flinging quotations around isn't the
answer to interpreting Peirce. The fact is - and this doesn't seem to
be acknowledged - but, our interaction with the world, be it a text or
a tree - is not direct. It's not a dyadic 'straight from the horse's
mouth' method. It's triadic. There is always that mediation by the
Representamen/Sign - and this means that the resultant Interpretant
is imbued with out own knowledge base. This is why, as Peirce noted,
'to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most
pernicious" [W2:212]. So, neither I nor JAS can, on our own, declare
that our reading of Peirce is 'the correct one'. All we can do is
write them out...and leave it to others; many others.
Edwina
On Sat 25/09/21 12:17 AM , "sowa @bestweb.net [4]" s...@bestweb.net
[5] sent:
Mike, Jon AS, Jon A, Edwina, List, That is a good summary of the
issues: MB: For a few years now I have felt it unfortunate that
Peirce chose to use the word 'mind' for these points, since it
conventionally conjures up images of thoughts and consciousness. If,
however, one views the concept of 'mind' as embracing patterns and
regularities (on the abiotic side, such as for crystals) to ones of
complexity, order and 'habit' on the biotic side, I think we can
better understand Peirce's intent of capturing the structure of
matter as well as the laws of thought and representation. This
interpretation, granted perhaps on the more aggressive end of
applying Peircean thinking (as I understand it) to the entirety of
existence, establishes a continuity that can extend from the Big Bang
to thought and teleological purpose. Under this understanding, I see
both Edwina and Jon as being right, though each is perhaps not
expansive enough to embrace the other person's viewpoint. Best of
all, it eliminates Two terms, which by Peirce's own criteria, should
be arrested for failing to show their passports at the gates of
perception and action: 'effete mind' and 'hylopathic'. JAS in
response to JFS: If Peirce's writings were so inscrutable that what
he meant, intended, and believed could not be reliably discerned from
exact quotations, then why would we bother trying to read, understand,
and discuss his thought at all? For most of what Peirce wrote, we
can get clear interpretations that (a) are good enough for our own
purposes. (b) are consistent with the mainstream results developed
in the century after Peirce, and (c) help us better understand those
new results by applying ideas we have learned through out studies of
Peirce. But those quotations about effete mind are far below the
quality of his best contributions. In fact, I agree with Jon A that
the quotation by Aristotle is far superior in clearness and quality:
: JA: Due to the importance of Aristotle's account for every
discussion that follows it, not to mention for the many that follow
it without knowing it, and because the issues it raises arise
repeatedly throughout this work, I am going to cite an extended
extract from the relevant text (Aristotle, On the Soul, 2.1),
breaking up the argument into a number of individual premisses,
stages, and examples. In summary, I believe that Mike's statement,
quoted above, is a good reason for putting the terms 'effete mind'
and 'hylopathic' in the bin of quaint and exotic terminology.
Perhaps somebody someday might find a use for them, but nobody so far
has found any reason for adopting them. John
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://bestweb.net
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the
body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
